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A b s t r a c t
This study examines the Indian Government's policy of supporting and promoting 
small manufacturing industry, whose aims stressed the generation of employment, 
the productive use of capital and skills, and the contribution small manufacturing 
can make to promoting regional and rural/urban balance. A less well publicised 
aim of the policy has been to create a sector which is viable and self-sustaining.
The study examines the growth of small manufacturing over the period 1961- 
1991, and finds that growth was conditioned more by the growth of the economy 
as a whole than by specific government policy for small manufacturing. Analysis 
at the All-India level reveals that the distribution of small industry was positively 
related to the level of urbanisation and industrialisation, while, at a smaller scale, 
within Tamil Nadu, the same results largely hold. Overall, there is no evidence 
that the growth of the small scale sector has reduced regional imbalances.
Examination of the viability of the small scale sector draws on research into the re- 
emergence of industrial districts of flexibly specialised small firms which 
emphasises that viability is dependent on the geographical agglomeration of small 
manufacturers, and the emergence of systems of informal and formal inter-firm 
cooperation through which they can collectively resolve their individual 
weaknesses and promote collective efficiency. A case study of small engineering 
units in Coimbatore sought to determine whether the Government's support 
services had acted as a model of public-private cooperation, and a catalyst to 
encourage cooperation between small firms, and with other agencies. The main 
finding was that the Government's support services were unsatisfactory. Small 
engineering units are flexible, adaptable, capable of accumulation and growth, but 
this dynamism co-exists with obsolete technology and poor quality standards. The 
explanation for this lies partly in the macro-policy environment, which has 
encouraged the growth of small manufacturing units, but has not provided either 
the incentive, or the support to pursue a path of technological innovation, 
compounded by the evident lack of trust and limited cooperation among small 
entrepreneurs, which is a major obstacle to the development of collective solutions 
to their problems.
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1c h a pter  1 A im s  a n d  m eth o ds  of the St u d y
In 1954 the Government of India established the Small Scale Industries Board and 
in doing so inaugurated a policy of promoting small modem manufacturing 
industry. That policy, with its elaborate support system, has been in existence for 
sufficiently long to enable a considered evaluation of its achievements to be 
attempted. Such an assessment seems all the more apposite in the context of the 
major changes in India's domestic and foreign economic policy since 1991. The 
opening up of the Indian economy to the rest of the world poses a challenge to 
India's hitherto protected industrial economy, and raises questions about its future, 
and that of its small manufacturing sector, in a competitive global economy.
The broad aim of this dissertation is to provide a critical examination of aspects of 
India's small scale industry policy. In doing so, it comments both on the origins 
and the implementation of that policy, and attempts to provide an assessment of its 
substantive achievements. The Government set out its aims for the policy in the 
1956 Industrial Policy Resolution:
"The Government of India would... stress the role of cottage and village and 
small scale industries in the development of the national economy. In relation 
to some of the problems that need urgent solutions, they offer some distinct 
advantages. They provide immediate large scale employment: they offer a 
method of ensuring a more equitable distribution of the national income and 
they facilitate an effective mobilisation of resources of capital and skill which 
might otherwise remain unutilised. Some of the problems that unplanned 
urbanisation tends to create will be avoided by the establishment of small 
centres of industrial production all over the country" (GOI, Industrial Policy 
Resolution 1956: para. 13).
In essence the central claims were that small manufacturing industry would help to 
create much needed employment, make use of capital and skills, and help to 
promote regional balance while reducing disparities between city and countryside. 
The hopes attached to the growth of the small manufacturing sector have to be
2seen in the broader context of India's post-Independence development strategy of 
heavy industrialisation. It was recognised by Mahalanobis, the architect of the 
Second Five Year Plan, and others, that the strategy would inevitably take time to 
reach maturity, and that heavy industry would inevitably tend to be capital 
intensive. In the meantime, the problems of underemployment and unemployment 
required urgent attention, and on that basis the policy of promoting small industry 
was largely justified (Mahalanobis, 1963). The aims of employment creation on 
the one hand, allied with the desire to create employment in rural and 'backward' 
areas through small industry promotion were reiterated in successive Industrial 
Policy statements, as well as in successive Five Year Plans.
A further general, but largely unremarked aspect of the policy was that:
"..the aim of the State Policy will be to ensure that the decentralised sector (of 
cottage, village and small industries) acquires sufficient vitality to be self-
supporting  The State will, therefore, concentrate on measures designed to
improve the competitive strength of the small-scale producers" (GOI, 1956: 
para 14).
This last aim of creating a viable small manufacturing sector is obviously vital. 
Security of employment and avoiding a drain on resources suggest that the 
promotion of small industry has to aim at creating a sector which is economically 
viable and 'self-supporting', rather than becoming an expensive form of social 
welfare. However, this important general aim of policy subsequently vanished 
from government policy pronouncements until the 1990s, when the aim was 
formally revived and re-emphasised. Thus the Finance Ministry's Economic 
Survey 1993/4 stated that:
"The nature of Governments' assistance to the SSI (small scale industries) 
needs to be reviewed with the objective of making SSI self-sustaining.." (GOI, 
Ministry of Finance, 1994: 109)
3These formal aims raise a number of questions:
1. How successful has the promotion of small modem manufacturing
been in creating employment and absorbing labour?
2. To what extent is growth in the small scale sector attributable
to the support system established by the Government?
3. What evidence is there that the growth of small manufacturing has
alleviated spatial imbalances and contributed to industrial
decentralisation?
4. Has the policy of promoting small manufacturing industry created a
sector which is viable, 'self-supporting’, and 'self-sustaining'?
There is today a substantial literature on small scale manufacturing in India, but 
much of it is descriptive and frequently uncritical, not least in its use of available 
statistics. Included in this category are two of the more useful general reviews by 
Kashyap, and Ramaswamy (Kashyap 1988; Ramaswamy 1994). A subset of the 
literature addresses the assumption that small scale manufacturing is labour 
intensive, and requires little in the way of capital (Little, Mazumdar and Page 
1987; Bhavani 1991; Ramaswamy 1993), and specific aspects of Government 
policy have also come under critical review. Thus a number of studies have 
examined the industrial estates programme (Vepa 1988; Sandesara 1988), and the 
provision of credit for small manufacturers (Sandesara 1982; Patvardhan 1988) 
What these studies reveal is that policy has not been based on particularly firm 
foundations, inasmuch as small manufacturing has not been shown to be more 
labour intensive than large scale industry, and specific measures of government 
policy also suffer serious shortcomings, and indeed may have been 
counterproductive. While making use of these specific criticisms and perceived 
shortcomings of the policy, this dissertation started from a rather different 
perspective of trying to assess 1). the growth of the small scale sector over time 
and 2). its changing spatial distribution. The apparent marked tendency towards
4the geographical concentration of small manufacturing raised the question 3). of 
how the geography of small industry is related to the issue of viability.
The connection between these apparently disparate issues can be traced back to 
the work of Alfred Marshall and Sargant Florence amongst others, who drew 
attention to the existence of thriving networks of small manufacturers (Marshall, 
1961; Florence 1948, 1972). Their concern with "industrial districts" has recently 
been revived against the background of a resurgence of a small manufacturing 
sector in developed European economies, and the growth of small manufacturing 
firms in a number of Asian Pacific economies. This revival/rediscovery of the small 
scale manufacturing sector has prompted great deal of research effort, much of it 
focused on and stimulated by developments in Italy and Japan, with the aim of 
attempting to identify the conditions under which apparently successful small scale 
manufacturing has been possible. In this context, successful is not simply a matter 
of the profitability of individual small enterprises, but of their ability to survive in a 
highly competitive environment through increased productive investment. What 
this comparative approach suggests is that a viable programme of small scale 
manufacturing is dependent upon two sets of factors:
1. the clustering of small firms in geographical space. Sectoral 
clustering of related small units promotes specialisation by task and product, and 
brings about a greater division of labour among the constituent units within the 
cluster. The basic contention of the industrial district thesis is that such sectoral 
clusters can be as efficient a way of producing manufactured goods as the large 
integrated manufacturing firm. The difference is largely one of boundaries. The 
large integrated firm itself involves an internal division of labour into separate 
departments, with the whole process of production being carried out within the 
factory wall. A cluster of related small firms is different only in that the various
5tasks are carried out in separate and formally independent units - or what might be 
described as a factory without walls.
2. while clustering is a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for 
success. The second ingredient is the development of a locally-based collective 
support system which enables small firms to overcome their individual 
weaknesses, and the obstacles they face in successfully undergoing a process of 
accumulation and growth. Simply put, small firms throughout the world face a 
common set of difficulties as compared with large-scale units of production 
(Sengenberger and Pyke 1991). The latter, because of their size and the 
resources at their disposal are in a better position to be able to create markets for 
their products through advertising; they are better able to secure access to credit 
and to gather technical information enabling them to adapt and grow. In a word, 
large firms have the advantage of being able to control the external environment to 
a much greater degree than their small counterparts. Small firms are confronted, 
as individual units, with problems of securing credit, finding markets, and keeping 
abreast of technological development (Sandesara 1992: 133/34; Sengenberger 
and Pyke 1991). Clustering does not of itself provide a solution to these 
problems; indeed, it may exacerbate them by heightening inter-firm competition, 
and thereby reducing the prospects for accumulation and growth. However, by 
acting collectively to develop a support system, small firms can begin to redress 
these difficulties, and thereby compete with the large firm sector. Individual small 
firms may act together, for example, to create joint marketing ventures and credit 
unions, as well as exchanging technical information and working jointly to devise 
new production technologies. Such informal methods may be supplemented by 
the efforts of local or national agencies in the public and/or private sector to 
provide the kind of support that individual small units would be unable, or hard 
put, to provide for themselves. Such a system of informal and formal cooperation 
seems to be the basis for the success of small manufacturing enterprises in Italy.
6In Japan, small firm success has followed a different route, with small firms allying 
themselves with large firms, through a system of 'relational contracting' in which 
small units are provided with more or less secure markets for their output while 
benefiting from technological transfers from large parent sponsors.
Cooperation, then, seems to be an essential hallmark of successful small firm 
networking, and high levels of inter-firm cooperation seem to be based on 
relations of high trust and reciprocity. Where the bonds of trust are strong, firms 
will have the confident expectation that suppliers will provide raw materials and 
components of an acceptable standard, and do so on time, while suppliers will in 
turn be able to anticipate prompt and full payment. And beyond that, where firms 
are able to count on the basic honesty, fairness and trustworthiness of others, they 
will be more prepared to invest in pooling and sharing information about market 
opportunities and technological developments, with the expectation that others 
will reciprocate. Trust reduces the risks of cheating and opportunism which may 
arise when small firms have to depend on others. Where the bonds of trust are 
weak, and opportunism, cheating and sharp practice prevail, the basis for effective 
voluntary cooperation is undermined, and in those circumstances, firms within a 
geographical cluster will tend to resemble the atomised competitors of economic 
theory.
The complex question of how trust arises is dealt with more fully in chapter 2. 
The argument to be examined here is that public policy can act as a social catalyst 
in the development of inter-firm cooperation. The Government of India has 
established an impressive array of support services for small firms, providing them 
with raw materials, cheap credit, technical advice and support, marketing 
information and outlets in the public sector, and also encouraging subcontracting 
arrangements between large and small scale units. Through such measures, public 
policy may reduce the risks that small firms face in their business dealings, and
limit the scope for opportunism and cheating. At the same time, by providing high 
quality support which directly addresses the needs of small firms, state action 
demonstrates in a very practical way what can be achieved through cooperation 
and collaboration, encouraging imitative behaviour by other public and private 
sector organisations, and by individual firms. Public policy may thus stimulate the 
development of closer voluntary partnerships and promote closer and effective 
networking..
What emerges from this comparative perspective are certain important themes 
which underlie and inform this dissertation. The first is that of the significance of 
the sectoral clustering of a critical mass of small firms in geographical space. 
Clustering, it is suggested, is a necessary condition for the development of viable 
and self-sustaining small manufacturing development. However, the literature also 
suggests that for expanded reproduction to occur, i.e. for small firms to be able to 
adapt to competition, there must be a cooperative support system - either in the 
form of close and reciprocal relationships between small and large firms, as in 
Japan; or in the form of an informal system of interfirm cooperation, overlain by a 
more formal system in which public and private organisations provide support for 
small firms, as in Italy. It is through such supportive, collaborative mechanisms 
that the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of individual small firms can be mitigated, 
enabling them to accumulate and grow.
In trying to use these insights into successful small scale industrialisation, and 
apply them to analysing small manufacturing in India, it is important to bear in 
mind that macro-economic conditions in India are significantly different from 
those pertaining in both Italy and Japan. Both Italy and Japan are fully integrated 
into a competitive world economy, and the literature suggests how, in those 
circumstances, small manufacturers are able to thrive. India, by contrast, has been 
a virtually closed economy for the last four decades, and its manufacturing sector
8has been spared the need to adapt to fierce international competition. Moreover, 
India has been a slowly and unevenly developing economy, where access to credit 
and to basic raw materials is more problematical. What effects such particularities 
create - either in holding back the growth of the small scale sector, or in fostering 
closer co-operation as a means of overcoming them - is a matter for empirical 
investigation.
Aims
The broad aim of this thesis is to provide an evaluation of the Government of 
India's policy for promoting small scale manufacturing industry, and to do so by 
considering three elements of that policy:
1. to assess the growth of the small manufacturing sector over time with a view to 
establishing the relative importance of government policy and the contribution of 
macro-economic factors
2. to examine the geographical distribution of small industry in India, so as to be 
able to assess the Government's contention that the growth of small industry will 
help to alleviate both inter-regional and rural-urban imbalances in levels of 
development
3. to examine the role of the Government's support system for small scale 
manufacturing in creating dynamic industrial districts, in which networks of small 
firms are able to accumulate and grow.
The arguments
1. A recurrent claim in the literature about small manufacturing industry in India 
is that there has been substantial growth in the number of units, and of 
employment. Such claims may be justified, but there is little justification for the 
uncritical use of flawed statistics. Moreover, there is little discussion in the 
literature of how and why such growth as is observed, has taken place. Thus both 
Kashyap and Ramaswamy claim to address the question of growth, but beyond
9offering some (selective) statistics, they fail to offer any real examination of the 
dynamics of growth (Kashyap 1988; Ramaswamy 1994). Where an attempt is 
proffered, growth is bracketed together with references to Government policy, 
with the implicit claim that the former is attributable to the existence of the latter 
(e.g. Bhattacharya 1988).
The argument examined in this thesis is that macro-economic conditions within 
India have been more significant than Government small scale industry policy in 
influencing the development of the small manufacturing sector. At first sight this 
might appear to contradict the emphasis given above to the importance of external 
support in sustaining small manufacturers. However, the emphasis in the Italian 
and Japanese literature is on the effectiveness of local support systems, and at 
least by implication, the ineffectiveness and insensitivity of bureaucratically- 
controlled national systems of support.
It can be argued that certain broad features of the Indian economy have tended to 
favour the growth of small manufacturing; in particular, the sheer size of the 
country together with high transport costs may have enabled small firms to protect 
themselves from competition from the large scale sector by carving out local 
markets, while at the same time benefiting from the heavily inward orientation of 
the economy. Those favourable factors have to be balanced against the less 
favourable elements of the macro-economy, namely, the slow growth of the 
economy, particularly between 1965 and the late 1970s, depressing demand and 
creating serious raw material shortages, both of which are hypothesised to have 
been a drag on the growth of small manufacturing. By comparison, the 1980s have 
been a period of faster growth in the Indian economy generally, with growing 
output from basic industries and rising consumer expenditure. We would expect a 
faster rate of growth of small firms under these more favourable circumstances, 
and this leads to the first hypothesis: that changing macro-economic circumstances
10
have had a significant effect on the temporal growth of small manufacturing 
industry in India. In putting this hypothesis forward, an attempt is made to provide 
an explanation for the growth of the small scale sector, an issue which has not 
been given much serious consideration. In part, this lacuna arises because of 
problems of data availability. Indeed, testing this hypothesis in other than crude 
terms of comparing inter-censal growth rates with general economic growth rates 
is ruled out by the lack of available and reliable data on the growth of small 
manufacturing industry.
2. The second argument running through this dissertation relates to the geography 
of small manufacturing in India. One of the aims of the Government of India's 
policy for small industry was the based on the simplistic belief that small industry 
is essentially 'footloose' and could more easily than large-scale industry, be 
decentralised to reduce regional economic imbalances as well as the imbalance in 
employment opportunities between the city and the countryside. This is highly 
questionable. As noted above, there is a marked tendency for small firms to 
concentrate spatially, for sound economic reasons. And in a country as unevenly 
developed as India, that tendency is likely to be even more pronounced. 
Specifically, it is argued here that small manufacturing will tend to be highly 
concentrated geographically in the more developed parts of the Union, where 
infrastructure and external economies are readily available. In practice, this means 
that small manufacturing is likely to be heavily concentrated into India's more 
urbanised areas. This hypothesis is tested by examining changes in the distribution 
of small manufacturing for the major states of the Union over the period 1961 - 
1991, and through an analysis of the changing distribution of small manufacturing 
at District level within the state of Tamil Nadu over the period 1961 -1981.
The study of the geography of small manufacturing is a further area that has been 
neglected in the literature. There are a large number of studies of India's industrial
11
geography, and the dynamics of regional convergence/divergence. Such studies 
focus exclusively on medium and large-scale manufacturing, using data from the 
Annual Survey of Industries (e.g. Banneijee and Ghosh 1988; Kundu and Raza 
1982; Dholakia 1985, 1989, 1994; Seth 1986; Sarker 1994; Tewari 1988). By 
comparison, the geography of the small manufacturing sector has been neglected, 
principally because of the difficulties of creating an appropriate database.
3. The third strand of the argument relates to the role and effectiveness of public 
policy in promoting inter-firm trust and cooperation. Reciprocal cooperation is 
seen to be the hallmark of the industrial district, and the essential basis for 
successful small firm industrialisation. While there are divergent interpretations of 
how trust arises, the proposition examined here is that an effective system of 
public support for small manufacturers can help to promote trust and cooperation 
between firms. A well designed, and accessible programme of support which 
addresses the real concerns of small firms and provides them with tangible benefits 
can provide a convincing demonstration of the gains to be made from 
collaboration and collective action, spurring individual firms to emulate that 
example. The task of encouraging cooperation might be made easier where there 
already exists a degree of trust among entrepreneurs, as may be evident in 
informal methods of cooperation such the existence of credit unions or joint 
marketing operations. Conversely, it may be more difficult to persuade firms of 
the benefits of cooperation where mistrust and suspicion - including suspicion of 
the state- prevails. But arguably, even in the latter case, well-directed and relevant 
support by public agencies may help reduce suspicion and promote a greater 
willingness to recognise the benefits of collective action.
The role of the state in stimulating the development of industrial networks is 
considered by referring to a case study of small firms in the city of Coimbatore, 
and specifically in the engineering industry. No claim is made that either
12
Coimbatore, or the engineering sector is in any sense 'representative'. The very 
heterogeneity of the small scale sector makes generalisation unwise. The 
approach adopted here is to examine a particular sector in a particular locality, 
while recognising the limitations of such an approach. Drawing on the analytical 
framework developed out of the Italian/Japanese examples, we attempt to assess 
whether this local concentration of engineering firms has developed the 
characteristics of the self-sustaining industrial district. The investigation involved 
interviews with small entrepreneurs to establish the linkages that exist between 
small and large firms, their degree of dynamism, and an examination of their use 
and perception of the formal support system provided by the state. The broad 
hypothesis was that successful state intervention to promote cooperation depends, 
firstly, on the effectiveness and quality of the state's support programme; and 
secondly on the level of trust that exists among small entrepreneurs. While the 
latter is difficult to measure empirically, it can be gauged by levels of informal 
cooperation between small firms.
There are a number of studies of localised concentrations of small industries, and 
these are reviewed later. Suffice it to say that these have adopted a very different 
perspective from that used here. In particular, examination of the support system 
for small industry has been neglected. As pointed out above, there are a number 
of studies of industrial estates and their utilisation, and access to credit. But there 
have been few studies of the effectiveness of Government technical and marketing 
assistance, and the issue of how local institutions interface with the small scale 
sector has aroused little attention.
Data and Methods.
In examining the growth and the geography of small manufacturing, this 
dissertation has of necessity made great use of secondary published statistical
13
sources. There are a number of different sources of statistical data relating to the 
small scale sector. The main sources comprise
- statistics collated by the Small Industries Development Organisation
on 'registered' small scale manufacturing units
- National Accounts statistics
- the Census of Population
- the Annual Survey of Industries
Each of these sources has its own definition of 'small' industry, either in terms of 
investment or employment levels. Each of these sources has its particular 
deficiencies and drawbacks, particularly in relation to coverage and reliability A 
critical examination of these sources led us to make use of a combination of the 
Census of Population, and the Annual Survey of Industries as providing the least 
unreliable and most comprehensive data. The Annual Survey of Industries is a 
comprehensive digest of statistics relating to medium and large scale industries 
registered under the 1948 Factory Act and covers all factory establishments with 
more than 10 workers using powered machinery, and more than 20 workers where 
no powered machinery is employed. The Census of Population includes data 
relating to employment in household industry - essentially village and cottage 
industries, where manufacture takes place on domestic premises - and non­
household industries. By subtracting employment in the organised factory sector 
from employment in the Census non-household category, we can identify 
employment in the small scale sector, defined as units employing fewer than 10 
workers, and fewer than 20 where no power is used. This is the data used in 
analysing the geography of small manufacturing. A breakdown of the Annual 
Survey of Industries data allows the definition of'small' to be extended to include 
units employing up to 49 workers, where power is employed and up to 99 
workers where no power is used. This more useful definition could not be used in
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examining the geography of small manufacturing, because the data is available 
only at the All-India level, and is not published for the individual states, let alone 
districts within the states.
While the combination of Census data, and data from the Annual Survey of 
Industries seems to be the most reliable method of identifying employment in small 
industry, the principal drawback is that, rather than an annual time series, we get 
a series of snapshots of the size of the small manufacturing sector at ten-yearly 
intervals. This is not a major drawback in considering the changing geography of 
the sector, but it does pose problems in trying to relate the temporal growth of the 
small scale sector to changing macroeconomic conditions, principally that the 
Census dates do not neatly correspond with important turning points in India's 
recent economic history.
Of necessity, the case study of Coimbatore's engineering industries makes use of 
questionnaire data, collected in the field during August/September 1993. The 
survey was supplemented by interviews undertaken in December/January 1993/4, 
with a variety of individuals involved in a number of organisations which have 
some connection with local industry, as a means of assessing their contribution to 
assisting small firms. A total of six visits was made to Tamil Nadu between the 
beginning of this research in 1989, and 1995. Two visits were made to 
Coimbatore prior to the fieldwork surveys.
The questionnaire
The questionnaire survey of small engineering units was designed to achieve 
several things. It sought first to obtain information on the main characteristics of 
small engineering firms - the characteristics of their owners, their employees and 
the process of production. A second aim was to examine the relationship between 
small engineering units and other economic actors, in particular, their relationships
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with medium and large firms in the city, with other small firms and with traders. 
The third area of concern was with the experience of growth; to what extent had 
small firms expanded their labour force and/or their level of investment in plant 
and machinery, and in what other ways was there evidence of firms' ability to 
adapt. Finally, an attempt was made to gather information about small firms' use 
and perception of those services provided by Government and the extent to which 
small firms had developed their own informal collective support system. A copy 
of the interview schedule is included as Appendix 1.
The difficulties of field survey
The sample survey is an indispensable tool for gathering the kind of information 
outlined above, but conducting a rigorous survey poses more than a few 
challenges. The first hurdle was the selection of a sample of units to be surveyed. 
The major problem is that there is no comprehensive record of all small 
manufacturing units for Coimbatore - nor indeed for any other town or city in 
India. The only available listing of small manufacturing units takes the form of the 
State Directory of Small Industries which lists all registered small units classified 
according to the National Industrial Classification. However the Directory records 
only those small units (defined as having investment levels below a certain ceiling) 
which choose to register with the State Directorate of Industries and Commerce. 
As such, the register is not a complete record of all small manufacturing units. 
Moreover, it is a rolling record, and includes all units that have ever registered, 
including those that have moved, as well as those which have ceased trading. An 
indication of the magnitude of over-registration can be gleaned from comparing 
the data from the Directory with that collected during the Second All-India 
Census of Small Scale Manufacturing. The latest - fourth - edition of the State 
Directory lists 88,442 small units registered up to the end of 1987. The Second 
All-India Census organised by the Small Industries Development Organisation 
used the Directory as its basic frame of reference, but was able to verify the
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existence of only 57,213 units on the register. In Coimbatore District, there are 
some 13,000 registered units according to the Directory, compared with only 
7214 functioning units identified by the Census. Clearly, the sample design had to 
take account of this high level of over-registration.
In spite of its questionable coverage, the Directory was perforce the main sample 
framework. The Directory lists units by District, and by sector, using the National 
Industrial classification. Using postal codes, a total of some 2900 small 
engineering units could be identified within the Coimbatore Metropolitan area. 
This procedure indicated a very uneven distribution of units by postcode within 
the city, with the highest concentrations in two areas; Ganapathi with the highest 
concentration of some 550 units, and Peelamedu with some 300. Of these two 
areas, Peelamedu postal district turned out to cover a large area to the east of the 
city centre, while Ganapathi was a smaller area, with a denser concentration of 
small units, together with a number of medium and large factories in the textile 
and engineering sectors. Ganapathi was selected for the field survey, and a 
systematic stratified sample of units was chosen from the Directory, with the 
number of chosen units being proportional to the total number of units in each of 
the industrial groups comprising the engineering sector (groups 34 - 37 inclusive). 
A total of 136 units was chosen to allow for moves and closures, and this work 
was undertaken prior to the fieldwork proper. In order to include data about 
non-registered units, there was little option but to resort to a rough rule-of-thumb, 
that for every four registered units, the nearest non-registered unit in the same 
street would be sampled. In the event, questionnaire data was collected for a total 
of 91 units, of which
- 56 were registered small units
-10 were registered both as small units, as well as under the 
Factory Act
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- 25 were unregistered small scale units.
It cannot, of course, be claimed that the results are based on a representative 
sample of small engineering units. Indeed it is impossible to state just how many 
such units there are in the city.
The fieldwork was carried out with the assistance of graduate students from the 
Agricultural University, Coimbatore. The use of graduate helpers was necessary, 
partly because of time constraints, but also because of anticipated language 
difficulties. It could not be assumed that the owners of small manufacturing units 
would necessarily be fluent in English, so the assistance of fluent English/Tamil 
speakers was sought. Professor Gothandapani of the Agricultural University 
provided access to postgraduate students with some experience of conducting 
field surveys. Altogether, six students helped with the interviewing at various 
times. All were briefed on the purpose of the survey, and the rationale for the 
specific questions in the schedule. At the end of each day, the questionnaires were 
checked for completeness.
A further difficulty in undertaking the fieldwork was that of identifying the 
location of the sample units on the ground. The problem lay in the lack of a map 
detailing the street layout in the chosen area of Ganapathi. While there are a 
number of tourist maps of the city, these are neither comprehensive, nor entirely 
reliable. Commonly, these maps record the street pattern around the city centre, 
but in outlying areas, such as Ganapathi, only the main routes into and out of the 
city are recorded. In the absence of a suitable map, progress in locating the 
sample units was firustratingly slow in the early stages; and that frustration was 
compounded when particular units turned out either not to have existed at all, to 
have died, or to have been misclassified in the Directory. Interestingly, none of 
the units was found to have moved. On a more positive note, very few of the
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proprietors approached for help in completing the questionnaire declined to 
participate; on the contrary, most were only too happy to take part - often at great 
length - once they had been reassured that there was no government involvement.
The support system for small engineering industry
In addition to the questionnaire survey of small engineering units, a further set of 
interviews was conducted with a range of government and non-governmental 
agencies with some relationship to the small manufacturing sector. There are 
certain obvious choices, and these include the District Industries Centre and the 
Small Industries Development Organisation, which are the main government 
agencies directly responsible for small industry promotion. CODISSIA, the 
Coimbatore and District Small Scale Industries Association, a voluntary self-help 
group, was a further obvious choice. Contacts among the business/industrial, and 
the academic community in Coimbatore suggested a number of other potentially 
interested agencies. In addition, the feedback from the questionnaires indicated the 
range of problems as perceived by small industrialists, and their perceptions also 
influenced the choice of agencies to be contacted. These interviews were largely 
unstructured, designed to uncover ways in which these organisations interface 
with small engineering units. Contacts in Coimbatore gave access to a number of 
owners and works managers in the large firm sector, and their views, while not 
rigorously recorded, also fed into the field survey.
Organisation of the dissertation
The dissertation is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 contains the main analytical framework of the study. This chapter 
examines the role of small industry in the modem economy, and focuses on small 
manufacturing in Italy and Japan. These are both instances of the successful 
growth of small manufacturing industry, and their experience suggests that there
19
are important pre-conditions for the development of a viable small industrial 
sector. Underlying this discussion is the view that a comparative perspective is 
useful in raising questions that have previously been ignored, neglected, or 
insufficiently explored.
Chapter 3 explores the origins of India's small industry policy, and its place in the 
country's post-Independence development strategy. The chapter includes an 
overview of the various policy measures implemented by the Government of India 
to support and promote the growth of the small scale manufacturing sector.
Chapter 4 examines the growth of small manufacturing enterprise. This chapter 
includes a critical examination of the main sources of data relating to the small 
scale sector. It assesses the growth of employment in the small scale sector 
relative to the large scale sector, and considers some of the criticisms that have 
been levelled at Government small industry policy in relation to employment 
creation.
Chapter 5 briefly reviews macro-economic changes in India in the period since the 
mid-fifties, as a prelude to Chapter 6, which attempts to relate the growth of the 
small scale sector to changing macro-economic conditions.
Chapter 7 is an examination of the geography of small scale industry. It examines 
changes in the distribution of small manufacturing at the All-India level between 
1961 and 1991, and this is followed by an examination of changes in the 
distribution of small industry in Tamil Nadu for the period 1961 - 1981.
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 present the results of the survey of small engineering units in 
the Coimbatore metropolitan area. Chapter 11 provides a summaiy and some 
general conclusions.
Ch a pte r  2. Sm a l l  sc a le  m a n u f a c t u r in g  in  a  m o d e r n  w o r ld
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In the postwar period, development has come to be synonymous with 
industrialisation. For most of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
industrialisation and the growth of a modem manufacturing sector has been seen 
as the means of diversifying the economic base and reducing dependence on a 
narrow range of primary export commodities which exposes them to the vagaries 
of an uncertain world market. Industrialisation held out the promise of creating 
additional sources of wealth and employment, stimulating agricultural production, 
and raising output and income across the economy. Industrialisation is desired not 
only because it is seen as the necessary means of raising material living standards, 
but also because of the political and military power that industrialisation is seen to 
bestow (Sen 1984). Just as the major Western countries have acquired economic, 
political and military strength through industrial development, so for many 
governments in the Third World, the ability to exercise their sovereignty after 
years of colonial rule is seen to require an economic transformation. For 
economic and political reasons, industrialisation has been and continues to be a 
major priority for many Third World states (Gwynne 1990). Of course, as 
Kitching points out, there have long been minority oppositional currents to this 
orthodoxy (Kitching 1982:10). Today's anti-development discourse is part of a 
larger populist tradition, extending back into the nineteenth century, which 
questions and rejects capitalist industrialisation for its attendant social and 
economic dislocation.
The orthodoxy however, persists. The progressive 'global shift' of manufacturing, 
the continued growth of the Newly Industrialised Countries of the Pacific Rim, 
and economic retrogression among (especially African) primary commodity 
exporters have combined to reinforce the conviction that not only is industrial
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development desirable, but is more easily attainable in the changing circumstances 
of the late twentieth century (Wood 1994; Wield, Johnson and Hewitt 1992, ch 
11).
While there is broad agreement about the desirability of industrialisation - 
agreement that spans the political spectrum - there has been ample scope for 
vigorous debate about means. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was, for example, 
much debate about the relative weight to be accorded to investment in industry as 
opposed to agriculture. Against the background of the resurgence of liberal neo­
classical ideas in the West from the 1970s onwards, the debate has shifted to the 
merits of inward and outward looking development strategies, and state-centred 
versus market-friendly approaches (Toye 1993).
There has also been a long running debate over the issue of whether to emphasise 
the development of large scale heavy as opposed to small scale light industries. As 
a broad generalisation, priority has been given to developing industry that is 
"large-scale, capital intensive and urban based " (Colman and Nixson 1978: 179). 
This is not to say that the promotion of small scale industry has been entirely 
ignored. A number of Latin American governments - Mexico, Venezuela and 
Argentina - introduced specific programmes of financial support for small industry 
in the 1950s, extending to Brazil, Colombia and Chile in the 1960s (Uribe- 
Echevarria 1991). Among Asian countries, India from the mid 1950s onwards 
formulated an elaborate programme to develop modem small manufacturing, 
while in China small scale rural industrialisation was a feature of its development 
programmes. Other Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Philippines devised their own promotional programmes in the 1960s (Tan Thiam 
Soon 1983: 218), and in Africa, similar policies were adopted in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sudan (Neck 1983: 260). Such policies are implemented
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on a variety of grounds to serve a variety of stated objectives, including the 
creation of employment, better use of factor endowments, the promotion of 
regional development and rural welfare, the promotion of entrepreneurship, and 
the democratisation of ownership. A measure of approval for these national 
policies has come from a number of important international agencies such as the 
World Bank, the International Labour Organisation and the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation, but it cannot be said that either national governments 
or international agencies have been ardent promoters of small manufacturing 
enterprise.
The experience of small enterprises in many countries, even those with a 
supportive policy, is that macro-economic policies tend to be biased against small 
-scale, and in favour of large scale enterprises (Little, Mazumdar and Page 1987: 
chapter 1: Dawson 1990; Fitzgerald 1990; Tambunan 1991: Meier and Pilgrim 
1994). Meier and Pilgrim's examination of Nepal, Bangladesh and the Philippines 
leads them to argue that distorted and overregulated markets favour large units. 
With a restrictive import policy, large firms enjoy easier access to licences for 
imported raw materials and machinery; easier access to credit, crowding out funds 
for the small scale sector; and easier access to public sector procurement, where 
contracts depend on 'influence, nepotism and red tape' (Meier and Pilgrim 1994 
:36). Their conclusion is that
"policy-induced constraints on SSE (small scale enterprise) may reduce or even 
offset the positive effect of the prevailing direct assistance to the sector"
(Meier and Pilgrim 1994: 37).
The implication that liberalisation will remove these biases is disputed by Fitgerald, 
who argues that large scale industry has an inherent superiority, which enables it
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to set price levels and monopolise sources of credit to the disadvantage of small 
units (Fitzgerald 1990: 397).
The essential point to emphasise is that there is evidence of a disjunction between 
macro-economic policy and policy towards the small scale sector, reflecting the 
essential ambiguity of small industry policies. Rarely are they fully integrated into 
overall development strategies. This ambiguity seems to be based on a particular 
interpretation of the way that the process of industrialisation unfolds, or should 
unfold, and this rests on a schematic model of the Industrial Revolution in the 
West and more specifically in Britain.
The Industrial Revolution marks the emergence of modem manufacturing, at the 
expense of precapitalist craft and household forms of production. In the nineteenth 
century much of this manufacturing capacity took the form of relatively modest 
enterprises, which formed the basis of Marx's analysis of competitive capitalism, 
(and seems to inform a resurgent neo-classical economic thinking). Over time 
with the growing division of labour, and the growth of markets for commodities, 
the number of firms increases (Fig 1.1). The result is that the competitive 
pressures on small manufacturers also increase, and are further intensified by 
improvements in transport reducing the ability of small manufacturers to shelter in 
protected local markets (Anderson 1982). Together these factors encourage a 
progressive restructuring of the manufacturing sector. Mergers, take-overs and 
bankruptcies lead to the growing concentration and centralisation of capital into a 
smaller number of large firms, characteristic of the modem economy. In short, 
what this evolutionary model suggests is that small scale manufacturing is 
characteristic of a transitional phase in the development from pre-capitalist to a 
developed capitalist economy. Inevitably small manufacturers are destined to 
disappear like the handicraft industries before them.
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That some such evolutionary change did occur in Britain’s experience over the last 
hundred years is not seriously disputed. The Bolton Committee of Inquiry on 
Small Firms revealed the steadily declining importance of small firms in British 
manufacturing over the period 1930 until the early 1960s (Davies and Kelly 
1972:10). A similar continuous decline in the importance of the small 
manufacturing sector was recorded for the USA, Germany, Sweden, France and 
Italy (Storey 1983). Such empirical studies lend credence to an evolutionary 
interpretation of the industrialisation process in which small firms play a declining 
role as economic development progresses, being displaced by large scale 
enterprises which embody progress. On the basis of this interpretation, "small
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firms (have) attracted much less attention from social scientists and policy makers 
than large firms" (Mason and Harrison 1990: 72). And what was true of the 
developed world also applied to policy makers in the Third World and among the 
international development agencies. Where small firms have been promoted in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America it has been as much if not more for essentially 
welfare objectives, rather than because of a positive belief in their viability and the 
contribution they can make to the process of development.
As it happens, this evolutionary model now turns out to be far more stylised than 
the real world itself. For while the Bolton Committee in the UK was lamenting 
the progressive and seemingly terminal decay of the small manufacturing firm, 
what came to be known as the Birch Report was claiming that most of the new 
jobs in the USA were being created by small firms (Birch 1979). At a time of 
growing economic turbulence and generally rising unemployment this finding 
stimulated a resurgence of interest in the small firm sector. While the focus of this 
interest lay primarily in Western Europe and the USA, a significant research effort 
was also directed to promoting an understanding of the sources of economic 
success in the Far East. The rediscovery of the Japanese "dual economy" and the 
contribution of small firms in the industrial development of South Korea, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong all suggested that the small firm had been prematurely written off. 
The challenge was to explain how small manufacturing firms were able to survive 
and indeed grow as other than a residual element in the industrial structure. What 
has emerged is a potentially fruitful framework which suggests that under certain 
conditions a process of industrialisation founded on small firms is economically 
viable.
In turn, this framework also poses a challenge to simple evolutionary ideas. The 
relatively new field of institutional economics takes issue with the assumption that
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in a competitive environment, evolution leads to greater efficiency and "the 
selection of relatively superior or near optimal organisational forms" (Hodgson 
1993: 199). Arthur, for example, points to the way that with competing 
technologies, 'path dependency' - or historical contingency - may lead an economy 
to be 'locked in' to an inferior technology (Arthur 1989). Likewise, Hodgson 
writes that
path dependency suggests that the development of the factory system and 
the modem capitalist firm is not simply a question of the evolutionary selection 
of the most efficient organisational configurations. ... the possibility of path 
dependency suggests that alternative less hierarchical or less regimented forms 
of organisation could have been just as viable. (Hodgson 1993: 204/5).
The apparent resurgence of small scale industry lends support to the view that 
there are indeed a number of different possible pathways to industrialisation.
Changing perspectives on Small Manufacturing
One of the problems in any study of the small manufacturing enterprise is the lack 
of a rigorous and coherent framework from which to approach the subject. The 
literature on small firms tends to be either entirely descriptive, simply recording 
the growth in numbers of small enterprises, or it adopts a programmatic 
perspective, setting out why small scale industrialisation is important and what 
action governments should take to promote it. A more analytical approach is 
evident in those studies which seek to assess the viability of small enterprises. 
Included in this category is the recent volume by Little, Mazumdar and Page, 
which focuses on the question of the efficiency of resource use by small firms as 
compared with medium and large enterprises (Little, Mazumdar and Page, 1987). 
While an important contribution to debunking some of the mythology surrounding 
small enterprises, the study also exhibits some of the weaknesses of the
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economists’ approach in which small firms are viewed through the prism of neo­
classical economic theory, with individual firms confronting each other in an 
impersonal marketplace. Such an approach is not without merit, but it is 
restrictive.
A different approach, popular in the 1970s, was associated with the concept of the 
informal sector. Originating in Hart's analysis of the labour market in Accra, 
Ghana, a formal sector of relatively large, capitalist enterprises was distinguished 
from an informal sector of small and micro activities, ranging from small scale 
manufacturing, to forms of retailing and distribution (Hart 1973). Hart's emphasis 
on the productive and income generating characteristics of the informal sector was 
taken up by the International Labour Organisation as part of its World 
Employment Programme, and through a number of case studies, conducted under 
the auspices of personnel at the Institute of Development Studies at Brighton, it 
popularised the notion, launching it "into its meteoric career" (Peattie 1987: 853). 
The criticisms of the informal sector concept are well-known, and comment is 
restricted to two points (Moser 1978; Peattie 1987). First, the concept is 
extremely fuzzy and difficult to pin down with any clarity. In common with other 
dualistic models, the approach demarcates one sector of the economy - the large 
scale, 'modem' sector, relegating all other activities to a category of 'informal 
activities'. As such, the informal sector is a heterogeneous collection of activities, 
typically described as small-scale, unregulated by the state, and involving non­
wage forms of employment. Detailed studies revealed that this was little more 
than another stylised and often misleading description. In his critique of the 
informal sector concept, Jan Breman pointed out that on grounds of smallness of 
size, India's small scale modem industries belong to the informal sector; but to the 
extent that such units typically employ wage labour and are also regulated by the 
state, they clearly do not (Breman 1976). Such an anomaly arose partly from the
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tendency to conflate smallness of size with informality, and the insistence on 
attempting to allocate all activities into just one of two arbitrarily defined 
categories. This leads on to the second issue of the relationship between activities 
in the formal and the informal sectors. The early assumption of independence was 
soon questioned by empirical investigation which revealed a variety of linkages 
between the two sectors. Bose's study of small manufacturers in Calcutta, for 
example, revealed the extent to which small firms bought in inputs from large 
firms, and at the same time acted as subcontractors (Bose 1974). The conclusions 
drawn from this were that, first, informal sector manufacturing is subordinate to, 
and exploited by large formal sector enterprises, thereby limiting the prospects for 
accumulation and hence for viable small scale industrial development. And 
secondly the notion of separate sectors was totally untenable, fatally undermining 
the original dualist conception of the economy.
Having said that, one of the positive benefits to come from the informal sector 
approach was to emphasise relationships between small and larger scale 
manufacturing units. This concern with relationships is at the heart of a more 
recent conception of 'networks' of small firms bound together by a variety of 
linkages. According to Sengenberger and Pyke, the main problem facing small 
manufacturing units is not just their size, but their isolation and their 
powerlessness (Sengenberger and Pyke 1991). Small units have fewer resources, 
less time and less expertise than their large counterparts. Individual small 
enterprises are likely to be in a weak position in relation to banks, to wholesalers 
and traders and the large companies who dominate the marketing system. Not 
only do they have less ability to search out and develop new markets for their 
products, they may also experience problems in keeping abreast of new 
technology. Individual small firms, in other words, face greater uncertainty and 
are less able to control their environment than large firms; indeed the evolution of
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large firms in the Anglo-Saxon world has much to do with attempts to reduce and 
limit the uncertainties of a competitive environment. The obstacles to small firm 
competitiveness can be mitigated by action 'from above', as is the case in India for 
example where the government attempts to support small units by providing a 
range of services for them. However, Sengenberger and Pyke make the important 
point that small firms can themselves begin to overcome these problems by 
''linking up with the resource pools of others, be it large firms or small firms, to 
gain strategic options." (Sengenberger and Pyke 1991; 9). In other words, small 
firms can help themselves to overcome their individual powerlessness and lack of 
resources by forming alliances, either with other small firms, or with large units.
In both cases, it is the localised network of interacting small firms that is the focus 
of concern rather than the individual constituent enterprises.
The notion of local networks and small firm alliances has become extremely 
fashionable in recent times among social scientists. Of course such ideas are by no 
means novel to geographers; on the contrary, linkage and agglomeration are part 
of the stock in trade of industrial geography. What is novel is the resurgent 
interest in ideas about networks, agglomerations and industrial districts. Attention 
has focused on two models of small firm networks, the Emilian model, and the 
Japanese shitauke system. The former comprises a localised agglomeration of 
small firms which both compete and cooperate with each other. The latter 
describes a situation in which small firms thrive through their links with one or 
other large enterprise. The next sections outline these two models, before going 
on to consider their applicability to the study of small firms in India.
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The Emilian Small Firm Model
The sociologist Amaldo Bagnasco is credited with drawing attention to the 
distinctive development pattern taking place in the 'Third Italy' (Bagnasco 1977). 
This North Central region of the country is distinguished from the industrialised 
North East, and the backward South by the growth of a multiplicity of small firms.
In the early 1980s, the "Emilian model" was drawn to the attention of the wider 
English speaking world with the publication of an article by Brusco (Brusco 
1982). Since that time there has been a veritable explosion of research and 
commentary attempting to explain how it is that small firms in North Central Italy, 
and especially the province of Emilia-Romagna have been able to grow and 
multiply in the face of competition from large-scale factories. Beyond that, 
Emilia-Romagna has attracted attention because of the potential policy 
implications of this pattern of regional development. The question here is whether 
the Emilian model can be replicated elsewhere, and thereby contribute to 
economic regeneration.
The important features of the Emilian model are that firstly, industrial production 
is undertaken in a large number of small/medium enterprises. According to data 
assembled by Cooke and Morgan, 94% of firms in Emilia have fewer than 10 
employees (Cooke and Morgan 1991: 13). Secondly, there is a pattern of 
geographical specialisation, such that particular industrial sectors concentrate into 
particular districts. Thus for example, light engineering firms tend to cluster in 
Bologna and Modena, ceramics concentrates around the town of Sassuolo, and 
the knitwear industry is associated with Carpi (Leonardi and Nanetti 1990). The 
third feature identified by Brusco is that small industry in the province receives the
i
active support and backing of both regional and local government agencies 
(Brusco, 1990).
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Identifying the distinctive features of current Emilian development does not tell us 
much about how these industrial districts have come into being and how they have 
succeeded in resisting competition from the large firm sector. It is possible 
however, to piece together a picture of how these districts have evolved recently, 
by drawing on Brusco's later writing, and a recent article by Bianchi and Gualtieri 
(Brusco 1990; Bianchi and Gualtieri 1990). In this account, we will focus on the 
engineering industry, and leave to one side the development of the consumer 
goods industries which appear to have followed a somewhat different trajectory.1
Emilia-Romagna is and long has been a prosperous agricultural region, famous 
amongst other things for Parma hams and Lambrusco wine. Agricultural 
prosperity helped to support a wide variety of artisan industries. Some of these 
produced consumer goods such as shoes and knitwear for local consumption, 
while other workshops produced and repaired agricultural machinery and food 
processing equipment (King 1987; 197ff). It was the light engineering workshops 
that from the late later 1960s began to be integrated into the production process 
controlled by the large scale producers in the North East. This process took place 
against the background of growing labour militancy in the Milan-Genoa-Turin 
triangle, which eventually resulted in the late 1960s with the unions achieving 
their ambition of wage indexation. Faced with labour unrest, large firms like Fiat 
attempted to loosen the grip of the unions by subcontracting the production of 
components to small, non-unionised workshops in Emilia-Romagna. In the course 
of the 1970s, these small workshops competed for subcontracting work, and 
used their profits to upgrade their machinery and techniques of production,
1 In the consumer goods industries, the literature stresses the important role of trading and 
merchant groups who use their market knowledge to orchestrate production. A classic example 
is Benetton, which is neither a traditional retailer, nor a producer. It uses market data from its 
network of franchises around the world to inform itself of changing demands, and that 
information is used in placing orders with more than 100 small independent knitwear producers.
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replacing old-fashioned lathes with CNC (computer numerically controlled) 
machine tools. By the early 1980s, these firms faced a growing crisis. The world­
wide recession led many of the large firms to reduce output with the result that the 
market for subcontractors began to wither away. However, instead of collapsing, 
these small firms have continued to thrive, but no longer in the shadow of large 
firms. Their survival and continued prosperity is generally attributed to two 
important factors. In the first place, small firms have been able to exploit their 
flexibility in production to develop new markets and new outlets. In the past, 
small engineering units may have produced components for Fiat, but today, using 
their general purpose machinery of lathes and CNC machine tools, they have 
created new niches for themselves by diversifying their product markets. 
Individual units may specialise in turning out particular products and components, 
or in performing particular processes, but they are not tied to a particular end- 
user. On the contrary, they produce the 'raw materials' which feed a range of end- 
users, producing amongst other things consumer durables including Marini 
motorbikes, as well as investment goods like machine tools, packaging equipment 
and earth removing machinery. Linking up to a number of different end-users and 
their intermediates is a way of reducing dependence, and minimising vulnerability 
to demand shifts.
The similarity between this form of industrial organisation and that described for 
Sheffield and Lancashire by Alfred Marshall in the late nineteenth century has not 
been lost on a number of commentators. Both Bellandi and Becattini, for 
example, appeal to Marshall's writings on external economies and agglomeration 
for an explanation of the contemporary Italian industrial district (Bellandi 1989: 
Becattini 1990). Marshall, and subsequently Florence, writing about the interwar 
West Midlands economy, saw the concentration of similar or complementary 
industries in a relatively small geographical area as offering a means by which
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individual firms could either reduce their costs and/or increase their revenues. 
(Florence 1948: 1972). With a greater division of labour, and specialisation by 
firm, each individual unit will benefit from increased overall demand, raising its 
productivity and reducing its costs. The internal economies achieved by each 
individual specialist producer are then transmitted to other producers in the form 
of external economies. Such localisation economies' may be supplemented by 
•urbanisation economies'. As an agglomeration develops so does a pool of 
'common resources' - a localised pool of labour, of capital, and what we would 
today describe as infrastructure, all of which are available to be tapped into by the 
constituent firms of an agglomeration. For both Marshall and Florence, the 
industrial district - the 'factory without walls' - could be as efficient a means of 
organising production as the large vertically integrated firm - the 'factory within a 
wall' (Florence 1972: 100). Clustering allows economies of scale which, while 
external to the individual firm, are internal to the industry. The essential efficiency 
of small scale, localised production is, for Becattini and for Bellandi, the secret of 
Emilia-Romagna's success. The difficulty in accepting such an explanation at face 
value is that competitiveness appears to have been maintained, not so much by the 
neo-classical mechanism of individual firms pursuing their own self-interest, but 
rather through the creation of a collective support system (Harrison 1992).
The second factor which appears to have been influential in enabling small firms to 
adapt and thrive has been the development of informal and form al collective 
support systems. Informal support systems are those developed by small firms 
themselves to collectively address their problems, and they include trade 
associations, credit unions, and joint marketing arrangements. Since the 1970s, 
these 'private' cooperative endeavours have been supplemented by more formal 
systems of support organised through government. Until 1977, the regions in Italy 
were purely administrative organs of the central government. With the passing of
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a Presidential decree in late 1977, the centre, under pressure from the regions, 
delegated responsibility and (extremely limited) funds to them for territorial 
development, artisan industries and professional training (Leonardi, 1990). The 
different regional authorities have interpreted these responsibilities in different 
ways. In Emilia-Romagna, because of the concentration of small and medium 
enterprises, the thrust of the (Communist) regional government's efforts has been 
directed at harnessing, consolidating and strengthening the small enterprise base of 
the region. The policy is based on the conviction that, left to themselves, small 
firms
"are simply not equipped to cope with the challenges of accelerated 
technological change, higher quality products, and more globalised markets.
The mono-industrial culture of the districts was a further stimulus, because if a 
sector went into terminal decline, it could well drag an entire area down with 
it." (Cooke and Morgan, 1991:53)
Hence the policy has been to create a network of technology and business centres 
whose principal role is that of providing 'real' or structural services to producers 
(Garofoli 1991: 132). In this context, 'real' services are distinguished from 
financial services. The provision of loans and credit is left in the hands of banks 
and financial institutions, while the regional authority concentrates on those 
services which will be more directly beneficial to producers and production. The 
term is infinitely broad but includes research and development for specific 
industries, market research, professional training, quality control, materials and 
product testing, advice on new technology, and management consultancy services 
(Bellini, Giordiani and Pasquini 1990; 172/3). The apex organisation is ERVET 
(Ente Regionale per la Valorizzazione Economic del Territorio) established in 
1974 to act as a general development board for the region. Under its auspices a 
number of specialised centres was subsequently set up, including CERMET 
which undertakes research, provides advice and testing facilities for the metal-
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using industries; ASTER, whose main task is to collect and disseminate 
information about new technology, while CITER and Centro Ceramico undertake 
research, training, consultancy for the textile and ceramics industries respectively 
(Bellini, Giordiani and Pasquini 1990; 175/182). The main role of this system of 
institutional support is to encourage technology transfer and continuous 
innovation among small firms; and secondly, to collect, analyse and disseminate 
information about market trends that will be relevant and useful for the local 
industrial community. The belief is that through adopting the latest technology, by 
putting the emphasis on quality, and by anticipating market trends, small firms 
will continue to prosper.
One of the important features of this network of business and industry centres is 
that they operate within a strongly collaborative framework. ERVET is not a 
department of the regional government, but an autonomous body. Three quarters 
of its shares are held by the regional council, with the balance being held by local 
banks and Chambers of Commerce. Each of the specialised local agencies has a 
board of management drawn from local industry, from the universities and local 
chambers of commerce (Bellini, Giordiani and Pasquini, 1990: 174). The agencies 
thus draw upon accumulated local expertise and experience, and become a vehicle 
to mobilise local resources around a common purpose. The universities, for 
example have developed and strengthened their local ties by undertaking 
collaborative research projects. These locally-rooted agencies, with their local 
representation create "territorial embeddedness", which makes them more 
effective in responding to local needs than a remote bureaucracy in Rome (Cooke 
and Morgan 1991; Schmitz and Musyck 1993; 37). Just how effective these 
agencies are, and how much they have contributed to the continued development 
of Emilia-Romagna is open to question. Some commentators believe their role 
has been crucial in guiding the region's growth through the troubled 1980s. What
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we do not of course know is what would have happened had this institutional 
support system not been in existence. The general consensus among research 
workers with direct experience of Emilian industry is that this support network has 
been crucial in maintaining innovation and ensuring high quality production 
(Cooke and Morgan 1991).
The 'discovery' of thriving networks of small industries in Emilia-Romagna has 
stimulated a search for similar arrangements elsewhere. Sforzi's analysis of Census 
data leads him to identify some 63 industrial districts in Italy, while other research 
has uncovered evidence of similar districts in Germany, Spain, Denmark and 
Canada (Sforzi 1989; for other studies see Pyke and Sengenberger 1992).
In turn, this empirical evidence of networks of small firms has taken on an 
enlarged significance because of the way that the concept of the industrial district 
has been appropriated by and incorporated into a broader analysis of changes in 
industrial organisation. Influential in this respect has been Piore and Sahel's The 
Second Industrial Divide (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The first industrial divide was 
the Industrial Revolution, in which mass production methods replaced small scale 
craft industries. The mass production model of Fordism is itself now in crisis, and 
this, according to Piore and Sabel, is partly because of exogenous shocks such as 
rises in the price of oil, but also because mass production methods are deemed to 
be inherently inflexible, relying on 'dedicated' machinery and therefore unable to 
satisfy increasingly affluent and sophisticated consumers' demands for greater 
variety. In turn this crisis of mass production opens up the prospect for a Second 
Industrial Divide, with a new model of industrial organisation based on the 
flexibly specialised small firm. The Italian industrial district is the paradigm of this 
emergent form of industrial organisation.
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A number of geographers, notably Alan Scott, and Michael Storper, have drawn 
on this work, to argue that in the West a new geography of flexible accumulation 
is in the making.2 Centres of mass production industry are in decline, and 'new 
industrial spaces' are in the process of being created (AJ. Scott 1988). This new 
post-Fordist world is defined above all by agglomerations of small and medium 
sized firms, which have a greater capacity to adapt to uncertain and changing 
product markets than large inflexible industrial organisations. Local/regional 
agglomerations of small flexibly specialised firms are, in this view, not simply 
feasible and sustainable, but are emblematic of a new industrial and geographical 
landscape.
It is not just in the West, however, where the thesis of 'flexible specialisation' is 
seen as offering a new model of industrial and regional development. A number 
of writers have actively canvassed the applicability of the idea to the Third World. 
Robin Murray, for example argues that just as in the West, where Fordism is in 
crisis, so in the Third World the received model of development based on large 
scale industrialisation has already revealed its limitations particularly in relation to 
the generation of employment. An alternative model of development now exists in 
the form of the industrial district of flexibly specialised small firms.
''Structures which were regarded as barriers to modernisation - small family 
firms for example.... can now be seen as the potential subsoil for alternative 
paths of industrialisation... This alternative reading of the industrialisation
2 Scott and Storper's work is a hybrid version of Piore and Sabel, combined with French 
Regulation theory. The latter seeks to explain the present economic crisis in the West in terms 
of the collapse of the postwar 'Fordist' regime characterised by mass production of standardised 
consumer goods. A major difference between Piore and Sabel, and Regulation Theory lies in 
their identification of the reasons for the collapse of mass production. For the former, emphasis 
is laid on demand factors, and the growth of sophisticated consumer tastes. For the 
Regulationists, collapse has come about because of the growth of organised labour, whose wage 
demands have led to reduced profitability, spurring the internationalisation of production, and 
the consequent deindustrialisation of the West (Dunford 1990).
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process and its organisation suggest new directions for industrial management 
and industrial policy" (Murray 1992: 207).
Schmitz has also pursued the argument that flexible specialisation is a paradigm of 
great relevance for industrialisation in developing countries (Schmitz 1990; 
Rasmussen, Schmitz and van Dijk 1992). He and his collaborators have argued 
that clusters of small scale industry are discernible in parts of the Third World, but 
"too often trapped in low profit/low innovation competition" (Rasmussen, 
Schmitz and van Dijk 1992:3). What is needed is an understanding of the 
conditions under which such clusters can be transformed into ’true' industrial 
districts, capable of sustained growth and accumulation. The same point has also 
been made by Sabel, who argues that
".... some parts of the informal sector could under certain conditions develop 
into a Latin American (or Brazilian or Colombian) variant of the small firm 
model of flexible specialisation" (Sabel 1986: 40).
This coupling of the informal sector concept, and flexible specialisation raises the 
question of how, if at all, these ideas are related. In the informal sector debate, as 
pointed out earlier, the International Labour Organisation and personnel from the 
Institute of Development Studies at Brighton were very much to the fore. In the 
current debate over 'flee, spec.', the ILO, through the International Institute for 
Labour Studies, and the IDS at Brighton also feature prominently. But apart from 
this institutional linkage, there seems to be a more fundamental linkage, in the 
common concerns that underlie both the informal sector debate and the current 
flee. spec, model. As Caroline Moser noted:
"The fundamental question underlying the whole informal sector debate 
concerns the ability or inability of small scale enterprises to generate not only 
employment, but also autonomous economic growth.." (Moser 1978: 1061).
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That question is also at the heart of the flexible specialisation model. Whereas the 
informal sector debate eventually tended towards a pessimistic answer, based on 
the view that the informal sector was subordinated to, and exploited by the formal 
sector, the experience of Italian industrial districts affords a more optimistic 
assessment of prospects for small scale manufacturing activities.
The burgeoning literature on industrial districts has certainly opened up an 
interesting and potentially fertile new approach to looking at small firms, in both 
the developed and the developing world. It is not necessary to subscribe to the 
hype and exaggeration of the Piore and Sabel Second Industrial Divide thesis, 
with its dubious assertions regarding the end of Fordist mass production. The 
view taken here is that the literature offers some insight into how clusters of small 
firms can develop along an evolutionary, as opposed to involutionary path of 
development. The concept can be used both analytically, in the sense of 
inquiring into whether the organisational principles of the industrial district can be 
found elsewhere; it can also be used, as Schmitz seems to suggest, as a 
programmatic or normative tool which might indicate how a more vibrant and 
viable small firm sector could be encouraged through appropriate policy measures.
The Subcontracting Model
So far our attention has concentrated on non-hierarchical networks of more or less 
equal small firms, and the way that through co-operative strategies, they can 
collectively become efficient and innovative. But as pointed out earlier, small 
firms can also survive by allying themselves with firms in the large scale sector as 
subcontractors. As Holmes has pointed out, the distinction between 
'subcontractor' and 'supplier1 is elusive (Holmes 1986: 84). Subcontracting has 
been formally defined as
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"a business arrangement between two independent firms - one (the contractor) 
provides the orders and the other (the subcontractor) furnishes the work or the 
services for the processing of materials or the production of parts, 
components... according to the specifications and the marketing arrangements 
of the contractor (UN Industrial Development Organisation 1974, quoted in 
Leung 1993:274)
What this seems to suggest is that a supplier produces standardised parts and 
components, while a subcontractor produces parts and components to the 
specifications laid down by the purchaser. In practice the distinction is extremely 
fine, but is important if only because the term 'subcontracting' has acquired 
prejudical connotations.
In the context of the Third World, the existing body of literature on 
subcontracting has been coloured by the debate over the formal/informal sector. 
The view that tended to prevail after the 1970s was that informal manufacturing 
units subcontracted work from large scale formal sector firms, with the benefits of 
subcontracting being appropriated by large enterprises at the expense of small 
units. Subcontracting came to be seen as a means by which large units could 
evade labour and minimum wage regulations, and the power of organised labour, 
by farming out work to unregulated small units. In doing so, the large firms 
profited from the ability of small firms to recruit from a large pool of 'surplus' and 
hence cheap labour. Nagaraj expresses this view when he describes 
subcontracting in India:
"Subcontracting is largely guided by two considerations; lower labour and 
overhead costs in small firms, and restricting in-house employment of workers 
to minimise the potential threat from organised labour" (Nagaraj 1984: 1451).
Subcontracting may encourage growth in the number of small enterprises, but 
individual subcontractors find themselves in the position of being squeezed by 
large firms to undertake work at the lowest possible cost. Profit margins are
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thereby reduced, so that small firms are at best able to survive, but find growth 
and accumulation difficult if at all possible.
In recent times, this largely negative view of subcontracting has been challenged 
by a number of observers (Holmes 1986; Mead 1984; Lawson 1992). Lawson, for 
example, has drawn attention to the variety of forms and rationales of 
subcontracting. Following Mead and Holmes, she distinguishes three main types 
of subcontracting:
1. subcontracting as a means of minimising labour costs
2. subcontracting to achieve production smoothing; i.e. large units use 
subcontractors as a buffer against cyclical shifts in demand.
3. subcontracting to overcome scale limitations. This refers to 
situations where specialist suppliers/subcontractors can operate at
high volumes and achieve economies of scale by supplying a number 
of independent large units.
Implicit in all three cases is the assumption that large firms resort to 
subcontracting in order to achieve cost reductions. For the moment we will go 
along with that assumption, but with the proviso that cost reduction per se may 
not afford a complete explanation for contracting out. The important element in 
Lawson's analysis is that these different forms of subcontracting are likely to have 
different implications for the subcontracting units and those employed within 
them. In the case of subcontracting to capture lower labour costs, (Fig 2.2, col 2) 
subcontractors may have little guarantee of continuing work, there is likely to be 
little security for workers, and given that the subcontracted work is likely to 
consist of simple, unskilled tasks, workers gain few new skills. Overall, such forms 
of subcontracting are unlikely to have a dynamic effect on the growth of the 
economy generally, except insofar as they contribute to the profitability of the
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large firm sector. On the other hand, where subcontracting takes place to 
specialised contractors to gain the benefits of economies of scale, (Fig 2.2, col 
3), the subcontractor is likely to have a more stable, long lasting relationship, 
which may itself encourage innovation and adaptability. The technological 
processes involved may require higher levels of technical skills and understanding, 
which may be transferred by employees into the establishment of new enterprises.
Subcontracting Forms 
and Rationales
1
Production Smoothing Use of Off-premises Technology
Workers Scale Limitations
Employment
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Contractual work
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4
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5
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7
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Subcontracting Subcontracting
FIGURE 2.2 Forms of subcontracting and their employment characteristics
(Source: Lawson 1992)
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The overall benefits of this form of subcontracting may thus be considerably 
greater.
This latter form of relationship bears some similarity to the form of industrial 
organisation in Japan. One of the remarkable features of Japan’s industrial 
structure is that, compared with many other countries, particularly in the 
developed world, small and medium sized industrial enterprises are numerically 
far more common (Table 2.1). The precise role that small firms play in the 
Japanese economy has been the subject of some controversy. One formulation 
views the Japanese industrial economy as a dual structure, in which large dominant 
firms have been able to enjoy a considerable competitive advantage through 
exploiting the multiplicity of small units. By drawing on an abundant, 
impermanent and unprotected labour force, small firms produce cheap 
components for the large firms (Friedman 1988: 128). This unequal exchange
TABLE 2.1 
Employment in small manufacturing
% manufacturing employment in firms 
with <100 employees
Japan 72
Italy 58
USA 53
France 43
UK 22
W. Germany 16
Source: for USA and Japan, Glasmeier & Sugiura (1991); for Europe, Mason & Harrison (1990).
between formal and informal sectors may, according to Friedman, have been the 
case in the early post-war period, when both large and small firms faced particular 
difficulties. Pre-war, small firms had specialised in producing consumer goods for
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both the domestic and export markets, both of which, at the end of the war had 
collapsed. Large vertically organised firms were confronted at the end of the war 
by a crippling shortage of plant and capital (Glasmeier and Sugiura 1991: 399). In 
these particular circumstances, small and large firms sought to resolve their 
particular problems by a marriage of convenience. Large firms made use of the 
capacity and resources of their smaller brethren, while small firms seized this 
opportunity to exploit this new source of demand for their services. More 
important still, during the American Occupation, large firms found themselves 
confronted by the rapid growth of militant Westem-style trade unions, whose 
eventual defeat was the result of a combination of mass dismissals and sponsorship 
of more compliant company unions (Halliday 1975: chap 8). To improve the 
latter's appeal, large employers conceded life time employment guarantees 
(Kenney and Florida 1988 :128). This was probably the most important factor 
encouraging the use of outside contractors, because with their unprotected labour 
force, they offered a means of upholding that commitment, and avoiding the 
potentially explosive prospect of periodic layoffs and dismissals.
For specific economic and political reasons, large firms resorted to subcontracting 
in the early 1950s. Since then, large firms have deliberately and consciously 
chosen to continue to contract out work rather than reverting to the pre-war 
pattern of vertically integrated large firms (Aoki 1988 :214) so that today, 
"virtually all manufactured goods are produced within an elaborate network of 
specialised production relationships" (Glasmeier and Sugiura 1991: 401). This 
network of relationships comprises a number of tiers of subcontractors and 
suppliers. First tier units are prime contractors, generally those ‘with a unique 
stock of production knowledge1 producing major assemblies for the large 
enterprises (Aoki 1988 :208/9). Second tier firms are those producing major 
components, while third and fourth tier units tend to specialise in producing single
45
often standardised components for higher tier units. In the automobile industry, 
the major manufacturers "normally maintain direct first tier relations with about a 
hundred suppliers, which in turn have second tier relations with still smaller 
subcontractors and so on" (Aoki 1988: 204). The relationship between firm size 
and position in this hierarchical layering appears to be rather complex. In general, 
lower tier units tend to be small in size, but higher tier units seem to come in all 
sizes - large, medium and small.
Patchell's detailed description of the robotics industry provides a good illustration 
of this hierarchical layering of firms (Patchell 1993). Matsushita is one of the 
largest Japanese robot manufacturers, and a world leader in its field. Production is 
divided between Matsushita's own plant, and three independent contractors (Toyo, 
Mori and Taiyo) each of which specialises in producing complete but different 
robot systems for Matsushita. Each parent plant in turn depends on a number of 
other subcontractors and suppliers (Fig 2.3). All four assembly plants, along with 
other major manufacturers, rely on the large firm (1000 employees) of Nippon 
Thomson, for example, for the supply of machine bearings. Trading firms like 
Harada and Daiden act as general agents, buying in standardised electrical and 
mechanical components made by small firms, and supplying them in bulk to the big 
manufacturers. A further set of relationships exists between the assembly plants 
and firms like Nishino whose eighteen employees provide highly specialised 
milling services, and Minamimoto which also provides specialised machining 
services.
This example of robotics manufacture serves to emphasise the pattern of vertical 
disintegration which prevails throughout Japanese industry (Sato 1984). Large 
firms, whether they operate in technologically advanced industries such as 
robotics, or in car production or even in such 'traditional' industries as textiles
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(described by Dore), farm out discrete phases of production to formally 
independent firms. This subcontracting is highly organised, and involves much 
more than a simple market transaction. Having chosen the path of vertical 
disintegration, large firms have also recognised the importance of developing and
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maintaining stable, long term relationships with suppliers and subcontractors. And 
having invested time and effort in developing such long term relationships, there is 
a reluctance to sacrifice that effort for the possibly short-term advantage of 
cheaper supplies offered by other contractors (Dore 1986 :81). This is not to say 
that there is no competition between suppliers and contractors; in the car, textile 
and robotics industries, large firms encourage competition by using several 
suppliers for the same or similar products, and as Dore points out
" A supplier or subcontractor which was unable to meet the prices and quality 
standards which other suppliers were providing... would in the end be dropped 
- perhaps after a grace period allowed for 'reform'. So there are market 
mechanisms at work, albeit 'lagged' market mechanisms" (Dore 1986 :81).
An important feature of subcontracting in Japan is, then, the development of 
'relational' transactions - that is the relationships are long-term and 'quasi­
permanent' (Aoki 1988 :204). This arrangement, according to Asanuma, is to be 
explained in economic rather than cultural terms (Asanuma 1989: 29). In return 
for the relative security of a 'relational contract', small and medium sized units 
can expect a good deal of support and co-operation as well as continuing orders. 
By offering support and security to their suppliers, large firms expect them to 
improve production over time, to invest in new technology, and to meet more 
exacting quality standards. Indeed because of their reliance on subcontractors, 
large firms have a vested interest in ensuring that suppliers are competent and 
efficient, and to that end, large firms offer considerable tangible help. Apart from 
helping suppliers and subcontractors with funds, by lending tools and machinery, 
and giving advice, 'it is common in the engineering industries for large firms to 
second engineers, technicians or skilled workers to their suppliers' (Dore 1986: 
82).
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This picture of the top-down diffusion of information from parent organisations 
painted by Dore needs to be filled out according to Patchell, by an appreciation of 
the genuinely co-operative nature of industrial development (Patchell 1993a: 802). 
Suppliers and parent companies may work together on new product designs and 
in modifying and improving manufacturing processes. Such shared technological 
development helps to further cement the relational ties between parent and 
suppliers and demonstrates the mutual commitment that underlies the system of 
relational contracting (Aoki 1988 : 216). This mutual commitment and the sharing 
of information which it breeds are in turn the foundation for achieving high quality 
and low cost production.
We have looked at two instances where small firms would appear to have enjoyed 
a considerable degree of success. In both Emilia, and in Japan, small firms have 
grown in number, have experienced a process of technological improvement, and 
helped to bring a degree of prosperity. Emilia, for example is now ranked the 
twelfth most prosperous region in the European Union, with a per capita GDP 
which is 28% above the European average, while unemployment in the late 1980s 
was half the European average (Commission of the European Communities 1991: 
Tables A24, A25). Japan's phenomenal growth hardly needs emphasising. There 
is continuing disagreement about the factors behind that country's post-war 
miracle, but a number of commentators firmly point to the significance of the 
system of industrial production and its incorporation of relational subcontracting 
(Sato 1984; Sayer 1986; Kenney and Florida 1988; Dore 1986). From a broader 
perspective, the overall growth in the number of small firms has been 
accompanied by an erosion of the wage differential that existed between 
employees in large and small units in the early 1960s (Aoki 1988 : 221). 
Admittedly, in Emilia, as Fergus Murray has pointed out, and in Japan, there are 
continuing wage differentials according to level of skill and gender, and there are
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questions about the stability of work in small firms (Murray 1987). Such issues 
are not however peculiar to small firms, but they do remind us of the need to 
avoid an uncritical idealisation of the small firm. What these two examples 
suggest is that some form of small scale industrialisation is viable, but small scale 
industrialisation is not a panacea for all the problems of society.
The question that arises is under what conditions can small scale industrialisation 
be successful? Are there any features which are necessary to promoting a viable 
small scale sector? The account given above of Emilia and of Japan has 
emphasised the particular and unique 'local' circumstances in which small scale 
industrialisation developed. In both instances, the growth of small firms has to be 
understood in terms of specific historical circumstances, and these are unlikely to 
be replicated elsewhere. But the account also suggests that, regardless of 
specific historical origins, there are certain common general features which have 
been of some importance in sustaining the small firm sector. The first factor is the 
clustering of small firms in geographical space; and the second is the high level of 
cooperation and collaboration which characterises inter-firm relations.
Clustering
The literature on Italian industrial districts suggests that geographical clustering is 
a further element in successful small scale industrialisation. Clustering creates 
the basis for an expanded division of labour, and consequently for individual small 
firms to specialise in one or other parts of the production process. At the same 
time, the growth of a local agglomeration of related firms provides the basis for 
the development of both informal and formal methods of information diffusion. 
Firms within a cluster of related activities are more likely to be privy to relevant 
information than the physically isolated unit. In the case of Japan, much of the 
literature on relational subcontracting tends to ignore the geographical dimension
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of the relations among firms. Even Patchell's informative account of the robotics 
industry relegates geography to the final conclusion, indicating that M (T)he robot 
makers are spatially dispersed, and each robot maker is supported by a vertical 
division of labour in its home base" (Patchell 1993b: 944). In other words, 
contractors and subcontractors tend to agglomerate around the parent companies. 
Geographers like Estall, and Sayer have tended to explain such clustering in terms 
of the adoption of Just-in-time methods, where frequent deliveries contribute to 
cost reductions by relieving larger firms of the need to tie up capital in large 
inventories (Estall 1985; Sayer 1986). Valid as that may be, the logic of the 
Japanese system of relational subcontracting suggests that clustering is as much 
about the exchange of information as of the flows of merchandise between firms. 
The point is highlighted in Glasmeier and Sugiura's account of efforts to 
decentralise industry from Tokyo, a policy which has foundered on the reluctance 
of small and medium firms to move out. In spite of rapidly rising land values, 
small firms remain highly concentrated:
"Because of their network associations, they are prohibited from decentralising. 
Thus even firms which do own land must remain in their clusters for reasons of 
industrial access" (Glasmeier and Sugiura 1991: 409).
This suggests that clustering persists in spite of the shortage and high price of land 
in Tokyo and in turn, this persistence reflects the benefits of geographical 
association. The localisation of small firms, both in Japan, and in Italy appears to 
be significant for the way in which it promotes the potential for a greater division 
of labour and the exchange and interchange of information.
While a necessary condition, geographical clustering is not a sufficient condition 
for healthy and evolutionary small firm development. Amin's study of the 
Neapolitan shoe industry demonstrates how the clustering of units within a limited
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sector of industry can lead to extreme competition, driving down rewards for all 
producers, and creating a low profit/low investment trap (Amin 1989). More 
interesting still is Dawson's study of small scale industry in Kumasi, Ghana 
(Dawson 1991: 173-207). Framed in the context of the formal/informal sector 
debate, Dawson looks at the effect of structural adjustment policies, noting their 
adverse impact on formal sector enterprises, and the consequent swelling of the 
informal sector. In most sectors, barriers to entry are low, and the result has 
been cut-throat competition. A similar fate has befallen the match industry of 
Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu State, India (Business India, Dec 7 1992: 91/2). It is 
estimated that there are as many as one thousand small units making matches, and 
these compete with each other, and with an even greater number of "tiny" units. 
Extreme competition has encouraged the small units to diversify into producing 
fireworks, while others specialise in printing labels and making packaging 
materials. Chronic overproduction and ruinous competition has encouraged the 
widespread use of cheap child labour and especially of young girls (The 
Economist, January 15 1994: 66). Low conditions of entry, very limited skill 
acquisition and a limited division of labour suggest that small industry in Sivakasi 
has reached a ceiling beyond which further diversification will be difficult to 
pursue because of the limited activity base.
Cooperation
What seems to be an important distinguishing factor between the Naples shoe 
industry and small units in Kumasi and Sivakasi on the one hand, and the small 
firms of Emilia Romagna and of Japan on the other, is the much more highly 
developed level of inter-firm cooperation in the latter instances. In Emilia, 
cooperation takes the form of both informal collective action, where firms jointly 
share information among themselves and have created credit unions and joint 
marketing organisations, while also being involved directly in the more formal
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support system operated through ERVET. In Japan, as in PatchelTs account, 
small firms are not passive recipients of orders from large firms but are actively 
involved in sharing information (Patchell 1993a). What is truly distinctive about 
the Italian industrial district, and the Japanese subcontracting system is that 
relations between firms are based on high levels of cooperation and reciprocity. It 
is by collective endeavour that small firms are enabled to overcome their individual 
weaknesses and to learn from others. But such collective efforts in turn depend 
on high levels of trust and trustworthiness between firms. To mainstream 
economists, trust is not an issue. Where cooperation with others confers benefits 
which individuals would not otherwise enjoy, then rational self-interested 
individuals will indeed cooperate to secure those benefits. The difficulty with this 
view is that rational self-interest may just as easily promote opportunism and free 
riding (Granovetter 1985: 487/8; Olson, 1965).
Trust appears to be an important determinant of genuine voluntary cooperation 
(Fukuyama 1995). Where individuals can count on the basic honesty, fairness and 
reliability of others, then genuine cooperation is feasible. Where there is little trust 
in others, then cooperation is likely to fail. In one sense, of course, all economic 
exchanges involve trust; indeed as Luhman points out, "the very complexity of 
social life makes trust a basic fact of social life (Luhman 1979: 4). The dilemma is 
that in trusting others, we lay ourselves open to abuse. Small firms in particular 
are open to such hazards. Of necessity they depend on others for inputs, markets 
and information generally, but that dependence exposes them to sharp practice, 
opportunism and cheating. They may be prey to unscrupulous suppliers of inferior 
raw materials and sub-standard components, to traders who use their market 
power to depress prices, to their fellow entrepreneurs who take advantage of 
information and help, but fail to reciprocate. Where opportunism is rife, 
cooperation is unlikely to be forthcoming and the opportunity to learn from
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others, including learning about mistakes, simply does not arise. On the other 
hand, where strong bonds of trust prevail, the risks of abuse may be assumed to be 
small and a major obstacle to collaboration is removed. And in turn, successful 
collaboration reinforces and promotes mutual trust and confidence and encourages 
further collaboration (dei Ottati, 1994: 532). As Ostrom puts it, in her discussion 
of collective action in managing common property resources, such as forests and 
grazing land:
"In a setting in which few individuals share norms about the impropriety of 
breaking promises, refusing to do one's share, shirking, or taking other 
opportunistic actions, each appropriator must expect all other appropriators to 
act opportunistically ... In a setting in which there are strong norms against 
opportunistic behaviour, each appropriator will be less wary about the dangers 
of opportunism" (Ostrom, 1990: 36).
This begs the question of how trust arises. One persuasive view is that trust is 
rooted in social and cultural norms and practices (Fukuyama 1995: chapter 1). In 
this view, relations between firms are 'embedded' in broader social relations which 
are themselves the product of a particular local history (Granovetter 1985). In 
the case of the Third Italy, a number of authors have pointed to the significance of 
agrarian relations, family type and land tenure (Bamford, 1987; Capecchi, 1989; 
Hadjimichalis and Papamichos, 1990; Putnam, 1993). These accounts suggest 
that the survival from pre-modern times until relatively recently of the extended 
sharecropping family, which combined farming with artisanal activity, fostered the 
virtues of initiative, enterprise and good management skills, while also 
encouraging a variety o f forms of mutual aid:
"..typical of which was the aiutarella, the exchange of labour between families 
at crucial moments in the agricultural calendar.... On a cultural level there was 
also the important practice of the veglia. During the long winter evening, 
families would gather.. to play cards and games, to knit and to mend, and to 
listen and to tell stories. Participation in the veglia .. involved rotating
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hospitality and a complex system of visiting” ( Silverman, quoted in Putnam 
1993: 142/3)
Such social arrangements helped to foster a high level of social solidarity, which in 
turn spawned the development of agricultural cooperatives, artisans and other 
mutual aid organisations (Putnam, 1993: chapter 5). These organisations, from 
the early decades of this century, provided a base for the growth of the socialist 
and communist parties. Their electoral success, especially in postwar Emilia 
Romagna, has been predicated on tapping into and organising within the dense 
network of associations within the province, while at the same time "championing 
small business interests., and assisting the self-employed.." (Weiss 1988: 49). The 
Left's success was based, in other words, on utilising and building on the existing 
high level of social solidarity, which was further strengthened by the conflict with 
the virulently anti-communist and pro-big business bias of the ruling Italian 
Christian Democrats. As Capecchi notes,
"The clash with the national (Christian Democratic) government on the part of 
a (Communist) region leads, as a matter of fact, to the formation of a 
"community" culture .. in which local administrators, artisans, and workers are 
"united" as against a common enemy (Capecchi, 1989: 199).
What emerges from this brief sketch is that, because of its particular social, 
cultural and political history, Emilia Romagna is a region in which strong ethical 
values are deeply entrenched. Those shared social values emphasise mutual aid, 
solidarity, reliability and trust, and it is those strong social norms which underpin 
successful inter-firm cooperation, as well as strong collaboration between the 
private and the public sectors.
The point is brought home forcefully by the contrasting experience of the 
Mezzogiomo, which has a very different social, economic and political history
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(Bamford, 1987; Mingione, 1981: 8 Iff; Putnam, 1993: chapter 5). Large landed 
estates were the main source of employment, providing occasional work for the 
mainly landless, and largely urban population. Competition for such work did 
little to promote social solidarity and communitarianism, while Spanish rulers in 
the south promoted distrust as a means of maintaining their political control 
(Pagden, 1988). Thus, whereas Emilia Romagna has developed a virtuous culture 
of trust, solidarity and mutual cooperation, circumstances in Southern Italy 
propelled it towards a culture of mistrust and suspicion.
The proposition that cooperation is rooted in socio-cultural norms and practices 
seems to be borne out in the case of Japan too. According to Murakami, "The 
single most important characteristic of the Japanese cultural tradition is a 
particular type of organisational principle, and that principle is the organisation of 
society into groups (Murakami, 1987: 35). Groups of unrelated individuals are 
omnipresent throughout Japanese society (Reischauer, 1977: 131)
Schoolchildren, for example, are organised into 'han' groups; every residential 
neighbourhood has its 'han' association, and of course, within companies, working 
practices are based on groups (Sugimoto, 1966: chapter 10). Sugitomo suggests 
that the pervasiveness of group membership is a form of social regimentation, 
"designed to standardise the thought patterns and attitudes of the Japanese and 
make them toe the line in everyday life" (Sugimoto, 1996: 2445). Whether that is 
the case or not, what seems clear is that membership of a group carries with it a 
set of moral obligations to others, which help to promote the virtues of loyalty and 
cooperation. Both Dore and Morishima trace the origins of loyalty and goodwill 
to others to the influence of Confucianism, which, in its Japanese form, elevated 
loyalty to the status of supreme virtue, whereas in China, benevolence was more 
highly regarded (Morishima, 1982:8/9; Dore, 1983). While acknowledging the 
impact of Confiician ethics, Reischauer places much more stress on the legacy of
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Japanese feudalism, which subordinated the individual to the village community, 
"which shared water resources for the rice fields and cooperated in handling its 
taxes and other administrative problems" (Reischauer 1977:132). As in the Third 
Italy, the nature of pre-modem social practices placed a premium on close 
association between non-kin and helped create a social pattern in which individuals 
were encouraged to work together as part of a larger grouping. This socio­
cultural heritage, and the social norms of trust and cooperation embedded in it, is 
seen to be the basis for thriving networks of small firms. What this particular 
interpretation seems to suggest is that trust, and reciprocal cooperation, cannot be 
manufactured or engineered. Rather, trust and the prospects for successful 
cooperation are characteristic of some, but by no means all societies. In 
Coleman's terms, some societies have more social capital than others (Coleman, 
1988).
The view that economic cooperation is embedded in socio-cultural norms and 
practices is by no means unchallenged. Weiss, while acknowledging that the 
successful small firm networks of Emilia Romagna thrive within a collectivist and 
communitarian tradition, argues that solidarity and communitarianism' are 
consequences rather than causes of small firm organisation" (Weiss, 1988: 202).
In this perspective, economic cooperation does not necessarily only arise out of 
social practices, but can be created. And one of the ways that can happen is 
through the repeated interaction between specialised firms within a limited 
geographical area. Repeated interaction between specialised small firms within an 
agglomeration creates a fund of local knowledge about the reliability and 
trustworthiness of others. Through repeated interaction, firms gain a reputation 
for better or worse (dei Ottati: 1994: 533). Those with a poor reputation may find 
themselves increasingly isolated and unable to prosper, and it is that prospect 
which can provide the incentive to build a good reputation by acting in a
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trustworthy manner. In his examination of subcontracting networks in the 
Lyonnais engineering industry, Lorenz argues for "an incremental notion of trust, 
of trust being built up in successive stages" and this comes about through personal 
contact, which is facilitated by geographical proximity (Lorenz, 1979: 207). In 
this perspective bonds of trust are not necessarily a precondition for cooperation; 
rather cooperation and collaboration can be created on the basis of 'time and 
experience" (Lorenz, 1979: 207).
Public policy may also contribute to creating trust and promoting collaboration. 
By providing real services, the state can reduce the risks which confront small 
firms, but more important, by providing services that are effective and address the 
needs of small firms, a partnership between the public and private sector 
demonstrates just what can be achieved by collaboration. Such a model may in 
turn encourage further partnerships (covering, for example, the greater 
involvement of universities and training institutions), as well as stimulating 
cooperation between small firms, and between small and large firms. As 
Holmstrom has argued:
".. once (publicly provided) 'real services' exist and are used, they can be the 
basis for building up and encouraging trust. They are object lessons in the 
possibility of common action, and an incentive to organise more of it.
(Holmstrom 1997: L17-L18).
In both Italy and Japan, there is a favourable policy disposition towards small 
firms. In Japan, since the early 1950s, the federal government has supported small 
businesses through the Office of Small and Medium Enterprises within the ministry 
for International Trade and Industry, a body which is widely credited with 
masterminding Japan's phenomenal postwar economic success (Glasmeier and 
Sugiura 1991: 406/8). In Italy, too, national policy has been very favourable to 
small enterprises (Bellini, Giordani and Pasquini, 1990: 173). But it is not at all
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clear whether, if at all, such national policies have contributed to successful small 
scale industrialisation. In their review of European industrial districts, Schmitz 
and Musyck were sceptical of the state being able to play the role of a social 
catalyst. They argued strongly that
".. none of the industrial districts are the result of planned action, of a local or 
regional strategy. They all developed spontaneously. Public and private sector 
institutions did play a role in their growth process but they were not created by 
these institutions" (Schmitz and Musyck, 1993: 31).
More recently however, Humphrey and Schmitz have reported examples from 
both Denmark and Chile where public policy appears to have had a much more 
positive and effective impact (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). In Chile, the 
government agency responsible for promoting small manufacturing firms, 
SERCOTEC, introduced a programme to encourage networking among small and 
medium enterprises. In spite of what Humphrey and Schmitz describe as Chile's 
"highly individualistic and anti-state entrepreneurial culture" (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 1996: 1871), the programme appears to have met with some success. 
SERCOTEC's strategy has been to work with a small group of firms within a 
particular locality, diagnosing their problems and offering appropriate support, 
which may involve coordination with other agencies in both the public and private 
sectors, such as training institutes, banks, and suppliers. This problem-solving 
approach has helped to overcome initial scepticism, and allowed the programme to 
proceed to the next stage of encouraging close relations among the individual 
firms through setting up group workshops and visits to each other's factories. The 
programme is very much that of a catalyst; SERCOTEC's involvement seems to be 
self-terminating, with the aim that after a defined period of time, groups of small 
firms will be self-sustaining and require no further assistance. Evaluating this 
programme, Humphrey and Schmitz state that "Firms are not only working 
together, but also taking initiatives on product and process development, human
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resource development, sales and finance” (Humphrey and Schmitz 1996: 1871). 
Here is an instance then, where public policy appears to have succeeded. And it 
has succeeded because of "skilled external assistance" (Humphrey and Schmitz 
1966: 1872). That is, to be effective, state policy must address the real needs of 
small firms, and it must be able to provide effective means of dealing with them.
We have looked at cooperation, and the bases for cooperation, because it is 
fundamental to the functioning of industrial networks in both Japan and Emilia 
Romagna. There is an apparent division of opinion between those who argue that 
trust is a pre-requisite for cooperation and that trust and cooperation are 
embedded within specific local/regional/national social practices and traditions; 
and those who argue that trust can be engineered, either by 'time and experience', 
or by 'skilled external assistance'. These interpretations need not, however, be 
taken as mutually exclusive. Where there already exists a degree of trust and 
embryonic forms of cooperation among small entrepreneurs, public policy can 
build on that to develop a more dynamic and vibrant local economy. On the other 
hand, on the basis of Humphrey and Schmitz's examples in Chile, even where 
mistrust and suspicion seem to prevail, public policy can still achieve a great deal, 
provided support is relevant, high quality and directly useful to small firms 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996).
From the foregoing account of small scale industrialisation, and the differences in 
experience of Emilia Romagna and Japan on the one hand, and Naples, Sivakasi 
and Kumasi on the other, it is possible to construct a number of ideal type models 
of small firm organisation:
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1. The competitive cluster is characterised by
• a geographical concentration of small and medium enterprises 
which exhibit specialisation by product or process
• linkages with other firms, large and small, which are 
predominantly based on market exchange
• the absence of collective and cooperative organisations, such as 
credit unions, joint marketing and other self-help organisations
• lack of support for small firms by other public and private sector 
organisations.
Such an ideal type is one where there is little in the way of cooperation and trust, 
and in the absence of mutual help, competition prevails. Competition may drive 
down profits and wages, reducing the ability to accumulate and invest in new 
product and process technology, exposing individual units to pressures from large 
firms, or from more progressive firms elsewhere. A cluster of this type is likely to 
be characterised by low levels of accumulation and growth, and lack of dynamism.
2. The non-hierarchically organised industrial district is based on the 
Emilian ideal type, characterised by (Rabellotti, 1995):
• a geographical concentration of small and medium enterprises, 
which exhibit specialisation by product or process
• linkages between enterprises based on both market and non- 
market exchanges of goods and information
• a well developed informal system of cooperation between 
enterprises, as shown by the existence of credit unions, joint 
buying and marketing arrangements, and producers 
organisations
• a network of public and private agencies providing support for 
small and medium enterprises
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In this instance, competition is overlain by forms of cooperation. Individual firms 
collaborate both informally, and formally through a local information network in 
which they themselves have a voice. This information network is the means by 
which individual, otherwise isolated small firms can cope with, or at least begin to 
reduce the many uncertainties that beset small firms - and especially uncertainties 
about market opportunities, new trends and products, and new technologies. 
Networking is thus a form of collective learning, which helps to promote 
collective adaptiveness and collective efficiency. Holmstrom believes that "an 
Indian model of flexible specialisation may already be developing in some places, 
or might be encouraged by national or local governments", helped by India's 
strong tradition of innovative craftsmanship, its informal networks of aid among 
entrepreneurs, and a well educated, numerate and self-confident labour force 
(Holmstrom 1993: M84). However, Holmstrom also points to the weakness of 
political institutions, especially at the local level, and the suspicion and lack of 
trust among Indian entrepreneurs of anyone outside the family, caste or religious 
community, as major obstacles to the development of collective action 
(Holmstrom 1993: M85).
3. the hierarchically organised cluster is characterised by
• a geographical concentration of small and medium enterprises, 
which exhibit specialisation by product or process
• linkages which are predominantly with large firms and based on 
quasi-permanent, and non-market exchange
• a high level of cooperation between small and large firms, based 
on the exchange of goods, information and personnel
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Characteristically, in this case, small firms develop stable and long term 
relationships with large enterprises. The stability of such relationships may be 
particularly beneficial for small enterprises, encouraging innovative behaviour 
while at the same time reducing the burdens of searching for new markets. 
Moreover, such relationships are the means by which technology transfer is 
effected, raising the overall technological sophistication of the small firm sector. 
Forms of relational subcontracting have received little attention in the literature on 
India, in favour of a more negative preconception. Yet there is some evidence that 
the government's ancillarisation programme has met with at least limited success. 
Nagaraj, for example, in his review of subcontracting refers to a study undertaken 
by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry of subcontracting by its 
member firms (Nagaraj 1984). That study revealed that large firms in a wide 
range of industries, but especially engineering, do subcontract and to a sizeable 
number of small firms in some cases. Kirloskar Bros, for example, are reported to 
regularly contract out work to 165 outside firms; Larsen and Toubro to some 600 
mainly small firms, and Mico, manufacturer of auto components to some 260 
small firms. More interesting than the scale of subcontracting is that these large 
companies offer more than simply a market for subcontractors. Most of the large 
firms included in the survey were found to provide some form of 
technical/management advice and support. Mico for example is recorded as 
providing comprehensive technical assistance, training of personnel, supply of 
tools and equipment, while Kirloskar Bros provided their suppliers with guidance 
about the selection of machinery and training for workers.
These three models provide us with a framework with which to look at the 
development of small firms. Like all models, they are idealised constructs; in 
practice, industrial clusters may well be hybrids, exhibiting characteristics of more 
than one of the individual models outlined above.
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An approach to small manufacturing units which sees them as part of a network of 
interacting small firms seems to be potentially useful for the kinds of questions and 
issues that it raises. Attention is directed away from looking at the individual firm 
and how efficiently it uses capital or labour, and concentrates instead on 
identifying and examining clusters of small firms and the relations that exist within 
such clusters. What kind of relationships exist between small firms? Are they 
primarily competitive, or is there evidence of co-operative behaviour? Is there any 
evidence of the development of a local institutional support system for small 
firms? What role do government and non-govemmental agencies play locally in 
relation to small firms? What relationship exists between small and large 
industries? Is the relationship simply exploitative, or do large firms actively 
promote the development of small firms through technology transfer and the 
provision of relatively stable markets for their output?
To date there are relatively few empirical studies that have adopted this approach. 
Among the few published studies of industrial clusters are Schmitz's study of the 
shoe industry of the Sinos Valley, Southern Brazil, and Morris and Lowder*s study 
of the shoe supply industry of Leon, Mexico (Schmitz 1993; Morris and Lowder 
1992). The building and carpentry industry of Mutare, Zimbabwe, are surveyed by 
Rasmussen, while Smyth et.al have provided a brief review of clustered industries 
(the rattan, batik, textiles and metals industries) of Indonesia (Rasmussen and 
Sverrisson 1994; Smyth et al 1994). In the Indian context, Pamela Cawthome's 
recent study of the hosiery industry of Tiruppur (Tamil Nadu) is a pioneering 
exploration of an industrial cluster (Cawthome 1995). Her original work was not 
concerned with industrial districts and clusters as such, but with the labour 
process', that is, with " what happens to workers as economic change takes place: 
how it affects work and what workers themselves do about it” (Cawthome 1993: 
47). As such, she says little about the local support system for industry. She
64
shows the industry is comprised of two sets of firms - a small group of large units, 
and their subcontractors, and a second group of small units which collectively 
produce finished garments. What further distinguishes the large and small units is 
that the latter group largely serves the domestic market, while the former have 
become increasingly export-oriented, with multinational retailing agents playing an 
important role in enforcing stringent quality control and design specifications. Her 
findings parallel those of Schmitz for Southern Brazil, where mainly foreign buyers 
have played an important role in fostering the growth of firms, reflecting the way 
that consumer goods producers in Italy have become organised. Finally, 
Holmstrom's monograph provides a non-quantitative and impressionistic 
description of small industry in Bangalore (Holmstrom 1994). Thus far, empirical 
examination has not proceeded very far. In particular, the role of the state in 
relation to the creation of a self-supporting and dynamic small scale sector has 
attracted little attention, in spite of the obvious policy implications. The question 
of whether public policy can contribute to furthering the process of small scale 
industrialisation is one of importance to many countries in the Third World and 
deserves closer scrutiny.
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Ch a pte r  3 The Scope a n d  Co n ten t  of the Sm a l l  In d u st r ie s  Policy
In India, a state policy of promoting small manufacturing industry emerged in the 
years immediately following Independence. The contours of this policy were 
strongly influenced by the views of a team of Western and Indian economists, set 
up under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, to advise the Indian Government. 
Members of that team subsequently established themselves at the Stanford 
Research Institute, and influenced the programmes of small industry development 
in Latin America (Kilby 1988: 226). From the 1960s, India began to export its 
small industry policy to other Asian and African countries, both through 
secondments to the World Bank and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation, and through direct contacts with, and assistance to other 
governments which continue up to the present day. The latest report of the Small 
Industries Development Organisation records visits by delegates from seven 
countries - Kenya, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Brunei, Mexico, Indonesia and 
Bangladesh - to learn from India's long experience in the field (GOI, Development 
Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, 1994: 40/41).
Within India, the policy of promoting the growth of a modem small scale 
manufacturing sector has been an important, but essentially subsidiary component 
of postwar development strategy. The Second Five Year Plan set India on the 
path of building a self-sufficient and modem economy, to be realised through a 
state-directed strategy of heavy industrialisation.
The Planning Era
Stem has described India at the time of its Independence in 1947 as
" ..possibly the largest aggregate of impoverished, unhealthy and 
illiterate people in the world” (Stem 1993: 137).
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In 1951 life expectancy at birth for men stood at 32.4 years, and 31.7 for women; 
only 27.2% of males and 8.9% of females qualified as literate (GOI, Ministry of 
Finance 1994: Appendix Table 0.1). With industry contributing 7% of GDP, India 
was overwhelmingly rural and poor. In the course of the 1950s, India embarked 
on an ambitious programme designed to transform that economy. The Industrial 
Policy Resolution of 1948, and the amended version of 1956, laid down the long 
term strategic goals and objectives, while successive five year plans spelled out 
specific medium term priorities and programmes. Apart from a brief period 
between 1977-80 when the Janata Government openly espoused Gandhian 
populism, the broad aims guiding post-Independence policy have been
• to achieve national self-reliance and national self-sufficiency1
• to create employment opportunities for all
• to raise living standards
• to reduce the concentration of economic power
• to achieve more balanced regional development
These broad, and potentially conflicting aims, were to be achieved by a state 
directed industrialisation drive, which formed the focus of the Second Five Year 
Plan of 1956. India's industrialisation was to be effected through an import 
substituting strategy, designed to free the country - at least in the longer term - 
from its past international dependence, and to reinforce its newly-won 
independence. Industries were to be protected from external competition by an 
elaborate system of import controls. High tariffs, quotas, and an import licensing 
system were designed to restrict the import of manufactured goods from abroad, 
and most especially o f consumer and intermediate goods as a means of 
encouraging their domestic production (Balasubramanyam 1984: 123; World 
Bank 1989: ch 4). This strategy, widely adopted in Latin America, Asia and
11 Self-reliance' was first used in the Third Plan, but according to the authors of the Fourth Plan, 
that aim was implicit in the Second Plan also
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Africa in the decades after World War Two usually involves the setting up initially 
of light consumer goods industries - such as textiles - and subsequently, through a 
process of backward integration, setting up heavier and more sophisticated 
industries in a stage by stage approach (Hirschman 1968). Already possessing a 
sizeable textile sector, as well as other consumer goods industries, the approach of 
the Indian planners in the Second Plan was to give the highest priority to:
"increased production of iron and steel, and of heavy chemicals and of
the heavy engineering and machine building industries.."
(GOI, Planning Commission, 1956: 393).
This programme of large scale heavy industrialisation, supported by heavy 
investment in developing the country's infrastructure, especially railways and 
power supplies, was to be spearheaded by public enterprises under direct state 
control. Acknowledging that 'the private sector has a valuable role to play', the 
1948 Industrial Policy Resolution argued for a 'progressively active role (for the 
state) in the development of industries.' (GOI, Industrial Policy Resolution 1948). 
The revised 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution sought to delimit the respective 
spheres of operation of the public and private sectors by identifying three 
categories of industry. Schedule A industries comprised a group of 17 industries ' 
the future development of which will be the exclusive responsibility of the state.'2 
Schedule B lists twelve industries 'which will be progressively state-owned.... but 
in which private enterprise will also be expected to supplement the effort of the 
state' (GOI Industrial Policy Resolution 1956). All other industries would be open 
to private investment, as well as to investment by the state.
2 This compares with six in the earlier Resolution. The expansion of the list is largely due to a 
more specific system of listing . Thus the 1948 version contained one general category of "iron 
and steel"; by 1956, this had been expanded into three separate categories - "iron and steel; 
heavy castings and forgings of iron and steel; heavy plant and machinery required for iron and 
steel production."
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Superficially, the Resolution can be interpreted - and indeed has - to mean that 
the state would henceforth control the commanding heights of the economy, while 
the private sector would be severely limited (Thakur 1993). A closer reading of 
the Resolution suggests otherwise. Paragraph 8 of the Resolution, dealing with 
Schedule A industries states:
"all new units will be set up by the state. This does not preclude the 
expansion of existing privately owned units, or the possibility of the 
state securing the co-operation of private enterprise in the 
establishment of new units when the national interest so requires. 
Railways and air transport, arms and ammunition and atomic energy 
will however, be developed as central government monopolies" 
(Industrial Policy Resolution 1956: para 8)
In effect, only four industries were to be totally closed to private enterprise. In 
essence what was proposed was the creation of a mixed economy in which the 
state would use its unparalleled ability to raise revenue, both domestically and 
from abroad, to invest in the infrastructure and at the same time to establish basic 
industries. These basic, nationalised industries would in turn supply the rest of the 
economy and the private corporate sector with basic inputs - and as it turns out, 
often at administered and artificially low prices.
But while there was considerable scope for private enterprise, it was not to be 
allowed total freedom of operation. On the contrary, the private sector was to be 
regulated through a system of licensing, introduced under the 1951 Industries 
(Regulation and Development) Act. The Act required the registration of all 
existing units in the 'scheduled industries' - broadly those listed in Schedules A and 
B of the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution. It also required all units to be 
established after May 1952 to be similarly licensed by the Government in the case 
where the unit would use power and employ more than 50 workers; or where the 
unit employed more than 100 workers without the aid of power. For all
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qualifying units, a license was necessary for the establishment of a new 
undertaking; the manufacture of a new product; and the relocation of any such 
unit. The broad rationale of this system was that in a country where resources - 
especially capital - are scarce, the use of such resources must be closely 
controlled to ensure that they are used wisely and in a manner consistent with 
social priorities, as determined by the Government (Ahluwahlia 1985:148). Thus 
the IDRA was the means by which the Government would exercise control over 
the pattern of industrial investment, avoiding overcapacity in some spheres, and a 
shortage of capacity in others.
Beyond that, the licensing system was intended to achieve other purposes too. 
The system allowed the authorities to determine who produced what, and, in 
theory, was a useful measure to control the activities of the large industrial 
houses, and thereby curb the growth of monopolies. Added to that, the license 
specified not just the amount of capacity to be created in each unit, it also 
contained provisions about where the unit was to be located. Potentially, the 
licensing system was a powerful weapon and the mechanism for implementing 
the stated aims of preventing the concentration of economic power, and achieving 
a more balanced regional distribution of industry3.
This bureaucratic system of industrial regulation - the ‘licence permit Raj' - has 
continued in operation until very recently. In the course of the 1980s, a number of 
industries were de-licensed, but the most comprehensive reform of the licensing 
and regulatory framework came in during and after 1991 as part of a sweeping 
liberalisation of the whole economy.
3 While the licensing provisions of the IDRA attract most attention, the Act also gave the 
Government other important powers - in particular, the power to take over 'sick' i.e. unprofitable 
units; and the power to control the price of basic commodities, notably iron and steel, and 
cement The system of uniform delivered prices adopted for steel helped to perpetuate industrial 
concentration at the expense of the government's stated policy < Seth, 1986).
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A further important consequence of the IDRA is that in defining a regulated, 
licensed manufacturing sector, the Act also defined an unregulated and unlicensed 
sector . This sector comprised all those units which fell below the employment 
ceilings specified in the IDRA. This unregulated sector, comprising the majority 
of units, was entirely outside the licensing system, so that there have been no 
controls over its growth and development. The First, and especially the Second 
Five Year Plan allotted a significant role to this unregulated sector. The essence 
of the strategy embodied in the Second Plan was to concentrate on building up the 
country's heavy industry to remedy the economy's basic structural weakness. 
Much of the necessary investment, along with investment in infrastructure, was to 
be made by the state, supported by the corporate sector, whose investments 
would be controlled by means of the licensing system. In turn, investment in 
industry, together with spending on infrastructure and on education and health 
would, according to the planners, provide a major stimulus to the economy, 
increasing the demand for wage and consumer goods. By means of the licensing 
system, the large-scale factory sector was to be prevented from meeting these 
demands.. Instead, demand for consumer goods was to be satisfied primarily by 
the small scale unregulated sector.
The Unregulated Manufacturing Sector
It will be useful at this point to spell out in a bit more detail the nature of the 
unregulated sector. A very mixed group of activities, it is the residual that is left 
after subtracting the licensed factory sector. It comprises, first, a group of village 
craft industries, or household industries as they are also referred to, e.g. pottery, 
handloom weaving, rice milling, and tanning. Such activities are not exclusively 
rural; they may also be found in some urban areas, along with more specifically 
urban crafts such as metalworking, the making of leather goods, printing, and the 
dyeing of cloth. The range of craft activities is huge, but whether carried out in
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villages or in cities, they have a common underlying characteristic, which is that 
they are mostly household, or family-based activities. They tend to make little use 
of hired labour; and they make little use of machinery, especially of power-driven 
machinery. In essence, these are very largely pre-capitalist forms of production.
They are therefore, conceptually quite distinct from the second component of the 
unregulated sector which consists of modem small-scale forms of manufacture. 
The latter is distinguished, not so much by what they produce, but by how they 
produce. Modem small-scale industries tend to make use of hired labour, and 
inanimate forms of power. While conceptually there is a clear distinction between 
household and modem small industry, in practice the distinction may be more 
elusive. Some household units for example, may use additional, hired labour; some 
may make use of powered machinery. In other words, these are not necessarily 
exclusive categories, but more in the nature of the extremes of a continuum, so 
that some household units may evolve or develop or be transformed into modem 
small units. The obstacles to this are, however, considerable. Numerous studies 
point to the continuing subordination of the household sector to merchants and 
traders, whose low rewards to producers help perpetuate their poverty which in 
turn blocks their ability to adapt new forms of production.
The Case for the Small Scale Sector
It was this unregulated small scale sector that was expected, in the Second Plan, 
to satisfy the bulk of the demand for consumer and wage goods. The case for 
supporting the unregulated sector of household and cottage industries was 
expressed in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956:
"The Government of India would... stress the role of cottage and 
village and small scale industries in the development of the national 
economy. In relation to some of the problems that need urgent 
solutions, they offer some distinct advantages. They provide 
immediate large scale employment; they offer a method of ensuring a
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more equitable distribution of the national income and they facilitate 
an effective mobilisation of resources of capital and skill which might 
otherwise remain unutilised. Some of the problems that unplanned 
urbanisation tends to create will be avoided by the establishment of 
small centres of industrial production all over the country"
(Industrial Policy Resolution 1956, para 13).
Essentially the case for promoting the unregulated sector rests on three 
arguments:
1. Employment generation
The contention is that units in the unregulated sector use less capital and more 
labour per unit of output than their large counterparts in the regulated factory 
sector. Assigning the production of consumer goods to the unregulated sector 
would therefore economise on the use of scarce capital, and at the same time 
generate much needed additional employment. It was generally recognised that 
the capital intensive nature of the large scale sector implied that it would be 
capable of absorbing relatively little labour, and that only in the long term because 
of the long lead times involved. Meanwhile, there was little expectation of 
expanding employment in the agricultural sector where underemployment was 
chronic. The small scale industrial sector on the other hand seemed to offer 
greater hope of providing work. That aim could be achieved by channelling 
demand for consumer goods towards the small scale sector. With assured 
demand, the small scale sector would expand, generating employment. 
Superficially, the argument is very attractive. But employment creation would 
follow from increases in output only if it is assumed that the unregulated sector is 
operating at or near full capacity. In those circumstances, increased demand for 
the products of the unregulated sector would, conceivably, lead to increased 
labour inputs. But, in the village and cottage industries sector, accounting for the 
bulk of units in the unregulated sector, that assumption was (and remains) 
untenable. Underemployment was - and remains - widespread among small
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producers (Koga 1968). Increased demand could therefore lead to ‘jobless 
growth'. Indeed, the Second Plan was itself sceptical about the ability of the 
cottage industries to absorb more labour, noting that "There is little scope for 
increasing the workforce in traditional small scale industries, which are already 
burdened with excessive numbers" (GOI, Planning Commission, 1956: 14).
In the case of the modem small scale industries, there is perhaps rather more 
justification for expecting output growth to lead to additional employment, but the 
assumption that such units are 'labour intensive and capital light' has to be 
questioned. From the late 1950s at least, empirical research has repeatedly 
undermined the thesis that 'small is always beautiful'. Amongst others, Dhar and 
Lydall's study in 1961 suggested that some modem small industries may indeed 
conform to the stereotype, but it is by no means generally true (Dhar and Lydall 
1961). The more recent, detailed World Bank study conducted by Little and 
others, came to the conclusion that "it is the medium size (50 - 200 workers), not 
the small, that is beautiful" (Little, Mazumdar and Page 1987: 126). Similarly, 
Bhavani's econometric study of small manufacturing concludes that it is not 
employment generating in the sense of substituting labour for other inputs such as 
capital (Bhavani 1991). All of this suggests that, while plausible, the argument 
that promoting the growth of the small scale sector as a whole would contribute to 
easing the employment problem is less than fully convincing.
2. Regional development.
The second argument advanced for favouring the unregulated sector is that it 
would contribute to a more balanced pattern of regional development and avoid 
the excesses associated with rapid urbanisation. What this seems to amount to is 
the contention that small scale activities can be decentralised much more easily 
than large scale enterprises. Small scale enterprises can thus be used as an 
instrument to promote rural and village development, and by creating
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employment locally within the countryside, cityward migration can be stemmed. 
As applied to the village and cottage industries, this argument again makes little 
sense. By definition, the village industries are already 'decentralised'. The 
argument appears to be more applicable to the modem small scale industries, 
which in the 1950s, and today, tend to be urban in location (Koga 1968). But 
even here, it is questionable whether small industries can be more easily 
decentralised than large ones. Regardless of scale, modem industry in India has 
tended to be spatially highly localised, reflecting the importance of inter-firm and 
inter-industry linkages as well as the pull of agglomeration economies. Rural 
areas, by contrast, have had little attraction because of their poorly developed 
infrastructure, their distance from sources of supply and from markets. Such 
obstacles to dispersal are arguably even more difficult for small modem industries 
to cope with than their large scale counterparts.
3. Mobilisation o f capital and skill
The final argument used to justify the production of consumer goods by the small 
scale sector is that by encouraging demand for its products, scarce resources of 
skill, of talent, and of capital can be mobilised for the social good. The argument 
seems to be that there are numbers of potential entrepreneurs whose skills and 
talents are currently going to waste, but which could be harnessed given some 
encouragement. At the same time, there are also people with capital (and 
presumably this is a reference to traders and merchants) who could be 
encouraged to invest productively in small enterprises. Guaranteeing a demand 
for the products of the small scale sector would provide the necessary stimulus to 
ensure the better use of the country's resource base, resulting in an expansion of 
the small scale sector.
The policy of promoting the village and small industries was justified, then, on the 
grounds that it would help to meet the broad policy aims of creating employment,
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and of promoting balanced regional development. Such arguments have been 
repeated in successive Plan documents, extending right up to the Planning 
Commission's Approach Document to the Eighth Plan. Taking as its overall aim 
"the need to remove the sources of discontent and unrest by attending to 
unemployment, illiteracy, ill-health and decline of the living conditions of the 
poor..", the Document claims that
"the thrust on employment and poverty will generate additional 
demand for mass consumption goods, the supply of which must 
expand. In meeting this requirement, the encouragement of labour 
intensive forms of manufacture on a decentralised basis is possible.
Many consumer goods can be produced economically using labour 
intensive techniques and with savings in energy and capital."
(GOI, Planning Commission, 1990; 47/8).
The same arguments used in 1956 to justify the promotion of the small scale 
manufacturing sector are still being used in 1990. The arguments are no more 
compelling now than they were then; if anything they are less convincing because 
of the accumulated weight of empirical evidence to the contrary.
While most commentators have accepted the highly dubious official justification 
for the small industiy policy - thereby ignoring the weight of empirical evidence 
against it - an alternative view has been put forward. Tyabji has argued with some 
force that the real aim behind the policy was to encourage the growth of a stratum 
of small capitalists (Tyabji 1980). In Tyabji's view, such a policy was intended to 
subserve two objectives. On the one hand, the growth of modem small industry 
would help to create a growing domestic market for machinery and other inputs 
from the large scale factory sector. As such a small scale industry policy would 
be complementary to the heavy industrialisation drive spearheaded by the state and 
corporate sector. Heavy industrialisation would deepen the development of 
capitalism, while the growth of small industries would broaden the process, by 
creating a demand for the products of the large scale sector. Secondly, according
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to Tyabji, there was also a more clearly political aim behind the policy - that of 
creating a class of entrepreneurs which would broaden the basis of support for the 
government (Tyabji 1984: 1425). To Tyabji's views, one might add a further 
plausible aim behind the promotion of modem small industries, namely as a means 
of attempting to avoid the further concentration of economic power in a few 
hands. One of the aims of the licensing system was precisely to secure that 
objective. However as the Das Gupta inquiry (GOI Monopolies Inquiry 
Commission, 1965), the Hazari inquiry (Hazari, 1967), and the subsequent Dutt 
Inquiry (GOI 1969 Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee) revealed, the 
licensing system was not in fact fulfilling its objective. One of the consequences of 
the evident trend to greater concentration was stiffer legislation in the form of the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1969) but the Monopolies 
Inquiry also included in its recommendations that greater assistance should be 
directed towards the small industry sector as a further means of broadening the 
industrial structure and limiting the power of the big industrial houses.
The ideological origins of the small industry policy
A proper understanding of the small industry policy has to take account of the 
historical context in which it developed. That context includes the debates and 
discussions within the nationalist movement in the decades preceding 
Independence. The main argument outlined here is that the impetus for the 
emergence of a policy for promoting small scale manufacturing has to be located 
in the tensions between two divergent strands of thinking - between the 
modernisers, intent on creating a modem industrial capitalist society, and 
populists, intent on recreating the self-sufficient village community.
The growth of nationalist sentiment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries focused attention on what was considered to be the crippling effects of
77
British rule on the sub-continent. The twin doctrines of free trade and laissez-faire 
as practised by the British colonial state in India - and indeed in other colonial 
territories - were self-serving and designed to buttress Britain's position as the 
workshop of the world. Laissez faire was not of course an absolute principle. In 
India the state did help to promote the growth of the railway system and of 
irrigation schemes. Such forms of intervention served to encourage the flow of 
primary commodities to Britain and free trade opened up markets in the colonies 
to British exports of manufactures. Indian nationalists were convinced that the 
lack of British support for the development of modem industries and the opening 
up of the country to British exports were actively promoting unemployment, 
underemployment and impoverishment. Superior British technology was seen to 
be undermining India's traditional handicrafts, while the colonial state's policy of 
benign neglect towards modem manufacturing, was creating as a consequence, a 
dearth of productive activity (Chandra, 1966).
For nationalists, the solution to growing impoverishment lay in the complete 
economic transformation of the country, to be achieved partly through the 
rehabilitation and modernisation of the handicraft sector, but primarily through the 
building up of a modem industrial sector. This task, it came to be argued, could 
not be left to foreigners, least of all the British, because to do so would leave India 
open to a continuing drain of wealth out of the country, to its enduring 
disadvantage. Echoing Marx, nationalists like Ranade and Dutt believed that a 
genuine economic transformation could only be effected by the growth of a 
specifically Indian capitalism. To that end, salvation lay in championing the cause 
of Independence, and the creation of an Indian state which in turn would 
contribute to the development of Indian capitalism by a state policy of 'direct, 
deliberate and systematic promotion of industrial enterprises' (Chandra 1966: 113; 
Mukheijee 1978: 1516).
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At the forefront of the independence struggle stood the Indian National Congress, 
a heterogeneous movement, representing a broad spectrum of political sympathies 
and interest groups, including a large section of India's nascent capitalist class 
(Mukheijee and Mukheijee 1988; Byres 1982). Both the intellectual leadership of 
the Congress, personified by Jawaharlal Nehru, and the capitalist class were 
agreed on the need for rapid industrialisation as part of a programme of economic 
transformation. This was an axiom of mainstream nationalist thinking.
Opposition to this general consensus came from Gandhi, whose personal 
attachment to the charkha (spinning wheel) and austere lifestyle, symbolised his 
view of India's future development. Populism, according to Wiles, is based on the 
premiss that "virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming 
majority, and in their collective traditions" (Wiles, 1969: 166). Gandhi's 
Constructive Programme was just such a populist programme to revive and 
recreate the 'traditional' self-sufficient and self-governing village community 
(Bandyopadhyaya 1969: ch XI). His vision was one of small-scale village 
industries, complementing agricultural production. According to Judith Brown he 
was not "the fanatical opponent of all machinery and industry....He was not 
totally hostile even to large scale production" (Brown 1990: 300). But his vision 
was significantly different from that possessed by Nehru and the capitalists. While 
in the short term accepting the existence of large scale industry, Gandhi, like other 
populist thinkers, reacted against the social, economic and political dislocation of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and championed the cause of (pre-industrial, 
and pre-colonial) local, agrarian communities. Because of his charisma, Gandhi 
drew large numbers of people into the struggle for Independence, and his Swaraj 
campaign may well have contributed to the growth of the cotton textile industry, 
but his economic ideals made few converts among the elite; and even among the 
generality of the population, it is not at all clear that his populist views were 
popular. While his views on economic matters were marginal, Gandhi's stature
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within the Independence movement was such that they could not be ignored 
entirely.
The prevailing views among the intellectual elite and the capitalist class were pro- 
Independence, and pro-industrialisation. Beyond agreeing on general aims, there 
was little meeting of minds over how the long term aim of building a modem 
economy should be achieved. A major area of controversy was over the role to be 
played by the state, and whether industrialisation could best be carried forward by 
some kind of state capitalism, or whether it should be left to private enterprise 
(Mukjeijee 1978; Toye 1981: ch 2). In an attempt to fashion a coherent and 
detailed economic programme for an independent India, Congress set up in 1938 
the All India National Planning Committee whose membership included leading 
industrialists (Walchand, Birla and Thakurdas) as well as politicians. While the 
Committee was never able to resolve the issue of how far the state should 
intervene directly in the ownership of industry, it did contribute to a general 
understanding that in order to create a modem economy, it would be both 
desirable and necessary to co-ordinate public and private investment decisions 
according to some overall plan for the economy (Ray 1979: 332-338). That 
planning was increasingly accepted by the capitalist class is illustrated by the 
publication by a leading group of industrialists of 'A Plan fo r the Economic 
Development o f India’, popularly known as the Bombay Plan (Thakurdas 1945). 
The eight signatories included Birla as well as the much more conservative 
J.R.D.Tata and two of his co-directors. The objective of the plan was for a 
doubling of per capita national income, to be achieved by a doubling of 
agricultural output, and a fivefold increase in industrial output (Thakurdas 1945: 
9). Industrial development was to focus on heavy industry and especially the 
power and capital goods industries. The Plan presaged the main features of post- 
Independence industrial and economic strategy, and at the same time expressed 
the received wisdom among the business and political elite, which emphasised
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industrialisation and the creation of a modem economy along Western lines. It 
stressed the priority of building up the country's heavy industry "without which we 
shall be at the mercy of foreign powers" (Thakurdas 1945: 58).
This linkage between industrialisation and security is an important theme running 
through much of Nehru's writings both before and after Independence (Nayar 
1972). Particularly enlightening is a passage in "The Discovery of India", where 
Nehru sought to explain his rejection of Gandhi's views about creating a 
'decentralised' society. "It can hardly be challenged", he wrote,
"that in the context of the modem world no country can be politically and 
economically independent, even in the framework of international 
interdependence, unless it is highly industrialised... An industrially backward 
country will continually upset the world equilibrium and encourage the 
aggressive tendencies of more developed countries. Even if it retains its 
political independence, this will be nominal only and economic control will tend 
to pass to others" (Nehru 1961: 407/8).
For Nehru, and the political elite, industrialisation was not an end in itself, but the 
means by which, once Independence from Britain was secured, India would be 
able to ensure its sovereignty:
"From both the economic and military viewpoints there could be no 
independence or freedom in India except through heavy industry" (Nehru, 
quoted in Gopal, 1975: volume 3, 163).
Nationalism was then the main driving force behind the preoccupation with rapid
large scale industrial development and the strategy of self-reliant development
(Nayar 1972).
While this was to be the main thrust of post-Independence strategy, the role of 
small and cottage industries could not be entirely dismissed, for there was a 
constituency of support for Gandhian populism and the idea of fostering cottage 
and rural industries. Congress itself at various times had supported resolutions in
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their favour, sanctioning the establishment of the All India Spinners Association 
(1925) and the All India Village Industries Association (1935) as vehicles for 
Gandhian ideals (Brown 1990: 203, 275). Moreover the National Planning 
Committee had incorporated support for village and rural industries into the 
proposed National Plan, as indeed did the Bombay Plan. This established and 
longstanding political commitment could not easily be jettisoned whatever the 
views of Nehru, for fear of jeopardising Congress unity. A compromise was 
needed, such that village and traditional industries could be accommodated within 
the overall modernisation framework. The problem was how such support could 
be integrated into the overall industrial strategy. The National Planning 
Committee had suggested that the most secure way of ensuring the survival of the 
small-scale sector would be for the state to have total control over the large scale 
sector (Rao 1979: 16). An enlightened state would then be in a position to 
minimise the competitive and potentially destructive effects of the latter on the 
former. But this raised the controversial issue of the extent and type of state 
intervention in industry.
The modernisers, with Nehru among them, were quite clear that cottage and craft 
industries had no place in a modernising India. In his Presidential address to the 
Congress in 1936, he averred that
"I believe that khadi and village industries have a definite place in our 
economy. But I look upon them as temporary expedients of a transition stage 
rather than as solutions of our vital problems" (Zaidi and Zaidi 1980: 97)
In Discovery o f India, he also made clear his view that
"adherence to out-of-date methods of production except as a temporary and 
stop-gap measure, is to arrest growth and development" (Nehru 1961: 408).
Likewise, Mahalanobis writing in 1959 about the small scale sector argued that
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"The long term aim would be to use as quickly as possible the most 
technically advanced machinery for the production of both investment 
and consumer goods. This is not immediately possible. It is therefore 
necessary to plan for a transition phase, in which preference would be 
given to capital light and labour intensive small industries.... As the 
supply of power, machinery and other capital goods increases, a 
gradual and steady change-over would be made to more efficient 
forms of production by the increasing use of machinery driven by 
power" (Mahalanobis, 1955: 71).
There is precious little support here for an unreconstructed cottage or household 
industries sector. Quite simply they had no place in the emerging economic 
landscape of a modernising India. On the contrary, they were the antithesis of 
modernity. For political reasons, however, the modernisers had little option but to 
concede a role to the village and cottage industry sector however difficult it might 
be to accommodate this sector within the overall thrust of capitalist development. 
It was of course much easier to accommodate the modem, mechanised, small 
industries within that framework. Using modem technology and modem methods 
of production, they fitted better with the views of a modernising elite. But openly 
espousing a policy for modem small industry at the expense of cottage and village 
industries would have caused political difficulties; instead these two very different 
forms of production were conflated, and in so doing created the confused and 
unconvincing arguments about the role of the small scale sector examined above.
While official documents bracketted together the cottage and village industries on 
the one hand, and the modem small industries on the other - as in successive five 
years plans - in practice at least, even during the 1950s, the focus of official 
concern was perceptibly shifting away from the Gandhian preoccupation with 
•traditional' pre-capitalist village industries towards a policy of promoting small, 
modem capitalist enterprises. This shift is reflected in the changes in institutional 
arrangements. The All India Cottage Industries Board was established in 1948 to 
look after the interests of the whole unregulated sector of the industrial economy.
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By the early 1950s, this all-purpose Board was disbanded in favour of a number of 
bodies with more limited and specific responsibilities - the Handloom and 
Handicrafts Boards were established in 1952, together with the Silk Board; the 
Kadhi and Village Industries Board in 19S3; and in 1954, the Coir Board was 
established along with the Small Scale Industries Board. The latter had a remit to 
advise both Central and State governments on policies and procedures for 
promoting the growth of modem small industries. The cottage industries were 
covered by the other five Boards, whose continuing existence has provided a 
veneer of Gandhian respectability to Government policy. From the time of the 
Karve Committee onwards, a number of inquiries and reports advocated a 
programme of technological improvement, financed by the state, as the means by 
which village industries could be strengthened (GOI, Planning Commission: 
1955). Such technological improvements could only have, as a consequence, the 
destruction of the Gandhian ideal, and the transformation of crafts into modem 
small industries. And without improvements, the craft industries would continue 
to languish, subordinated to merchants and usurers, and barely able to offer its 
practitioners a living.
In essence, by the mid-1950s, there had emerged a policy in India that sought to 
promote modem small industries. Officially, this policy of "stimulating 
entrepreneurship on a wide basis" in the words of the Administrative Reforms 
Committee (GOI, Administrative Reforms Commission, 1969:11) was justified 
and legitimised according to conventional accounts and according to successive 
governments on the grounds of contributing to the important policy objectives of 
creating employment opportunities for all, and achieving a more balanced regional 
distribution of industry. An alternative view is that the policy of promoting small 
modem industries was directed much more towards the aims of helping to create a 
self-sufficient Indian economy, and avoiding the growing concentration of private 
economic power. More fundamentally, however, the account given here suggests
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that the policy originated in a contest between different ideological views of how 
India should develop in the post-Independence era. In the following section, we 
attempt to throw further light on the small scale industry policy by considering the 
content of the policy.
The content of the small industry policy
Much has been written about the vexed question of how to define a ’small’ 
enterprise. It is not particularly appropriate to rehearse those well worn 
arguments here. Suffice it to say that in the context of India, small industry has a 
fairly specific meaning. In the first instance the modem small industries comprise 
all those manufacturing activities which do not fall within the purview of the five 
specialist Boards, covering handicrafts, handlooms, khadi, coir and sericulture. 
Secondly, small was originally defined on the twin criteria of employment, and 
investment. It will be recalled that the industrial licensing system applied to all 
units employing more than 50 workers and using power; or more than 100 
workers where no power was used. Those limits in turn came to be used to define 
the small scale sector, but a further criterion was added. Small scale units were 
those with an investment in plant and machineiy of less than Rs 500,000. In 1960, 
the employment criterion was dropped - on the grounds that a limit on the number 
of employees was wholly inconsistent for a policy intended to create jobs - and 
since then, 'small' has been defined by investment level alone. The investment 
ceiling has been raised periodically (Table 3.1), partly to take account of inflation, 
but also because a fixed ceiling would tend to inhibit the growth of individual 
small enterprises (Vepa 1988: 178).
Over the years a battery of measures has been introduced to encourage a 
multiplication in the number of small units, and at the same time an elaborate 
bureaucratic superstructure has come into existence to dispense various forms of 
advice and assistance. This programme was largely based on the
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TABLE 3.1
Investment ceilings for small scale modem industries (M Rs)
1953 1960 1966 1975 1980 1985 1991
Small units 0.1 0. 5 0.75 1.0 2.0 3.5 6.0
Ancillaries 1.0 1.5 2.5 4.5 7.0
Source: GOI Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries (1989).
recommendations of an International Planning Team sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation at the invitation of the Government of India. The Ford Team's report, 
published in 1954, argued for a comprehensive approach to address the various 
problems - of finding markets, of access to credit, to raw materials, of access to 
technical help and support - inhibiting the development of small enterprises (GOI 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1954). Accordingly, the Team advocated the 
setting up of a central marketing organisation; a liberal credit regime; the 
establishment of specialised technical institutes, together with local technical 
training institutes. These recommendations were largely accepted and 
implemented by the Government.
Two central organisations were established:
• The Central Small Industries Organisation, later renamed the Small 
Industries Development Organisation (SIDO), is primarily responsible for 
policy formulation, and the oversight of technical services for small industries. 
Currently the SIDO operates Small Industry Service Institutes in each state, 
providing a wide range of advisory services, some of a strictly technical 
nature, others in the broader fields of marketing, business and management 
practices.
• The National Small Industries Corporation is the main agency through which 
the Government Stores Purchasing Programme is operated. It also provides 
plant and equipment to small units on a hire purchase basis.
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Constitutionally, the implementation of the small industry policy is primarily the 
responsibility of the individual State Governments, each of which has its own 
specialised agencies dealing with small enterprises.
The specific measures introduced over the past four decades to encourage small 
industry can usefully be categorised into "preventive" and "promotional" (GOI, 
Ministry of Industrial Development, Development Commissioner, Small Scale 
Industries, 1973).
Preventive Measures
Preventive measures are those which seek to provide protection to 'infant' small 
industries from the weight of competition from medium and large factories. The 
argument here is that in a free market large factories are able to benefit from 
economies of scale, and consequently will be able to undercut small firms. In the 
Indian case, the industrial licensing system introduced in 1951 effectively 
prevented this from happening. Using the provisions of the IDRA, the expansion 
of capacity in the licensed factory sector could be controlled and prevented, 
thereby creating opportunities for the unhindered expansion of the small sector.
In the course of the late 1960s, against the background of a number of reports 
exposing abuses of the licensing system by the large houses (see above), a further 
protective measure was introduced in the form of the reservation scheme. 
Specified product lines under this scheme were exclusively reserved for 
production by small units. Beginning with 47 items in April 1967, the number of 
reserved items has subsequently grown, as is shown in Table 3.2. Over time, a 
number of items have been added to, and others have been removed from the list 
but apart from very general statements to the effect that the items are suitable for 
production by small firms, there has never been any explanation of the criteria 
used or the method by which items are considered for reservation. Over time the
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number of items reserved has dramatically increased, the biggest jump being in 
1978 at the time of the Janata administration, which was committed to a much 
greater emphasis on agricultural and small industry development than previous, or 
successive governments (Singh 1978). While proclaiming the basic principle that
"It is the policy of the Government that whatever can be produced by 
small and cottage industries must only be so produced"
(GOI Industrial Policy Statement 1977: para 6).
in practice a large part of this observed increase came about through sub-dividing 
broader categories of already reserved products (Ghosh 1988: 307). On top of 
this, the adoption of the National Industrial Classification to describe reserved 
items further increased the total. Under the previous classification system, the
TABLE 3.2 
Items reserved for the small scale sector
Date of reservation Number of items
1967 47
1970 8
1971 73
1974 53
1976 3
1978 324
Total as at 26 April 1978
1980 27
1981 12
1982 9
1983 35
1986 8
Total as at 1991
Source: GOI, Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, 1989: 65.
total of reserved items as at the beginning of April 1978 stood at 504; by the end 
of that month it had been boosted to 807. By 1991, some 843 items were 
reserved specifically for production by the small scale sector. The sectoral 
distribution of these reserved items is shown in Table 3.3, from which it will be
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seen that almost half (43%) of all items belong to the light engineering group, with
a further 20% belonging to the chemical and chemical products group. The
programme of reservation continues to operate to date. In the light of the
liberalisation programme embarked on in 1991, it is anticipated that the
TABLE 3.3 
Reserved items by sector
NIC Industry Group Number of reserved items
20/21 Food products 17
22 Beverages, tobacco 1
23/5 Cotton and other textiles 0
26 Hosiery and garments 31
27 Wood Products 14
28 Paper products and printing 30
29 Leather 17
30 Rubber and plastics 99
31 Chemical and chemical products 166
32 Non-metallic mineral products 39
33 Basic metal industries 14
34 Metal products 131
35 Non-electrical machinery and parts 55
36 Electrical machinery and parts 59
37 Transport equipment and parts 102
38 Miscellaneous manufacture 68
TOTAL 843
Source: GOI, Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, Small Scale
Industries (1992): Table 10.1.
policy of reserving items exclusively for small industry will be phased out (India 
Today December 31 1993: 86/88).
Promotional Measures
Over the last forty years, a variety of measures has been introduced to assist small 
enterprises, and to make entry easier. The range and type of assistance, and the 
number of agencies involved is considerable, so much so, that enterprising 
publishers have found a large market for books of the "How to start your own
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small industry" variety (Sharma, 1989). The various measures of assistance can be 
grouped together into a number of categories:
a/  financial assistance
One of the widely acknowledged problems facing potential, as well as existing 
entrepreneurs is that of access to credit. Both the Central and the State 
Governments have devised schemes to provide medium and long term 
concessional finance for investment in plant and machinery. The State Finance 
Corporations are the principal sources of investment finance, and they in turn are 
refinanced by the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI). In 1989, IDBI 
established the Small Industries Development Bank as the apex institution to 
disburse financial assistance to small industry.
The main potential source of working capital is the banks. One of the earliest 
schemes of financial aid, established in 1960 was the Reserve Bank of India's 
credit guarantee scheme, which guaranteed the commercial banks against losses 
on loans to small enterprises. In spite of this, the commercial banks have been 
reluctant to extend loans to small firms, but the position improved after the 
nationalisation of the main commercial banks in 1969 (Patvardhan, 1988) 
Nationalisation gave the Government much greater direct control over the use of 
credit, and the Reserve Bank has used this power to require the banks to reserve 
40% of their lending for so-called priority sectors, which include agriculture and 
small industry. The setting up of a new scheme by IDBI in 1988 to provide 
working capital to small units suggests that the banks remain reluctant lenders.
b / financial incentives
Both Central and State Governments offer a number of financial incentives to 
small units. Small units benefit from excise duty concessions. Currently no 
excise duty is payable where the value of excisable goods is less than Rs 200,000
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per annum; above that limit, excise is payable but at a discounted rate. Thus on 
production between Rs 200,000 and Rs 750,000, excise is payable at 90% of the 
usual rate. The significance of this concession varies from industry to industry 
because excise rates also vary, from 100% in the case of luxuries to 10% for 
capital and intermediate goods. One the basis of the then prevailing concessions, 
Tulsi estimated in 1980, that the excise concession was the most significant form 
of financial aid to the small industry sector (Little, Mazumdar and Page 1987: 
28). Additional special concessions of a capital investment subsidy and a ten year 
tax holiday are also applicable in the so-called backward areas.
Individual States also offer incentives to small units, the nature and generosity of 
which vary from State to State as is demonstrated below in Table 3.4 It will be 
seen that
TABLE 3.4 
State Financial Incentives for Small Industries
Kerala Karnataka Tamilnadu
- soft loan for -10-25% investment - 10% investment subsidy 
for units in drugs, 
electronics, car parts, 
solar energy 
equipment
purchase of developed land subsidy
-10% State subsidy in - interest free loan 
districts not eligible for for plant and machinery
Central Subsidy
- 6 year interest free 
Sales Tax loan as 
working capital
-10% interest free loan 
for buildings
- 5 year interest free
Sales Tax loan as 
working capital
- subsidy on electricity
tariff for 3 years
- subsidy on electricity 
tariffs for 6 years
Source: Jain & Kapur (1990)
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Karnataka and Tamil Nadu offer apparently more generous incentives than the 
neighbouring State of Kerala, though whether such differences are at all significant 
is open to question.
c/marketing assistance
Central and State governments both extend help to small units through providing 
them with market research information, contacts with wholesalers, as well as 
direct purchasing schemes. The National Small Industries Corporation is 
responsible for operating the Government Stores Purchase Programme, under 
which some 409 items of government consumption, ranging from attache cases to 
PVC pipes, are bought exclusively from the small industry sector; for a further 13 
items (mattresses, filing cabinets etc.) 75% of purchases are from small units; 
while a further 50% of purchases in 28 additional items are bought from small 
units (GOI, Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, Small Scale 
Industries, 1989: 66/68). For non-reserved items, small units are given a 15% 
price preference over medium and large units. State governments similarly 
operate some form of purchasing scheme favourable to small industry.
A further scheme to assist small units is the ancillarisation programme, under 
which the SIDO encourages large public and private enterprises to sub-contract 
the production of components, parts, and sub-assemblies to small firms. Through 
the Small Industry Service Institutes located in each State, the SIDO operates a 
'Sub-contracting Exchange' where small firms can enlist their capabilities and such 
information is then available for potential large scale collaborators.
d/technical assistance
The Small Industry Service Institutes through their offices in each State provide 
help, advice and assistance to entrepreneurs on the choice, installation and 
operation of plant and machinery. Both the SISIs and individual State
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Governments have their own workshops and production centres, which combine a 
training and educational function, with the role of experimental workshops to 
produce prototype machinery.
e/physicalfacilities
Since 1955, State Governments, encouraged by the Centre, have embarked on an 
ambitious programme of developing industrial estates. There are today more than 
1000 of these, offering a variety of sizes of industrial accommodation, available 
either at concessional rents, or for purchase. In theory, estates provide basic 
services of electricity, water supply, telephones, as well as good access to road 
and rail links. In practice, such facilities tend to be available on the larger estates 
and those in or near urban centres, but estates in rural areas, which are usually 
smaller anyway, tend to be poorly serviced. In a renewed effort to promote 
decentralisation, the SIDBI in 1991 launched a scheme to make finance available 
to State Governments to create "industrial agglomerations" in rural and backward 
areas.
Apart from workshops and factory units, the other significant form of physical aid 
is that concerned with the supply of raw materials. Within India, while many raw 
materials are freely available through the market, others, notably steel until 
recently, have tended to be in short supply and their distribution has been 
controlled by the Government. Lacking the contacts and the clout of their large 
counterparts, small industries have been at a disadvantage in securing their raw 
material needs. To overcome that problem, the National Small Industries 
Corporation, and its counterparts in the States, have assumed the responsibility for 
distributing raw materials to small enterprises.
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This brief overview of the variety of measures to promote small industry 
demonstrates the highly elaborate and wide ranging nature of the support 
programme. The proliferation of individual measures, and their provision by a 
number of separate agencies at both state and Union level was recognised by the 
Janata Government as likely to bewilder and confuse as much as to encourage 
small manufacturers. To simplify the system and make it more user friendly, the 
Janata Government in 1978 set up District Industries Centres (GOI Industrial 
Policy Statement 1977: para 9). The laudable aim was to create within every 
District, an accessible local service dispensing advice and assistance to existing 
entrepreneurs about the kinds of help available, while at the same time undertaking 
investigations into the problems of local small manufacturing, and drawing up an 
appropriate District Action Plan. Beyond that, DICs were also set up to promote 
the further growth of the small scale sector, by mounting 'entrepreneurship' and 
'self-employment' development programmes, particularly among women, 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
This review of the small industry development programme underscores its highly 
elaborate character. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation has 
described India as having one of the most comprehensive programmes of small 
scale industry support in the world" (UNIDO 1990:120) The whole programme 
has been accorded a high priority by successive governments, but that priority has 
not been matched by a similar high priority in terms of public sector outlays. 
Table 3.5 shows the outlay of Central and State governments on village industries, 
small scale industries and the industrial sector as a whole. From the Second Plan 
until the Annual Plan of 1979/80, the industrial sector as a whole received 20 - 
25% of total public sector outlays. By comparison, the outlay on the small scale 
sector has been relatively modest. The high point for the modem small industries 
was the period of the Second and Third Plans, when 1.2% and 1.3% respectively 
of total public sector spending was devoted to their support, but subsequently the
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outlay declined and from the Fourth to the Eight Plan, public spending has been of 
the order of 0.6% of total outlays.
TABLE 3.5
Public Sector Plan Outlays by Centre and State Governments (Rs 10 million)
Plan period Village
industry
(a)
Small
scale
industry
(b)
Total
industry
(c)
Total
public
spending
(d)
% of 
(b) to 
(d)
I (1951/6) 42.0 5.20 97.0 1960 0.3
II (1956/61 187.0 56.0 1125.0 4672.0 1.2
El (1961/66 241.0 113.1 1967.0 8577.0 1.3
Annual Plans 
(1966/69)
126.0 53.48 1637.0 6625.0 0.8
IV (1969/74) 243.0 96.19 3107.0 15779.0 0.6
V  (1974/79) 611.0 221.74 9581.0 39322.0 0.6
Annual Plan 
(1979/80)
289.5 104.81 2640.0 12177.0 0.9
VI (1980/85) 1780.5 616.1 15017.0 97500.0 0.6
VII (1985/90) 2752.5 1120.5 22460.0 180000.0 0.6
VIE (1992/97) 3522.1 2812.1 46921.8 434100.0 0.6
Sources: Cols (a), (c), (d) .from Centre for Industrial and Economic Research (1993)
Col (c) from GOI, Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, Small Scale 
Industries, 1994
NOTE: Except for the Eighth Plan, where the data refer to planned outlays, all other data refer 
to actual outlays.
In this chapter we have looked at the scope and contents of the policy to promote 
small manufacturing industry in India. The question that arises is, what light, if 
any, does this throw on the aims of the policy?
As we have seen, successive governments have justified a small industry policy on 
three grounds - employment generation; decentralisation and the reduction of 
rural-urban inequalities; and the mobilisation of scarce skills and talents. It was
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suggested above that the promotion of small scale industries would contribute to 
meeting the objectives of employment creation and regional/rural development 
only on the basis of certain assumptions - namely, that small industries are labour 
rather than capital intensive; that they are relatively footloose, rather than being 
locationally constrained. Both assumptions are questionable.
Moreover, when one examines the purported aims of the policy with the contents 
of the policy and the tools which have been used to implement it, there are striking 
shortcomings. It is remarkable that a policy which aims to promote employment 
generation by means of incentives and subsidies lacks a mechanism to tie the 
provision of assistance to job creation. This lacuna was emphasised by a report by 
the Comptroller and Auditor General of India into the performance of Tamil Nadu 
Industries Investment Corporation, which provides investment funds for small as 
well as medium industries in the State (Swaminathan 1986: 618). The 
Corporation's own guidelines require it to give priority to "the units capable of 
generating larger employment opportunities". The report was critical of the lack of 
a proper monitoring system to ensure that this requirement was fulfilled. The 
investigation discovered there were no records showing the number of jobs to be 
created by prospective applicants, nor was there any follow up to verify the 
number of jobs actually created, if any. What needs to be emphasised is that this is 
not an isolated instance of poor implementation. None of the schemes of 
assistance to small manufacturing industries are conditional on the creation of 
additional employment, nor are there any specific incentives to encourage job 
generation.
The second important formal aim of policy is to encourage geographical dispersal 
of industry and employment. The major tool for achieving this seems to be the 
programme of building industrial estates. As a tool, it is weak and, to anticipate a 
later discussion, has been shown to be ineffectual, yet the programme continues to
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operate, consuming considerable scarce resources at a high opportunity cost. The 
interesting question is why persist with a programme which fails to deliver what it 
is ostensibly supposed to deliver?
At root, there is, in India's small industry policy, a gap between official aims and 
outcomes, a gap that is to be explained not simply in terms of poor 
implementation of the policy - though that may be part of the reason - but in terms 
of a fundamental confusion over what the proper aims of the policy are. The 
argument of this chapter is that this confusion and ambiguity over aims arose out 
of the way that the policy originated. The policy of promoting small 
manufacturing was essentially a political compromise between the differing views 
of Gandhian populists and industrial modernisers. Mahalanobis sought to 
reconcile these different views by providing an economic rationale for the 
promotion of small industry, but the economic rationale was subsequently 
elaborated to encompass a variety of other purposes. Not only was small industry 
seen as a means of providing employment, and rectifying imbalances in the spatial 
economy, it also came to be seen as a means of alleviating poverty in rural areas, 
and - to take Tyabji's view - to provide a market for the machinery produced by 
the large scale sector, to act as a counterweight to the growth of monopolies, and 
to encourage self-employment among women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes. In other words, the policy acquired a multiplicity of aims, both economic 
and social, and in the process further heightening the confusion and ambiguity 
over whether the policy is essentially an economic policy, or a social policy. Such 
ambiguity of aims is not unusual, for governments frequently find themselves in 
the position of having to square straightforward policy goals with a variety of 
political pressures and social considerations. But the result is likely to be 
confusion as to what is the main priority, with the result that effort and resources 
are dissipated in seeking to achieve what may turn out to be divergent ends.
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Chapter  4  Th e  g r o w th  of sm a ll  m a n u f a c t u r in g  in d u st r y  in  In d ia
Attempting to evaluate the progress of India's policy of promoting small scale 
industry is difficult, and a large part of the difficulty arises from the lack of clarity 
about the real aims behind the policy. Should it be judged primarily in terms of 
its contribution to creating employment? to keeping down unemployment? to 
preventing or reducing the concentration of economic power? to its contribution 
to reducing regional and rural-urban disparities? Or should the programme be 
judged on the extent to which it has created "a sector of sufficient vitality to be 
self-sufficient” (GOI Industrial Policy Resolution 1956: para 14)? While the real 
aims of the policy remain open to question, there are still legitimate questions to 
be asked about the growth of the sector, its geographical distribution and the 
viability of small scale industrialisation. As we argued in Chapter 1, these 
questions are interrelated.
Apart from the ambiguities over the real aims of the policy, there is a further 
problem which confronts all forms of policy analysis. Even if it can be 
demonstrated that there has been some success in achieving a particular aim, it 
does not strictly follow that it is the policy as such which has contributed to the 
achievement of that aim. It is perfectly plausible that the aim has been achieved 
in spite of, rather than because of the policy. The growth of small manufacturing 
is a case in point.
In a previous chapter, it was pointed out that historically, the early stages of 
industrialisation have often been based on the growth of small manufacturing 
units. Only at a later stage, if at all, does a process of concentration and 
centralisation occur, with small units progressively losing ground, via mergers, 
take-overs, etc to large scale units. Anderson's review of the statistical evidence
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of the role of small manufacturing in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America certainly suggests that "small workshops and factories emerge rapidly... 
in periods before industrialisation is in an advanced phase" (Anderson 1982: 
926). In the case of India, we are confronted with an economy which is highly 
unevenly developed, combining simple craft industries at one extreme and a 
capacity to build nuclear power stations and satellite rockets at the other. In 
view of its recent and very uneven development, we might expect small industry 
to proliferate. Apart from this, there are several other specific features of the 
Indian economy which may well have contributed to the growth of small industry 
even in the absence of a positive government policy. One of the most important 
of these has been post-Independence economic policy. The overall aim of ’self- 
reliance' has implied a strict regime of limiting imports, and especially of 
consumer goods. In itself such a stance may well have created the opportunity 
for the mushrooming of small enterprises. In an economy as poor and as starved 
of capital as India, it is highly improbable that the large scale sector could have 
satisfied the demand for a wide range of previously imported commodities even 
in the medium term. The restrictions on imports, together with the restrictions 
on what could be produced by large firms through the licensing system may have 
been far more important than any number of other specific government measures 
in promoting the growth of the small manufacturing sector. On top of this, we 
need to bear in mind the sheer geographical size of the country, and the poorly 
developed state of its infrastructure. Given the size of the country, and the 
impediments to the easy flow of goods, it might be expected that markets for 
goods would be localised and fragmented, stimulating localised, small scale 
production - a point made by Anderson (ibid: 921). Without labouring the point 
any further, suffice it to say that, if there has been growth and development in the 
small scale sector, it may well be as much the result of macro-economic 
conditions, as of the implementation of a specific small industry policy. We shall
99
return in a later chapter to consider the issue further. For the moment, we 
concentrate on charting the growth of India's small manufacturing sector.
The growth of small scale modern industry
The view that prevails in both the official and non-official literature is that the 
small industry policy has been remarkably successful when measured in terms of 
the number of units, the level of employment, and the value of output. Sen, for 
example refers to "the spectacular rate of growth of the small scale sector since 
the beginning of the Second Plan" (Sen 1982: 120). Similarly, Kashyap states 
that "the growth performance of the small scale units by broad economic 
magnitudes has been quite impressive", and he continues that
"As of today, the small scale sector accounts for more than half of total 
manufacturing in terms of value added, and provides full or part-time 
employment for over three quarters of the persons engaged in manufacturing. 
It also accounts for more than one third of exports" (Kashyap 1988:668/9).
Battacharya, in support of his view that the policy of'vigorously promoting small 
industry* has made tangible progress cites a mass of statistics:
"The number of small units increased from 37153 in 1960 to 1.4 million at 
the end of 1985/6. The value of output generated in this sector increased 
from Rs7852.4 in 1960/61, to Rs380,500 in 1985/6. The contribution to total 
industrial production in this sector increased from 38.7% in 1960 to 50% in 
1985/6" (Battacharya 1988: 94).
Such confident statements of success are not necessarily untrue. What is true is 
that the statistical base on which such pronouncements are based - and many 
more could be assembled - is less than robust. As Professor Sandesara put it, 
"one can say anything, even statistically [sic], ranging from the most 
complimentary to the most derogatory on small industry" (Sandesara 1988: 641). 
That possibility arises because there are a number of separate sources of data
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about small industry, but in the main they all suffer the weaknesses of incomplete 
coverage, compounded by inconsistency and non-comparability. The limitations 
of the database do not seem to be fully appreciated - and in some cases are not 
appreciated at all - by those who make use of it. The following section will look 
at these various sources, and their limitations, in an attempt to build up a picture 
of the performance of the small industry sector over the last three decades or so. 
The main sources to be considered are
• SIDO statistics on registered units
• the Annual Survey of Industries
• National Accounts
• the Census of Population
Small Industries Development Organisation
The Small Industries Development Organisation compiles data for small 
industrial units which are registered with the State Directorates of Industry. This 
data refers to units defined on the basis, not of employment, but on investment in 
plant and machinery. As pointed out earlier, the investment ceiling has changed 
over time, and this makes it difficult to compare data over time. Figure 4.1 is 
based on data published by SIDO. In 1960, some 36,000 units were registered, 
and the number increased through the 1960s, reaching 140,000 by 1972 and 
1.64 million by 1992/3 (GOI Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, 
Small Scale Industries, 1994). Commensurate with this growth in the number of 
units has been growth of employment, from 3.9 million in 1973/4 to 13.4 million 
in 1992/3. SIDO compiles data not just on number of units and employment, but 
also regularly publishes data on the value of production and value of exports of 
the registered small scale sector.
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The SIDO data is widely used and referred to - it is the basis for Battacharya's 
data, quoted above - so it is as well to understand the limitations of this source. 
In the first place, the data refer to registered units, and registration is voluntary. 
Efforts were made in the 1960s to encourage registration, and to that end the 
various concessions and incentives made available to the small sector were 
conditional on registration (Ramachandran 1988: 47). The data is not therefore, 
a complete and comprehensive record of the small firm sector, but a summary of 
a self selected sample. Nor can the data be used as an index of the rate of new 
firm formation. Units may want to remain invisible to the authorities, only 
registering at such time as they need to avail themselves of official assistance. 
The size of this unregistered sector is unknown. SIDO estimates that 
unregistered units are between 40 and 50% the number of registered units (GOI, 
Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries 1989: 
17)1, but precisely how this figure has been arrived at is unclear.
A further problem is that there is reliable evidence of the unreliability of the 
SIDO data. In 1972 according to the figures supplied to SIDO by the State 
Directorates of Industry, there were 258,000 units. The Census conducted by 
SIDO for the same year was able to identify only 140,000 units (GOI Ministry of 
Industry, Development Commissioner SSI 1977). The results of the Second All 
India Census, undertaken in 1987/88 also suggest considerable over-registration. 
As of March 31 1988, the total number of small units registered with State and 
UT Directorates of Industries was 1.1 million. After weeding out duplicate 
entries and those which were not small modem industries, the total was reduced
1 The Reserve Bank of India, in its publication Currency and Finance, regularly reports data on 
the small scale sector. The data is based on SIDO statistics, but the number of units is 
inflated to include the unregistered sector. Thus, for 1987/88 the RBI records 1.59 million 
small units. For the same year SIDO records 1.05 million registered units, and estimates an 
additional 540,000 unregistered units. (RBI, Report on Currency and Finance, 1988/89:67).
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to 986,861. But of those 57,000 were untraceable, and a further 300,000 had 
closed down. In short, out of more than a million registered units, only 610,00 
were found to be in operation (GOI. Ministry of Industry, Development 
Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, 1992: 19).
A major problem with the SIDO data is that it is a cumulative record, so that 
once a unit is registered it continues to be included regardless of whether it 
continues in business or not. There is not, in other words, any mechanism for 
de-listing units as or when they fail. The two censuses of the small scale sector 
provided an opportunity for the State Directorates to compile a more accurate 
record, but this not been the case. While the Second Census recorded 610,000 
working units for 1987/88, SIDO publications continued to claim 1.57 million 
units, rising to 1.64 million by 1992/3 (GOI Ministry of Industry, Development 
Commissioner, SSI, 1994: 4,5). Taking all the new registrations over the period 
1987/88, and adding to the known figure of operating units in 1987/88, we arrive 
at a total for 1992/3 of 1.08 million units - two-thirds of the more impressive 
total claimed by SIDO.
There is a further consideration which may lead to the overestimation of the 
number of small units. Cawthome draws attention to the way that the investment 
limit for small units may lead to the "formal and spatial splitting of firms under 
single ownership" (Cawthome 1993: 47). That is, in order to qualify for 
continuing assistance from government, units remain within the prevailing 
investment limit, and growth is channelled into the setting up of other, apparently 
independent units. The investment limit thus acts as a disincentive to the growth 
of individual units, and at the same time it also inflates the statistics by including 
as independent units those which might more properly be described as being part 
of a single enterprise.
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There are then serious limitations to the SIDO statistics. Their reliability and 
accuracy as to the number of units, employment levels, value of output, and 
value of exports is open to serious doubt because of the methods used in their 
compilation. Not the least important limitation is that a small unit is defined in 
terms of investment levels, and those levels have been raised periodically, making 
comparisons over time a difficult proposition.
Annual Survey of Industries
The Annual Survey of Industries is the most detailed source of data about India's 
manufacturing sector. However, coverage in the Survey is limited to those 
industrial units employing more than 10 workers and using power, or more than 
20 workers and not using power; in other words, it covers only 'organised' 
industries which are required to register with the State Factory Inspectorates 
under the 1948 Factory Act. In spite of this, the ASI data is the most complete 
and comprehensive available. There have been changes in the recording of the 
data - notably the introduction of a new National Industrial Classification of 
Industries in the early 1970s. This did not affect the reporting of the aggregate 
statistics, though preparation for the change led to the suspension of publication 
of all data for 1972 (CSO Annual Survey of Industries 1985/6).
Until 1983/4, the data covered by the ASI were recorded in two parts. The 
Census sector was a complete enumeration of all industrial undertakings with 50 
or more workers, using power; or more than 100 workers without the aid of 
power. The sample sector data was based on a sample of units employing 10 - 
49 workers using power; or 20 - 99 workers and not using power.
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The distinction between sample and census sector provides a convenient way of 
measuring the growth of the small sector within the larger organised sector of 
manufacturing. The sample sector data is available for the limited period of 
1961 to 1982, when publication of separate data ceased (CSO Annual Survey of 
Industries 1985/6: Introduction). We can however, extend the series to 1989/90
FIGURE 4.2 All-India growth of small factories 
Units and employment, 1960/61 - 1989/90
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by making use of the additional information provided by the ASI since 1973/4. 
Up to that time, the ASI reported only aggregate figures of employment, number 
of factories etc, but subsequently it provided a breakdown by size of unit. Figure 
4.2 makes use of these two sources of data, and plots the number of units and 
employment in organised factories with between 10 and 49 employees. Over the 
period 1961 to 1990 the number of small factories increased by 146%, from 
33,657 to 82,646. Over the same period, aggregate employment in these units 
increased by 110%, from 677,00 to 1.43 million. The rate of growth of 
employment was not much different from that of the medium and large scale 
factories which showed an increase of 120% in employment terms over the same 
period. One cannot infer from this that small factories have done better or 
worse than the rest of the organised factory sector. The size of the small factory 
sector at any one time is the result of the interaction between several flows. It 
reflects both the number of newly established units that fall within the ambit of 
the Factory Act; the number of previously small units whose growth brings them 
within the umberella of the Act; and the outflow of units whose growth puts 
them into the category of medium size factories. The size of the small factory 
sector is a balance between these three forces. Having said that, the data does 
indicate that the small factory sector has increased in size, both in terms of the 
number of units and in terms of employment but not at a faster rate than the 
medium and large scale factory sector.
National Accounts statistics
The National Accounts statistics provide information about the contribution of 
the manufacturing sector to national income. Manufacturing is subdivided into 
the registered and the unregistered sector. 'Registered' manufacturing covers all 
those establishments that fall within the ambit of the 1948 Factories Act, so it 
covers all those units which are enumerated by the Annual Survey of Industries.
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Unregistered1 units are those which do not fall within the scope of the Act. The 
latter unregistered sector is frequently referred to as the 'small scale sector1, while 
the registered sector is usually described as the factory, or large scale sector.
Figure 4.3 shows income from the registered and the unregistered sector as a 
proportion of national income for the period 1961/2 to 1992/3. Until the late 
1950s, the unregistered sector made a greater contribution to national income 
than the registered sector. From the early 1960s the registered sector's share has 
been increasing, and at a faster rate than that of the former, so that by the early 
1990s, it was contributing 13% of income compared with 5% in the early 1950s. 
By contrast, the unregistered sector's contribution has hovered around 7.5-8% 
since the early 1960s. Data relating to value added in manufacturing tells much 
the same story of the relative decline of the unregistered sector. In 1951, the 
latter produced some 45% of total manufacturing value added, but that share fell 
steadily to about a third by the mid 1980s.
Overall the data from the National Accounts suggest that the unregistered sector 
has performed reasonably creditably. In absolute terms, it has continued to 
grow, but its share of manufacturing activity has progressively slipped. This is 
hardly surprising perhaps in view of the greater resources and priority accorded 
to the factory sector.
Having looked briefly at National Accounts data, it needs to be said that too 
much faith in them would be misplaced. As explained earlier, most units in the 
registered sector are required to file annual returns with the Factories 
Inspectorate so that data in respect of such units is reasonably complete. 
Unregistered units make no such returns, so the data for this sector is estimated.
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The Central Statistical Organisation makes use of the National Sample Surveys 
to estimate value added and output for rural industries; for urban unregistered 
units, it has in the past used the 1972 All India Census of Small Scale Industry - 
not a complete coverage of small industry, but limited to those which are 
registered with SIDO. Using such survey material, the CSO calculates value 
added and output per employee. From the Census of Population, it then grosses 
these figures up to calculate national totals. From the benchmark years, chosen 
to coincide with the Census, the Index of Industrial Production, which is based 
on production in the factory sector, is then applied to produce estimates for each 
inter-censal year (Saluja,1988: 68/70). As a method, this is ingenious, but it 
must be doubted whether the results are reliable or accurate. Even more 
unsatisfactorily, from our point of view is that the National Accounts data are a 
composite of the entire unregistered sector. They include not just the modem 
small scale industries, but also the household and handicrafts sector. The 
Planning Commission has at various times included a breakdown of the 
unregistered sector into its various components, but it is based on the same 
flawed methods.
Census of Population
The final source of data to be considered here is the Census of Population This 
provides information about employment in the household and the non-household 
manufacturing sectors. The latter includes the modem small industries as well 
as the medium and large factories. The Annual Survey of Industries data can be 
used to decompose the non-household sector into the factory sector - defined as 
units employing more than 10 workers with power, and 20 without - and the 
small industry sector. The results are tabulated below (Table 4.1) for India, but 
for the sake of comparability, excluding Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam.
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TABLE 4.1
Workers in Manufacturing by Sector 1961 - 1991. 
All-India (excluding Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam)
1961 1971 1981 1991
Household 7,322,610 4,971,332 5,668,408 6,741,566
Small ind 4,446,098 5,595,164 9,868,356 13,507,247
Large ind 2,738,759 4,230,753 6,046,592 8,142,550*
Sources: Censuses of Population, 1961,1971,1981, and 1991; General Economic Tables
provide data on employment in household and non-household industry. Data on employment 
in the large scale (factory) sector from the Annual Survey of Industries. * data for 1989/90
What this table shows is that small industry as defined grew more rapidly in 
employment terms than the medium/large scale sector, while the household 
sector experienced a displacement of employment. Household industry absorbed 
as many people as the other two groups combined in 1961, but by 1981 it was 
smaller than either of them. The household sector is characterised by great 
heterogeneity, and its constituent components have doubtless fared in different 
ways. The handicraft industries, according to Cable, Weston and Jain, have 
fared remarkably well, not least in penetrating export markets (Cable, Weston 
and Jain 1986). But other elements of the household sector seem to depend 
crucially on State patronage and this is particularly the case with the handloom 
industry. That dependence on state purchases is vital was borne out by the fate 
of handloom weavers in Anhra Pradesh, where, in the early 1990s, a government 
order to purchase uniforms and office linen was rescinded because of complaints 
about quality. For the weavers, this loss of an assured market was little short of 
a disaster (India Today, Dec. 15,1991).
I l l
Comparing the small scale sector with the factory sector, what seems clear is that 
there is remarkably little difference between them as far as the creation of 
employment is concerned. Both sectors increased in size by a factor of three 
over the period 1961 to 1991, although in absolute terms, the small scale sector 
evidently absorbs more labour than the organised factory sector.
Again it is evident from this data that there have been significant variations in 
the rate of growth of the small scale sector over time. Between 1961 and 1971, 
employment increased by 26%; between 1971 and 1981, by 76%; and between 
1981 and 1991 by 37%. This pattern of uneven temporal growth of the small 
scale sector is broadly in line with the observations made above on the basis of 
examining data for the small organised factory sector. There too growth was 
faster in the 1970s than in the 1980s.
To carry this analysis a bit further, it is possible to extend the definition of the 
small sector further, by adding to the sector identified above, the units with up to 
49 employees that are enumerated as part of the ASI organised sector. By doing 
so, ’small’ now includes all units employing up to 49 workers. The results are 
tabulated in Table 4.2. The results of this exercise indicate that the total number 
of people employed in the small scale sector have tripled over the thirty year 
period, but the rate of growth has varied, being modest in the 1960s, higher in 
the 1970s, and slowing again in the 1980s.
These estimates of total employment in small scale manufacturing industries are 
subject to important qualification. In the first place, there were changes in the 
definition of ‘worker’ between the censuses. The most important was the 
introduction in 1981 of a category o f ’marginal’ workers, alongside the category
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TABLE 4.2
Total Employment in Small Industries with up to 49 workers.
Non factory, ASI units with TOTAL
non-household sector up to 49 workers
(a) <b)
1961 4,446,098 677,190 5,123,238
1971 5,595,164 837,340 6,432,504
1981 9,868,356 1,179,413 11,047,769
1991 13,507,247 1,426,238* 14,933,485
Sources: Column a: from Table 4.1.
Column b: GOI, Central Statistical Organisation, Annual Survey of Industries, 
♦data for 1989/90.
of main worker. As it happens the 1981 figures can be adjusted and made 
comparable with the earlier definitions. For 1991, the sectoral distribution of 
marginal workers was not available, so the 1991 data refer only to main workers.
A more difficult problem has to do with women workers. The 1971 Census 
recorded a drop of half in the number of working women. Female labour 
participation declined from 31.55% in 1961 to 17.1% in 1971. It recovered in 
the 1981 Census, but to a level below that recorded in 1961. Many 
commentators believe that there is an inbuilt bias, such that many working 
women become invisible in the Census volumes (Duwury 1989; Singh and 
Kelles-Viitanen 1987; World Bank 1991). Part of the reason is believed to lie in 
the kind of casual, seasonal, part-time work that many women engage in, which 
is easily overlooked; and part of the reason lies with the attitudes of mainly male 
enumerators (Standing n.d.). Whatever the reason, women workers are 
probably underenumerated in successive Censuses. What effect this has on the 
estimated total labour force in small industry is difficult to say. What the
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Censuses do reveal is that relatively few women work in the small scale sector. 
But whether that reflects reality, or whether it reflects the invisibility of women’s 
contribution to the small scale sector is basically unfathomable.
To conclude, we have looked at various sources of data relating to the growth 
of the small industry sector. In one way or another, they all have flaws, so that it 
is simply not possible to present anything approaching an authoritative 
conclusion. The Planning Commission itself has recognised the difficulties of 
attempting any assessment of Government policy with an inadequate database. 
The issue, it has to be said, is by no means confined to India. Few countries can 
be said to have a uniform and comprehensive system of collecting data about 
small enterprises. Compounding the problem is the existence of various ways of 
defining 'small'. In India, small is defined either in terms of investment or 
employment. And in relation to employment, it is possible to define small in any 
of a number of ways. Of the various sources considered, the Census and the ASI 
together provide the most comprehensive view of the industrial sector as a 
whole, and its constituent parts. The drawback of such data is that it provides a 
snapshot of the situation at widely spaced time intervals.
On the basis of the Census data combined with the ASI data, we estimate that 
employment in the small manufacturing sector, defined as those units employing 
fewer than 49 workers grew from 5.1 million in 1961 to 14.9 million in 1991, a 
total growth of just short of 10 million. In absolute terms this is a large figure, 
and compares well with the growth of employment in the medium and large scale 
factory sector. The latter, excluding small factories increased from 2.1 million in 
1961 to 6.7 million employees in 1991, an increase in absolute terms of 4.6 
million However, these figures need to be seen in the context of a doubling of 
the total population between 1961 and 1991 (from 439 million to 844 million),
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and an increase of 65 million in the number of men between the ages of 15 and 
59 for the years 1961 and 1981 (Census of Population 1961,1991). In other 
words, whatever progress has been made in increasing the number of job 
opportunities in the small scale sector, the hopes entertained in the 1950s have 
not materialised. The small scale sector has grown, but its growth falls far short 
of the need for productive employment.
A critique of policy
We noted above that there are considerable difficulties attached to assessing just 
what role government policy has played in the growth of the small manufacturing 
sector. It is conceivable that small manufacturing would have grown in the 
absence of a specific policy for its promotion, but ultimately, it is impossible to 
determine what might have happened. We can however examine some of the 
criticisms that have been levelled at the operation and implementation of the 
policy as one way of assessing its contribution. Broadly, the criticisms of the 
Small Industry Policy is that it has been inadequate, wasteful and in some 
respects counterproductive to the generation of employment.
The charge of inadequacy has been levelled at two aspects of the policy - the 
provision of technical and marketing expertise, and the provision of credit. Vepa 
has noted that the quality of technical expertise offered by the Small Industries 
Service Institutes has tended to deteriorate. The information they provide is "not 
always up-to-date; market intelligence and demand data are non-existent (Vepa 
1988:44). Similarly Taub and Taub's study of small manufacturing in various 
states led them to identify "the lack of trained advisors as a real and continuing 
problem in the implementation program" (Taub and Taub 1989:34). The second 
aspect of inadequacy relates to the provision of credit. It has long been 
recognised that limited access to credit, both for working capital and for long
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term investment monies, are major hindrances to small firms. Indeed, the lack of 
access to credit is a major factor leading to closure. Steps have therefore been 
taken to make credit available at concessional rates, and while the flow of credit 
has increased, it continues to fall far short of need. The recent Nayak Committee 
report estimated the demand for credit from the small scale sector during the 
Eighth Plan period as amounting to Rs 9950 crores. The Small Industries 
Development Bank, the principal source of credit, has quantified its likely 
contribution over the same period as Rs 4000 crores, leaving an unsatisfied 
demand, conservatively estimated, at Rs 5950 (Reserve Bank of India 1994: para 
4.11). The shortfall of credit, by no means a recent phenomenon, means that the 
number of units able to take advantage of financial assistance is low in relation to 
the total number of small scale units. It tends, according to Patvardhan, to be 
the smaller units which are most disadvantaged by the system, and which are 
therefore less likely to reach their full potential (Patvardhan 1988:255).
It is of course to be expected that in a country where resources are scarce that 
there will be difficulties in meeting all demands for credit. But the criticism of 
inadequate financial backup has to be seen in the light of the second set of 
criticisms of the policy, which allege that the programme has been in some 
respects wasteful of public money. A specific criticism here directs attention to 
the indiscriminate provision of excise concessions, sales tax exemptions and 
other forms of subsidy. Essentially the criticism is that such concessions and 
subsidies are granted to all registered small units regardless of their need for such 
help, and regardless of their contribution to generating employment or to other 
social aims. Such a uniform treatment of small manufacturers may be justified on 
grounds of administrative simplicity, or on grounds of some concept of fairness 
and equity, but one of the consequences of this unselective approach is that 
scarce public funds are wasted "on the wrong types of small industry" - that is
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the types of industry that do not contribute to the growth of employment 
(Sandesara 1988: 651). Indeed, indiscriminate assistance may simply be a means 
of supporting units which are otherwise unviable.
A particularly criticised element of the policy which involves the waste of public 
funds concerns the industrial estates programme. There are now more than 1000 
industrial estates all over India. The programme consumed a fifth of all public 
sector outlays on the small manufacturing sector during the Second and Third 
Plans, falling to a still considerable 16% of the total in the Fourth, and 12% in 
the Fifth Plan (Nagaiya 1989). The evidence suggests that by no means all of 
this substantial public sector investment has borne fruit. In particular, estates in 
rural areas have performed poorly (Vepa 1988:82). A number of such estates 
are either non-functioning, or at best partially occupied, vindicating the Ford 
Foundation team's verdict over thirty years ago, that "industrial estates alone 
cannot overcome locational disadvantage" (GOI, Ministry of Industry, 1964: 
10).
The ambitious and costly industrial estates programme also provides an example 
of how the Government's small industry programme can be counterproductive. 
Sandesara cites a number of studies of the economic performance of units 
located on industrial estates, with those outside them. The evidence shows that 
units located off industrial estates have tended to perform better than those 
located thereon (Sandesara 1988: 649). The main reason for this apparently 
perverse effect of policy seems to be that estate-located units benefit in the short 
term from subsidised rents, but thereafter, rents tend to rise, undermining their 
profitability and hence their growth potential.
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Sandesara's study of the efficacy of Government incentives and concessions, 
conducted for the Industrial Development Bank of India, revealed other ways in 
which aspects of the policy can be counterproductive (Sandesara 1982). Cheap 
credit, for example may encourage firms to acquire relatively sophisticated 
equipment at the expense of jobs. In his study of assisted and non-assisted units 
in Bombay, Hyderabad and Jaipur, Sandesara was able to show that units taking 
advantage of Government financial assistance
"had higher labour productivity, higher surplus per worker and higher average 
wage than (non-assisted) units, and (non-assisted units) had higher 
profitability, higher capital productivity, higher surplus per unit of capital, and 
lower capital-intensity than (assisted) units" (Sandesara 1982: 105).
This suggests that the provision of assistance to small units in the form of cheap 
credit encourages the greater use of machinery at the expense of employment 
creation, a prospect that is encouraged by the absence of any mechanism to link 
the provision of credit to employment creation.
A further important area of criticism of Government policy relates to the 
programme of product reservation. Reserving a number of items for exclusive 
production by small scale units has been an important element of policy, 
providing a safe haven where the small man would be free to operate without 
fear of competition from larger enterprises. It is not clear how and why some 
products have been reserved, but the criticism of this protective device is that it 
may encourage "too many cooks in the kitchen" (Sandesara 1982: 112). That 
is, it may encourage a relatively large number of units to be set up to produce 
reserved items, with the result that by creating extreme competition among such 
units, the programme actively creates the very conditions of limited viability that
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the policy seeks to combat.2 Indeed, a comparison of units producing reserved 
and non-reserved items shows that the latter increased their output faster over a 
three year period, both in aggregate and in individual branches of industry (GOI, 
Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner, SSI 1992: Table 38). On this 
evidence reservation appears to be a further example of the way that particular 
policy tools can have counterproductive results.
This review of the shortcomings and criticisms of the small industries policy has 
highlighted some of the ways that it falls short of its own declared objectives of 
creating employment, promoting dispersal and contributing to the ability of small 
manufacturers to becoming self-supporting and competitive. That a disturbingly 
large number of small firms are neither competitive nor self-supporting is 
suggested by the increasing incidence of sickness in the small scale sector. A 
sick unit is defined as one in receipt of financial assistance but which has cither 
not made a profit in the previous twelve months and/or has been unable to 
service the loan. Basically a sick unit is one that is unable to generate a surplus 
over a reasonable span of time. The number of such units has increased 
substantially, from 58,000 at the end of 1982, to 240,053 by 1988 and 245,575 
by March 1993 (GOI Ministry of Finance 1994: 109), or 15% of all registered 
units. Between them these units have total outstanding arrears of Rs 11533 
crores (ibid). Some of these units may ultimately be rehabilitated, but the 
potential loss of resources and of employment is, as Vepa points out, something 
that India can ill afford (Vepa 1988: 117). Sickness is by no means confined to 
the small scale sector, but has been a growing problem among medium and large
2 As it happens this criticism, while valid in some instances, can be exaggerated. Only a small 
proportion of units in the small scale sector produce reserved items. Of the 200 leading 
products produced by the small scale sector in 1987/8, only 48 were reserved (GOI, Ministry of 
Industry, Development Commissioner, SSI 1992: 110). What this suggests is that the 
programme of reservation is largely redundant
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organised enterprises (Anant and Goswami 1995). There are any number of 
reasons why organised firms find themselves in financial difficulties and end up 
by being taken over by the public sector, but their plight is not helped by certain 
institutional rigidities. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976, 
for example, effectively prevents firms from raising finance by disposing of 
surplus - and often valuable - land, while the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act in 
effect gives State Governments powers of veto over the retrenchment of labour 
(Mathur 1989). Such considerations do not apply to the small scale sector. 
The increasing incidence of sickness among the latter does suggest that the 
lengthy process of assessing and sanctioning loans to the small scale sector is not 
as thorough as it could be.
In conclusion, we have looked in this chapter at two related issues. First we 
examined the growth of small manufacturing in India over the period since the 
1960s. Employment has grown, but its growth has been uneven over time. The 
contribution that government policy has made to this growth is not easily 
determined, but the criticisms made by a number of authors do suggest that the 
policy measures, while undoubtedly helping some units, may also have had a 
variety of perverse and counterproductive effects. One of the most basic 
criticisms of the policy has been its apparent failure to place a sufficiently large 
emphasis on creating a viable small manufacturing sector. The operational aim 
of the policy seems to have been to encourage the establishment of as many small 
units as possible, without regard either to their prospects in the medium term, or 
to the productive contribution they can make to the economy as a whole. Such 
is the consequence of the indiscriminate manner in the which the policy has been 
implemented.
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Cha pter  5. The M a c r o -E c o n o m y  : fr o m  self r elian c e  to  liber a lisa tio n
The previous chapter looked at the growth of the small scale sector over the 
period since the early 1960s. That this sector has grown is beyond dispute, but 
the role which government policy has played in encouraging that growth is open 
to question. An equally, if not more important factor may have been the evolution 
of the macro-economy over the past few decades. In this chapter we look at the 
broad development of the industrial economy, and consider how the general 
economic and political environment has affected the small scale sector.
The Indian government set out consciously in 1948 to transform the economy. It 
aimed above all to promote the growth of a self-reliant, capitalist industrial 
economy. Bearing in mind "the full dimensions of the planning and developmental 
problems faced by India in the 1950s" (Bhagwati and Desai 1970: 500), the 
industrial economy can lay claim to considerable achievements (Ahluwalia 1988: 
151). The industrial sector is larger and more diversified than it was at the time of 
Independence (Table 5.1) and self-sufficiency has been achieved in a wide range 
of industrial products, including capital goods (Ahluwalia 1988:151). The World 
Bank, in spite of certain misgivings, has also recognised that
'India's industrial policies have had a large measure of success in accomplishing 
some of the country's fundamental development objectives. High protection of 
domestic producers, large scale government investment, and widespread 
controls and incentives have interacted to encourage the development of a 
sector that produces a broad variety of products, that is increasingly regionally 
dispersed, and that has given the country considerable self-reliance" (World 
Bank 1989: 186).
On the debit side, the overall growth rate of the economy has been 'disappointing" 
as Bhagwati has recently pronounced (Bhagwati 1993: 39). Except for the
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TABLE 5.1
Selected measures of growth of industrial production, 1950/1 to 1991/2
Output:
M tonnes 1950/1 1960/1 1970/1 1980/1 1991/2
Steel 1.04 2.39 4.64 6.82 14.33
Coal 32.3 55.2 76.3 119.0 243.8
Cement 2.7 8.0 14.3 18.7 51.7
Oil 0.3 0.5 6.8 10.5 30.4
Index of 
industrial 18.3 36.2 65.3 100 212.4
production 
1980/1= 100
Source: GOI, Ministry of Finance, 1994: Table 0.1
Seventh Plan, industrial output has consistently fallen short of Plan targets 
(Ahluwalia 1993). Per capita income remains low, increasing from Rs 1127 in 
1951 to Rs 2167 in 1991 (GOI Ministry of Finance 1994: Table 0.1). Poverty 
remains endemic, compounded by a failure to meet basic needs of access to safe 
drinking water, electricity and basic literacy (Basu 1993; Sen 1989; World Bank 
1989).
One view of India's apparently poor performance is associated with a group of 
right wing, neo-classical economists, including Jagdish Bhagwati and T .N. 
Srinivasan. Based on the premise that economic growth is the essential means to 
combat poverty, Bhagwati has since the 1970s, argued that the root of India's 
problems lay in an excessively regulated, planned economy (Bhagwati and Desai 
1970). Extensive controls over production, investment and trade are held to have 
stifled efficiency and growth (Bhagwati 1993: 46). The over-protected industrial 
sector is characterised by high costs, which in turn have militated against export
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success, with the result that not only has India been denied gains from trade, but 
more particularly,
'the inward-orientation (of the economy) in drastically impairing India's export 
performance, simultaneously prevented the build-up of labour intensive 
exports and hence a favourable impact on wages and employment and therefore 
ceteris paribus on poverty as well (Bhagwati 1993: 61).
The 'control infested system' of the 'license-permit-quota Raj' has thus impeded 
growth, but that is by no means the end of the story, for bureaucratic controls 
have also bred corruption of the political system by 'diverting resources into 
unproductive rent-seeking activities' (ibid.: 56). Time, effort and resources are 
devoted to seeking trade and industrial licences and their potential windfall gains, 
encouraging expensive lobbying and the bribing of politicians and bureaucrats who 
control access to such licenses. Buchanan's public choice theory, which was 
originally developed to explain "log-rolling" and "pork-barrelling" in the USA, is 
also called into play by Bhagwati and Srinivasan in explanation of a further 
element of unproductive activity (Srinivasan 1985). Public choice theory (or 'the 
economics of politics') applies the assumptions of neo-classical economics to 
those who hold positions in the state apparatus. Thus, just as producers and 
consumers are assumed to be utility maximisers, so politicians and bureaucrats will 
also seek to maximise their utility, with the inevitable result that the former will 
embrace vote-catching, populist policies, and the latter will embark on empire- 
building (Buchanan 1978:17). This combination of populist political policies, an 
increasingly bloated public sector, and competition for scarcity rents adds up to a 
diversion of scarce resources into what Bhagwati describes as 'directly 
unproductive activities' (Bhagwati 1982).
The implication of this position is that all forms of government intervention 
inevitably lead to economic distortions: to inefficiency, waste, and stagnation. 
Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s, the state was seen, naively perhaps, as a benign
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institution, promoting development in the interests of all, by the 1980s, the state 
was being projected as a predatory anathema (Shapiro and Taylor 1990; Toye 
1993: 133 - 150). In India, as in the West with its own problems of slow and 
erratic growth, a resurgent neo-classical political economy offered an analysis of 
what was wrong, and a proposal for what needed to be done. The problem lay in a 
Leviathan state, and the solution to slow growth, stagnation and poverty lay in 
rolling back the state in favour of greater reliance on the market.
The neo-classical critique is undoubtedly right in emphasising the way that some 
forms of regulation can have perverse effects, but as John Toye observes, it does 
not follow that all forms of regulation are inherently bad (Toye 1993: 100). 
Rather, as he goes on to argue, there is a need for "selective, intelligent 
intervention” (ibid.: 100). For our purposes however, the major defect with the 
neo-classical critique is its abstracted quality. In its quest to demonstrate the 
superiority of market forces, its approach is "ahistorical and timeless” (Shapiro 
and Taylor 1990: 866).
Of greater interest is the very considerable body of material that shows the uneven 
growth of Indian industry in the period since the beginning of the Second Plan. 
It is generally accepted that industrial growth was fairly rapid from 1956 to the 
mid-sixties, after which growth decelerated significantly, eventually picking up in 
the early 1980s (Figure 5.1). The reasons for stagnation over the period 1965 to 
the late 1970s/early 1980s have been endlessly explored, and a variety of views 
have been offered (Harriss, 1989). Among the more important contributions to 
the debate are those by Ahluwalia, whose careful analysis leads her to the 
conclusion that stagnation was the result of several factors - the slow growth of 
agricultural incomes which retarded demand; the slowdown in public investment, 
especially in infrastructure; poor management of the infrastructure; and finally the
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industrial policy framework, which a la Bhagwati discouraged efficiency and 
provided little incentive for cost reduction (Ahluwalia 1985:168).
Economic Stagnation
The slowdown in public investment after 1965 seems of fundamental importance 
(Bardhan 1984: 23). Given that public sector industry provided the bulk of basic 
raw materials as well as energy supplies for the rest of the industrial economy, the 
slowing of public investment had severe repercussions on the whole economy. 
Steel production rose from 1.5 million tonnes in 1950 to 6.4 million in 1965 but 
then stagnated. By 1975 output was 6.7 million tonnes, and only began to 
increase substantially toward the end of the Fifth and the beginning of the Sixth 
Plan in the late 1970s. The slowdown inevitably led to a similar slowdown in 
private manufacturing investment (Bardhan 1984: 24). The shortage of basic 
inputs was compounded by the decline in real terms in infrastructural investment, 
and especially in railways. The growing shortage of railway wagons, combined 
with lack of maintenance, created transport bottlenecks which further adversely 
affected both the industrial sector, and the whole economy (Ahluwalia 1985: 76 
ff).
The downturn in public investment in industry and infrastructure needs to be 
examined in its broader context, both of specific and unpredictable conjunctures, 
and in the context of the way that attempts to develop the economy unleashed 
powerful social and economic changes. Defeat at the hands of China in 1962 led 
to a doubling of the defence budget, and subsequent wars with Pakistan in 1965 
and 1971 encouraged a further diversion of resources to military use. On top of 
this, India suffered serious droughts in 1965 and 1966, and again in the mid-1970s 
requiring costly relief programmes. To add to the country's difficulties, the United 
States of America, the main aid donor, suspended aid flows following the 1971 
conflict with Pakistan, only restoring it in 1978 (Lipton and Toye 1990: 82).
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These exogenous factors help explain the decline of public investment in industry 
and infrastructure. Adopting a conservative attitude to public finances, the 
diversion of finance to defence and increasingly to agriculture automatically 
implied a reduced share for other budget heads.
The experience of drought focused the minds of the planners on the need to 
correct the neglect of agricultural production. In the Second Plan, agriculture's 
share of total plan outlay was 11.7%, rising only modestly to 12.7% in the Third 
Plan, but subsequently its share grew significantly - to 17.2% in the Fourth Plan, 
and together with investment in irrigation, the total outlay on the rural sector 
amounted to 24% of the Fourth Plan total (Rao 1993: 258). As is well known, 
the approach to increasing agricultural production involved encouraging farmers 
to make more intensive use of land through the technology of the Green 
Revolution, backed up by a system of administered prices and subsidised fertilisers 
(Rao 1993: 225). In the medium term, this helped India to achieve self-sufficiency 
in foodgrains by the late 1970s, but in the meantime, agricultural performance 
continued to be problematical.
The recurrence of food shortages in 1972/3 and 1974/5, on top of the first oil 
crisis, pushed inflation upwards in an economy already suffering stagnation. 
Stagflation precipitated growing labour militancy, political unrest, and growing 
disillusionment both with the planning process, and after Nehru's death in 1964, 
with the Congress Party (Stem 1993: 208). Its hegemony both at the Centre and 
even more so in the State Legislative Assemblies was being undermined, and one- 
party rule was replaced by a more competitive party politics (Vanaik 1990: 77 ff ). 
In the 1972 elections, Mrs Gandhi sought to reassert Congress hegemony, by 
appealing, through the slogan of Garibi-hatao (abolish poverty) to the poor, the 
marginalised and the dispossessed. Her 20 point programme and the proliferation 
of anti-poverty programmes, while by no means unjustifiable, added a further twist
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to the pressure on public spending. As the economic and political situation 
continued to deteriorate in the wake of food shortages and rampant inflation, Mrs 
Gandhi's declaration of a state of emergency in 1975/77 was intended both to 
secure greater discipline among industrial workers, and at the same time to silence 
all opposition by the simple device of the prison system (Brass 1994 :42/3).
Growth in the 1980s
With the ending of the Emergency, the Congress (I) suffered a disastrous defeat at 
the hands of the electorate, and was replaced by the Janata government. The 
Janata coalition showed itself no more capable of dealing with India's underlying 
economic problems, and soon disintegrated, paving the way for the return of 
Congress (I). In the aftermath of his mother's assassination, Rajiv Gandhi scored a 
major triumph at the polls in 1984 largely on the basis of an electoral platform to 
liberalise the economy. Changes were introduced reflecting the disillusion that 
had been growing within the Congress (I) at the state directed industrial strategy. 
Under Gandhi, there was a relaxation of the licensing and regulatory controls over 
industry (small factories more than 30 miles from an urban area, for example, were 
exempted from the need for an industrial license, and among large firms, controls 
over the level of production were significantly eased), tax rates on individuals and 
companies were reduced, and access to imported technology was made easier 
(Echeverri-Gent 1990). The hope was that a shift towards encouraging private 
enterprise would stimulate the economy, and indeed, industrial growth rates rose 
significantly, at an average of over 8% from the mid-1980s (Figure 5.1). This is 
all the more remarkable bearing in mind that the 1980s was a period when the rest 
of the world was mired in recession and economic turmoil. Ironically, as the 
pressure for further liberalisation was increasing within India, the International 
Labour Organisation was pointing out that India's strong performance in the 1980s 
was mainly attributable to its inward looking economic strategy which had 
insulated the country from global pressures (ILO 1989: 27).
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The changing policy environment may have contributed to the improvement in 
industrial performance in the 1980s, but a more significant factor was the increase 
in public investment. Ahluwalia suggests this began in the late 1970s, with 
increased investment in infrastructure which continued in the Seventh Plan of 1980 
- 1985, and helped to alleviate the transport bottlenecks as well as providing a 
stimulus directly and indirectly to output (Ahluwalia 1988: 153). It is generally 
believed that in the course of the expansionary 1980s, the number of middle class 
consumers in the countryside and the city increased substantially. Stem, 
remarking on this embourgeoisiement of the population, refers to a middle class of 
85 - 170 million people (Stem 1993: 5). Others estimate it at between 150 and 
250 million (The Economist October 28 1989; The Guardian February 25 1995), 
while yet others believe these estimates to be grossly inflated. A Director of US- 
based drugs company Merck, Sharp and Dhome estimated the Indian middle class 
at 10-20 million (The Hindu, September 10 1991). Whatever the figure, there is 
little doubt that production of consumer durables has been increasing, further 
stimulating industrial expansion. Car production for example, hardly changed 
between 1970/71 and 1980/1, rose dramatically from 49,000 in 1980/81 to 
221,000 by 1991, helped by increased foreign collaboration (D' Costa 1995: 488). 
Production of motor cycles and scooters also increased from 447,000 to 1.84 
million (GOI Ministry of Finance 1994: Table 1.31). Consumption of other 
consumer durables - watches, radios and TV sets has also grown rapidly, with "the 
biggest consumption boom taking place in rural areas" (The Economist 1994).
Increased spending by government enabled public investment to grow, but a 
growing share of government spending has been directed towards subsidies. The 
Green Revolution created a class of'rich' fanners who have benefited from higher 
administered prices, heavily subsidised fertilisers, cheap irrigation and free 
electricity. But as Kothari has argued, the very process of development which has 
benefited some groups, has also marginalised others, spawning local grassroots
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movements which threaten the legitimacy of the system (Kothari 1988 : chapter 
2). In response, successive governments have found it prudent to respond to the 
growth of poverty by means of relief measures (Brass 1994: 295 £f), food 
subsidies (said by one source to be equal in volume to the enormous fertiliser 
subsidy in the mid 1980s (Stem 1993:7)), and by expanding the coercive 
apparatus of the state (Kothari 1988: 30 ; Brass 1994: 364 ).
Overall, the quantum of subsidies appears to have grown rapidly since the late 
1970s. Mundle and Rao have attempted to quantify the total of both explicit 
subsidies (fertilisers, food) and those that are implicit (where goods and services 
are provided at less than cost) arriving at a figure of Rs 42,324 crores or 15% of 
GDP in 1987/88 (Mundle and Rao 1991: 1172). They point out that by far the 
largest proportion of this subsidy is invisible, so that it is not at all clear who 
benefits, or whether the subsidies are mis-targeted.
In effect, and particularly with the growth of a more competitive electoral system 
during the 1970s, the demands on government spending have grown. While 
governments have sought to pander to electors through populist policies, they 
have also been subject to growing pressures from below - pressures which are 
difficult to resist in a democratic polity. But while spending has grown, 
governments have found it increasingly difficult to raise the necessary revenue. 
Both the rural rich, and the growing urban middle class have shown themselves 
averse to taxation, with the result that a large share of revenue comes not from a 
progressive system of taxation, but from a regressive system of indirect taxes on 
consumption. By the mid-1980s, the Centre's revenue was not sufficient to cover 
even its current spending, let alone contribute towards public savings. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the fiscal deficit was low, amounting by the mid 1970s to 4% of GDP, 
but then rising to 6.3% in the first half of the 1980s and to 8.2% in the second half 
(Nayyar, 1993 : 640). Spending has increased but this increase has not been
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matched by proportionate increases in revenues, hence the growing deficit and as 
the deficit has grown, government has increased its borrowings, both at home and 
from foreign sources, and the servicing of this debt has eaten further into 
government revenues.
Crisis and Liberalisation
By 1991, India was caught up in a severe economic crisis. External debt rose from 
$19.3 billion in 1980/1 to $84 billion in March 1991 (GOI Ministry of Finance 
1994). With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, India lost its single most important 
export market which had accounted for 20/25 % of exports, but more serious still 
was the fall out from the Gulf War. The flow of remittances from workers in the 
Gulf states, which had helped to reduce India's fragile trade balance, collapsed, 
while oil prices rose, squeezing the country's foreign exchange reserve. By June 
1991, reserves stood at an all time low, and India came close to defaulting.
The quid pro quo for assistance from the IMF and the World Bank was that the 
Government adopt a wide ranging reform of the economic system. This 
liberalisation of the economy has involved the reform of trade policy, such that 
tariff levels and other restrictions on imports are being progressively reduced, and 
controls over foreign investment have been relaxed, opening the economy up to 
the rest of the world. To reduce the fiscal deficit, attempts have been made to cut 
subsidies - although the proposed ending of fertiliser subsidies has been scaled 
down because of fierce rural opposition - and a programme of (partial) 
privatisation of nationalised industries has got under way. Industrial policy has 
also been reformed. Licensing has been abolished for all but a small group of 
industries1 where, for reasons related to "security, and strategic concerns, social 
reasons, hazardous chemicals and overriding environmental reasons, and items of
1 These cover coal, oil, alcohol, sugar, tobacco, asbestos, wood, hides, paper/newsprint, defence 
equipment, drugs, hazardous chemicals, entertainment electronics and white goods
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elitist consumption”, licensing will continue (GOI New Industrial Policy, 1991(a): 
para 2.1 (i)). The number of industries reserved for the public sector has been 
reduced to armaments, atomic energy, coal and lignite, mineral oils, mining, and 
railway transport.
The general thrust of policy is spelled out in the Eighth Plan (1992 - 1997), which 
states that much greater emphasis will be given to promoting industrial 
development through private initiative, and to that end the main aim is to 
concentrate on the provision of the necessary infrastructure of power, transport 
and communications (GOI Planning Commission 1992: Foreword, vol. 1). 
These are the major areas where the government hopes to encourage foreign 
investment, thereby helping to promote India's future development.
The changes introduced through the liberalisation programme have been broadly if 
not enthusiastically welcomed by most business and industrial leaders in India 
(India Today, November 15 1993). If there are misgivings, it is over the speed of 
the reform process. To the extent that part, if not all, of Indian industry is 
relatively uncompetitive in both price and quality, there needs to be a period of 
gradual adjustment in order to avoid large scale deindustrialisation and to allow 
Indian industry to be able to compete on more equal terms with foreign 
competitors both within India and abroad. The main political parties also appear to 
have accepted liberalisation, though again in some cases with reservations about 
some elements of the programme. The nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, for 
example, while not totally opposed to the opening up of the economy to trans­
national corporations, has revived the old slogan of "swadeshi" (goods made in 
India) in opposition to Coca-colonisation. The left, including the trade unions, 
which initially opposed liberalisation as a sell-out to Western imperialism seems to 
be coming round to the view that, to coin a phrase, there is no alternative (India 
Today, February 15 1994). The collapse of the Soviet Union and China's embrace
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of market reforms have helped to hasten the apparent triumph of neo-classical 
economics, but what shape this New Economic Order will assume and who 
benefits from it, remains to be seen (Biersteker 1992). What can be ventured is 
that some classes, some countries, regions and localities may well benefit from 
increasing global integration, but the imperatives of a market-driven global system 
will lead other countries regions and localities to lose out.
Liberalisation and the Small Industry Policy.
While major changes are slowly being introduced into the economy, the Small 
Industry Policy has so far remained largely intact, though with a slight shift of 
emphasis. The Tolicy measures for promoting and strengthening small, tiny and 
village industries' as a complement to the New Industrial Policy', emphasises the 
need to 'add vitality and growth impetus to the small scale industry sector' (GOI, 
1991(b): para 1.2). Much of this statement is a reiteration of previous official 
pronouncements about the necessity of upgrading technology, and supporting 
marketing initiatives, now with an added stress on export promotion.
There are two main areas of the new policy which portend important departures 
from past policy. Under the new system, subsidised/cheap credit is to be 
withdrawn "while at the same time ensuring an adequate flow of capital to small 
manufacturing". Present indications are that the Priority Bank Lending Scheme, 
under which banks are required to reserve 40% of their lending to agriculture and 
the small scale sector, will be radically reformed. The Committee on Financial 
Sector Reforms is believed to be likely to recommend that the scale of the scheme 
be considerably reduced, and applicable only to the agricultural sector (Small 
Industries Development Bank of India 1995: 149). The small manufacturing sector 
thus faces the prospect of confronting a free market in credit. Whether this will 
benefit small scale industry must be in some doubt.
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The second new departure is the identification of a role for industry associations. 
In the past, it was the government and government agencies which were seen as 
the principal vehicles for promoting small industry. For the first time, this policy 
document suggests that industry associations should take on responsibility for 
quality counselling and testing. These two points are developed slightly in the 
Eighth Plan document, which makes the points that, in relation to the small scale 
sector
"Greater emphasis will be laid on private initiative in industrial development.
The public sector will become very selective in the coverage of activities and in 
making investment" (GOI, Planning Commission Eighth Plan, Volume 2: para 
6.3.2).
and
"Industry associations will be encouraged to form marketing organisations 
which, besides marketing, will go into the quality aspect of products" (ibid: 
para 6.4.11).
There is here an evident shift towards greater self-help by individual entrepreneurs 
and by their collective associations. It would seem that the state is beginning to 
relinquish its felt responsibility towards the small scale sector and embracing a 
greater role for market freedoms. In line with this, it is generally believed that it is 
only a matter of time before the programme of reserving items for exclusive 
production in the small scale sector is formally abolished (India Today, 
December 31 1993). In late 1995 the government announced a complete review 
of the policy for small manufacturing industry in the light of the general 
liberalisation of the economy and the shift to global integration, but with an 
election pending in 1996, it could be some time before the final shape of a new 
policy emerges.
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Ch a pter  6 Eco n o m ic  Ch a n g e  a n d  the Sm a l l  M a n u f a c t u r in g  Se c t o r .
In this chapter, we will consider how the broad changes in the macro-economy 
have affected the growth and development of the small scale sector. The latter has 
largely been excluded from the discussion of industrial growth rates in India which 
has centred on the performance of the large scale factory sector.
There are of course, several ways in which the small scale sector may have been 
affected by the uneven pattern of growth of the economy generally. In the first 
place, growth of the small scale sector is likely to be affected by the supply of raw 
materials and of machinery from the large scale sector, as well as through the 
opportunities for subcontracting from, and supplying the large factory sector. 
Secondly, the macro-economy may exert an important influence through the 
medium of consumer spending and consumer demand.
The general thrust of the evidence presented in chapter 5 was that industrial 
growth rates slowed significantly for most of the 1970s, as a consequence of 
which many raw materials were in short supply, compounded by logistical 
problems created by transport bottlenecks. One would expect these problems to 
have a damaging effect, both on the expansion of existing small units, as well as on 
the establishment of new units By contrast, the 1980s was a period of expansion, 
when raw material supplies eased considerably. On top of this the growth of 
incomes and consumer demand was, on the evidence, more rapid in the 1980s than 
in the previous decade. We would then expect to find a more rapid growth of 
small manufacturing in the more buoyant 1980s, than in the stagnant 1970s.
The evidence assembled in the previous chapter suggests a contradictory pattern 
(Table 6.1). Defining the small scale sector as those small firms in the factory 
sector employing 1 0 - 4 9  workers, the data shows that employment grew more
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rapidly, in absolute and relative terms in the decade 1971/81 - roughly the period 
of industrial stagnation - than in 1981/91 - roughly the period of greater buoyancy. 
In the period 1971/81, employment grew by 40.9%, and in the following decade 
by half that amount, 20.9%. Similarly, employment in the non-factory, non­
household sector - essentially units employing fewer than 10 workers - also 
showed faster relative and absolute growth in the 1970s, with an absolute increase 
of 4.3 million workers ( a 76% increase), while in the 1980s, the absolute increase 
was a more modest 3.6 million workers, a percentage increase of 37%.
TABLE 6.1
Employment in manufacturing industry, 1961 - 1991
Non-factory
non-household
% change ASI units up to 
49 employees
% change
1961 4,446,098 677,190
1971 5,595,164 +25.8 837,340 +23.6
1981 9,868,356 +76.4 1,179,413 +40.9
1991 13,507,247 +36.9 1,426,238 +20.9
Sources: as for Table4.2
What the data suggest is that small manufacturing has behaved in a countercyclical 
fashion, with larger increases being registered in a period of industrial and 
economic stagnation, and more modest increases when the rate of industrial and 
economic growth picked up. It is a result that seems entirely counterintuitive, but 
it is one endorsed by Kashyap, who argues that in India, small firms do poorly in 
times of prosperity, and well in times of declining demand (Kashyap 1988: 670). 
What is not at all clear, and what Kashyap fails to explain is why this should be the 
case.
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Superficially at least, the finding that small manufacturing behaves in a 
countercyclical way is not entirely at odds with experience elsewhere. It may be 
unusual when compared with the experience of much of Western Europe in recent 
times, where growth of small firms has been associated with periods of general 
expansion; but in parts of the Third World, recessionary conditions appear to 
have encouraged the growth of 'informal' manufacturing. Dawson's study of 
Ghana, for example, shows how the collapse of the formal manufacturing sector 
has prompted a shift into 'informal' manufacturing enterprises, while Schmitz has 
also tended to link economic crisis with the resurgence of small scale industry 
(Dawson 1991; Schmitz 1989: 24/27). In the case of India, while there were 
serious economic difficulties in the 1970s, these were hardly comparable with the 
"economic crisis of unprecedented proportions" which many parts of Africa and 
Latin America experienced in the 1980s (Ghai and de Alcantara 1990: 389).
Rather than accepting the Kashyap hypothesis, it may be useful to examine the 
growth of small manufacturing over the period since the early 1970s in a bit more 
detail. The data provided in Table 6.1 are aggregate figures for the small 
manufacturing sector as a whole, and such aggregates may conceal as much as 
they illuminate. One of the characteristics of the small manufacturing sector is its 
considerable heterogeneity, and there is no reason to assume that all branches of 
small industry will grow at the same pace. An examination of the structure of the 
small sector may provide some clues as to the uneven rate of growth over time. In 
this connection it is worth pointing out that Ahluwalia's analysis of the progress of 
the large scale industrial sector points out that low rates of growth in the 1970s 
were not uniformly characteristic. The slowdown in growth was most marked in 
the basic metals and capital goods industries, while the agro-based industries 
showed no sign of a deceleration in growth rates (Ahluwalia 1985: 25). On that 
basis, we hypothesise that a large part of the growth in the small scale sector in the 
1970s was in those branches of industry linked to the rural economy, while those
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branches of the sector reliant on inputs from the large factory sector would have 
grown at a more modest rate, but exhibiting higher growth rates in the more 
favourable circumstances of the 1980s.
Testing this hypothesis is difficult because of the lack of suitable data. The Annual 
Survey of Industries provides a very detailed breakdown of the structure of the 
whole factory sector, but the data is not disaggregated by size of factory, so 
nothing can be said about the structure of the small factory sector. The only 
available sources of data which shed some light on the structure, and changes in 
the structure, of the small scale sector are the two Censuses of Small Scale 
Manufacturing carried out for the reference periods of 1972 and 1987/88. These 
are not particularly appropriate reference dates for the purposes in hand, but in the 
absence of suitable alternative data, there is no alternative. Table 6.2 shows the 
main characteristics of the small registered sector by major product groups 
(Sandesara 1993: 225).
TABLE 6.2
Growth of small registered manufacturing by sector, 1972, 1987/88
Main group 1972 1987/88
% of % of % of % of % of % of
units employment production units employment production
Food/
textiles
10 13 12 24 22 30
Metals/
electrical
49 43 48 25 30 33
Other 40 42 39 35 42 35
Services 1 2 1 15 7 2
Source: Sandesara (1993) Table 5.
What the table shows is that over the period 1977 to 1987/88, growth of units, 
employment and production was largely concentrated in the food and textiles 
group. A more detailed breakdown of changes reveals that employment in the
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food/beverage industry increased by 267%, while employment in the small textile 
sector (which includes hosiery and ready made garments) increased by 163% 
(Sandesara 1993: 225). By contrast, the number of units, level of employment and 
of production increased much more slowly in the metals/electricals group. 
Employment in basic metals increased between the two Censuses by 24%, 
machinery and parts by 92%, transport equipment by 20% (ibid.: 225).
Some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting figures, because the definition 
of a registered small unit changed between the two reference dates. In 1972, a 
small units was defined as one with fixed investment of less than Rs 75,000, and 
by 1987/88 the limit had risen to Rs 350,000. Some of the increases may thus have 
come about purely because of changes in definitions. However, as Sandesara 
points out, the magnitude of the changes particularly for the food products and 
textiles sectors do suggest real growth, while the modest figures for the metals 
and electricals group suggest that in spite of the upward revision of the qualifying 
limit, growth was much slower.
There are of course several plausible explanations of this picture of differential 
growth in the small scale sector. One possibility is that the food/beverages group 
grew more rapidly because of easier entry conditions than in other sectors. The 
detailed data reported in the Second All India Census of Small Manufacturing 
does not entirely bear this out. Investment in plant and machinery per unit in the 
food sector is recorded as Rs 8000 compared with Rs 9000 in the beverages 
group (GOI, Ministry of Industry, Development Commissioner SSI 1992: Table 
20). By comparison, per unit investment in the engineering sector is significantly 
higher at Rs 18000. However, within the engineering sector, the largest number 
of small units is in the metal products division where investment per unit is Rs 
8000, the same as for the food/beverages group. Differing conditions of entry 
may have played some role in the faster growth of some sectors, but it appears
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from this evidence not to afford a complete explanation of the observed pattern of 
growth of small manufacturing.
Among the alternative explanations is that differential growth of the small scale 
sector has been influenced by the wider macro-economy. From the early 1970s 
until the mid 1980s, the growth of employment was concentrated in that part of 
the small scale sector most closely associated with the rural, agricultural economy. 
Conversely, as we hypothesised, those elements of the small scale sector 
associated with the large factory sector - the metal working, engineering and 
electrical sectors grew more slowly, being constrained by raw material shortages, 
as well as transport difficulties and the slow growth of consumer demand during a 
period of stagflation. Our hypothesis would lead us to expect a more rapid 
growth of the latter groups in the 1980s as the economy generally picked up. 
That this expectation of higher growth rates of employment in the 1980s is not 
reflected in the data may be attributed to the intervening influence of several other 
factors. First, it needs to be borne in mind that while there was a marked 
improvement in industrial output from the early 1980s, the lag effect of new 
investment implies that the availability of raw material supplies did not begin to 
significantly improve until the mid 1980s. Steel production, vital for small 
engineering units, remained flat from the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s, after 
which production of finished steel began to rise. This suggests that the stimulus of 
an improving macro-economy was delayed and only began to have an effect on the 
growth of the engineering sector in the second half of the 1980s. There is some 
evidence to support this; as we shall see later, in the city of Coimbatore, there 
was an increase in the establishment of new units in the engineering sector in the 
course of the 1980s, and especially after the mid 1980s.
The condition of the macro-economy may help explain the apparently slow growth 
of the engineering and metal-using division of the small scale sector through the
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1970s and into the 1980s, but it does not offer an explanation of why employment 
grew more rapidly in the 1970s than in the subsequent decade. One possible 
contributory factor is increased capital intensity. It might be hypothesised that 
over time, the small scale sector has become more capital intensive, and has been 
able to increase capacity utilisation, at the expense of employment generation. 
There is some evidence for this for the small factories covered by the Annual 
Survey of Industries, which shows that fixed capital per employee has been rising, 
together with value added and value of output, and most markedly since the early 
1980s (Table 6.3). It seems a plausible argument that the
TABLE 6.3 
Changes in structural ratios, small factories
% change 1974/79 1979/84 1984/90
Value added
per employee 18.7 84.6 122.7
Fixed capital
per employee 38.0 83.2 119.5
Source: GOI, Central Statistical Organisation, Annual Survey o f Industries
deceleration in employment creation during the 1980s has little to do with the 
countercyclical nature of small manufacturing; rather, small manufacturing has 
grown considerably in value-added and output terms, while employment growth 
has lagged behind reflecting technological progress and the adoption of more 
modem labour conserving production methods. While the evidence for this is 
strictly limited, it does afford an intuitively more satisfactory explanation of the 
observed pattern of growth than that favoured by Kashyap.
In conclusion, what light does this shed on the role of government in promoting 
the growth of small manufacturing? There is a tendency on the part of 
government agencies to suggest that policy has been a success, and is vindicated
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by the way that employment and output have increased. The argument we have 
tried to develop here is that growth in these parameters is more the result of 
general economic conditions than of the specifics of policy. Broadly speaking, the 
measures associated with this policy were in place by the mid 1960s. No major 
policy initiatives have been implemented since then. What changes have come 
about, such as the extension of reservation have been largely cosmetic, and largely 
immaterial inasmuch as the reserved industries account for a relatively small share 
of the sector generally.
Against the more or less constant policy frame, the performance of the small scale 
sector in employment terms has been variable over time. The analysis in this 
chapter has attempted to relate that performance to the general development of 
the economy. Disaggregating the small scale sector into its broad component 
parts suggested a pattern of differential growth of employment. The relatively 
poor performance of the engineering sector was explained in terms of the 
constraints imposed by the general slowdown of industrial production in the 
1970s, as compared with the better performance of the agro-processing industries 
which were presumably less affected by limited availability of raw material inputs. 
It was suggested furthermore that the slower growth of employment in the 1980s 
might be understood in terms of increasing capital intensity, itself perhaps a 
reflection of the improved availability of modem machinery from the large scale 
sector. It has to be admitted that in putting forward these hypotheses, we are 
considerably hampered by the lack of availability of appropriate data to test them, 
but it remains plausible to argue that growth has been more strongly conditioned 
by the development of the economy in general than by specific government 
policies for the small scale sector. It does not follow from this that government 
policy is irrelevant. The development of the economy in general has, of course, 
been strongly affected by general economic policy, but it is to suggest that the role 
of the Small Industry Policy as operated hitherto has been less important than the
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general management of economic affairs. And indeed, bearing in mind some of 
the criticisms of the way the policy has been operated, then it may in some 
respects have held back stronger performance in the field of employment 
generation. In particular, the lack of any linkage between the provision of 
subsidised credit and employment creation may have encouraged the tendency to 
increased capital intensity at the expense of labour absorption.
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Ch a pter  7. The  Ge o g r a ph y  of Sm a l l  M a n u f a c t u r in g  In d u s t r y  in  In d ia
Previous chapters have concentrated on employment growth in the small 
manufacturing sector, reflecting the high priority attached to that particular 
objective of the Small Industry Policy. A second aim behind the policy of 
promoting small industry was that it would help to achieve the more general 
objective of "balanced development of different areas in the country" (GOI 
Ministry of Industrial Development, Development Commissioner SSI 1973: 16). 
Balanced development can be, and has been interpreted in one of two ways. It can 
mean reducing imbalances between different regions, or reducing imbalances 
within regions, between urban and rural areas. In India, the small industry policy 
has been seen as a means of contributing to both of these aims. It has been seen as 
a way of helping to reduce interregional disparities, and at the same time helping 
to promote rural development through employment creation.
In the 1950s and 1960s, planning in India was more concerned with sectoral than 
spatial planning. In the course of the 1970s, the commitment to regional balance 
came to the fore (Mackie 1983: chapter 3). The Pande Working Group was 
established by the Planning Commission in 1968 to consider the means and criteria 
for identifying "backward" areas, while the Wanchoo Working Group looked at 
ways of overcoming backwardness (Menon 1979: 43). "Backwardness" was 
essentially defined in terms of areas possessing little industry, and the solution to 
backwardness was to provide incentives in the form of subsidies for industry to 
locate in such areas. The National Committee on the Development of Backward 
Areas, set up under the Planning Commission was explicit about the role of small 
industry in helping overcome backwardness, noting that
"... in the early stages of development (of backward areas), the small industry is
likely to be the major activity at least for local entrepreneurs. Hence the
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promotion of small industries in these areas is paramount" (GOI, Planning
Commission 1981: 64).
The incentives made available in the backward areas were seen as the means of 
attracting medium and large scale factory industry away from the more developed 
areas, while at the same time, those same incentives would encourage local 
entrepreneurial development, and this would contribute to a process of regional 
convergence and balance. As it turns out, the proposals of the Working Groups 
were subverted by political objections. Originally, backward areas were conceived 
of as backward states, but objections from the Chief Ministers of the more 
developed states led to a revised scheme, in which some 246 districts were 
deemed backward, including less developed districts in the more developed states 
(Menon 1979: 53).
In addition to their perceived role as helping rectify regional imbalance, small scale 
industries have also been seen as having a prominent role in reducing rural/urban 
disparities. Encouragement of small manufacturing in rural areas would help, so it 
was believed, to reduce the problems of "unplanned urbanisation" (GOI, Industrial 
Policy 1956: para 13). By contributing to rural development through the creation 
of employment and income, small industry would reduce the flow of migrants to 
the cities, and thereby alleviate the pressures on cities.
The question that arises is how realistic is it to pin such hopes on a programme of 
rural industrialisation? There are strong theoretical arguments which cast serious 
doubt over the prospects of small industry development programmes being of any 
significant benefit to rural areas in the circumstances of a late developing country. 
There are two issues here that need to be addressed, the first being agglomeration, 
and the second being the marked rural/urban disparity in infrastructural facilities.
In an earlier chapter, we noted that there is a strong tendency for small 
manufacturers to concentrate together in space in order to benefit from
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localisation economies. The clustering of firms either in the same, or in related 
industries creates the conditions for what Schmitz describes as 'collective 
efficiency' (Schmitz 1989: 27). Clustering in effect creates the scale economies 
more usually associated with the single large enterprise. The difference is quite 
simply one of boundaries. The large firm is, as we said earlier a factory within a 
wall, whereas a cluster of small firms can collectively function as a factory without 
walls. Each individual unit within the cluster can benefit from its closeness to and 
its association with other units. Each benefits from reduced distribution and 
assembly costs, while the greater information flows that proximity creates will add 
to growth prospects. Increased output for the cluster as a whole implies 
increasing demand for each individual unit, allowing productivity to rise and unit 
costs to fall.
Clustering or agglomeration, is thus an important feature of the industrial 
landscape, but clustering in turn tends to be associated with specific environments, 
and most especially with cities. This is because the urban environment affords 
another set of benefits in the form of urbanisation economies. The tendency for 
industry to concentrate in cities reflects not only the advantages which cities offer 
to capital in the form of local linkages, but also because of the easier availability 
of basic services of power connections, access to communications, banking 
facilities and the like, and not least ready access to a large pool of labour. These 
are basic facilities whose existence cannot be taken for granted in rural India. 
James Bema tells an instructive tale about how he
"met the owner of a newly established textile mill for whom supply of skilled 
labour had become a grave problem. A town fifteen miles from Coimbatore 
had been chosen as the site for the mill. Although it had been in operation for 
only a few months, the proprietor had already come to the conclusion that he 
had made a serious mistake. All his skilled workers had been drawn from other 
mills in Coimbatore. Besides having to pay them extra money for travel to and 
from the city, he reported that absenteeism was much higher than it normally 
should have been, with serious detriment to production" (Bema 1960: 96)
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That such difficulties persist is borne out by the more recent experience of firms 
in the industrial growth centre of Hosur, Tamil Nadu. Located in a backward 
rural area, employers found themselves having to import semi-skilled, skilled and 
supervisory staff from Bangalore 40kms away (Mackie 1983: chapter 6). In an 
unevenly developed economy, cities afford significant external economies which 
are important for large industry; the 1977 legislative ban on new large scale 
industrial development makes the point. Small and medium enterprises are not so 
restricted, and external economies are likely to continue to draw such activities to 
large urban centres (Harris 1991: chapter 3). McPherson’s study of small (service 
and manufacturing firms) in four Southern African countries demonstrated that 
rural firms are much less likely to survive than those in urban locations, and the 
reasons are not difficult to discern (McPherson 1995). As we noted in chapter 2, 
small firms are faced with particular problems; they have neither the resources nor 
the expertise to be able to search out suppliers and customers, nor do they have 
the resources to train their own labour. A location in a large industrial centre may, 
therefore, be particularly advantageous and appealing. Cities, and most 
particularly those with a sizeable industrial base offer greater potential and greater 
opportunity for setting up small units, while the higher level of incomes - for some 
sections of the population at least - generated by industry and commerce implies 
higher demand for and higher consumption of goods. Not only are urban industrial 
areas more likely to afford larger industrial and consumer markets, with 
opportunities for subcontracting but, as both cause and effect of their 
development, they are more likely to be able to offer better support and 
infrastructure facilities, and a pool of trained labour. And in turn, that pool of 
trained labour may become the basis for the growth of small entrepreneurs. By 
contrast, villages, small towns and even those cities with a weakly developed 
industrial base provide fewer opportunities and less support, and will tend 
therefore to be a less fertile seedbed for growth.
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What this line of argument suggests is that small industry will tend to agglomerate, 
and such agglomerations will typically be concentrated in cities. And to the extent 
that cities, especially industrial cities are themselves likely to be geographically 
unevenly distributed between regions, we should expect small manufacturing to 
show a similar uneven regional distribution. In what follows, we attempt to test 
these two propositions: that at the regional scale, the distribution of small scale 
industry is positively related to the level of industrialisation and urbanisation; and 
secondly, that within regions, small industry is likely to concentrate into urban 
centres, and particularly the larger urban industrial centres.
Small manufacturing at the regional scale
The proposition to be tested is that the more urbanised and the industrially 
developed regions will support a higher level of small scale manufacturing. What 
this proposition basically amounts to is that the more developed regions will have 
a larger share of small industry than less developed regions. The data used in this 
section is derived from the Census of Population, which provides information on 
employment in ’non-household industry', and the Annual Survey of Industries, 
which provides information on employment in the factory sector, defined as 
establishments employing more than 10 workers and using power, and 20+ 
workers without power. Subtracting the number of workers in the factory sector 
from the Census category of employment in 'non-household industry' provides 
data on employment in what we might describe as the small scale manufacturing 
sector. This residual category covers employment in establishments with fewer 
than 10 workers and using power; and less than 20 workers in units not using 
power.
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Maps 7.1 and 7.2 show z scores for workers in small industry as a percentage of 
each state's labour force for the years 1961 and 19911. Together the fourteen 
states accounted for 93.5% of all employment in small manufacturing in 1991. In 
1961, the states with the highest proportions of employment in small industry 
were, in order, Kerala (6.7%), West Bengal (6.4%), Haryana/Punjab (6.1%), 
Tamil Nadu (5.4%) and Maharashtra (5.1%). By 1991, these five states 
continued to lead, but the relative positions had altered, so that Maharashtra had 
a larger share of its labour force in small industry than any other state (11.3%), 
ahead of West Bengal with 9.4%, Haryana/Punjab/Delhi (8.4%) and Tamil Nadu 
with 7.8%. Kerala's position deteriorated significantly, a reflection perhaps of the 
political and economic climate in that particular state (Thampy 1990).
What emerges from the two maps is that in both 1961 and 1991 employment in 
small manufacturing industry is unevenly distributed among the states of India. 
Figure 7.1 compares the proportion of each state's labour force working in small 
industry in 1961 and 1991 based on z scores which show the data as standard 
deviations around the mean. The plot shows four clusters of states. The first 
cluster comprises five states with above average employment in small 
manufacturing in both 1961 and in 1991. These five states are Maharashtra, West 
Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Haryana/Punjab. These five states accounted for 
50.1% of small manufacturing by employment in 1961, and 59.1% by 1991. A 
second group of two states comprising Gujarat and Karnataka lie just above the 
mean, while a third group of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and 
Uttar Pradesh cluster just below. The final group, comprising the three states of 
Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa cluster below the mean on both dates
}No Census data was collected for either Assam or Jammu and Kashmir in 1991, so both have been 
excluded from the analysis, as have the Union Territories, whose contribution to total 
smallmanufacturing is negligible. The exception is Delhi, whose small manufacturing sector is 
substantial, and has been included here with the data for Haryana/Punjab.
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While by no means a perfect fit, the pattern seems to suggest a relationship with 
the general level of development among the states of India. The states with 
above average levels of small manufacturing employment tend to be the more 
developed states, while the poorer less developed states lag behind. The 
proposition that small manufacturing is related to the general level of development 
among the states can be tested in a simple way by using rank correlation. The 
states were ranked according to the percentage of the labour force in small 
industry, and correlated with a ranking of states on the basis of Joshi's index of 
development (Joshi 1990; 119). The index is a composite measure based on ten 
separate measures of ’development', including per capita state domestic product, 
value added per industrial worker, urbanisation, literacy and agricultural 
productivity. Using this index, the rank correlation for 1961 was 0.84; and for 
1981 0.79. These results tend to bear out that there is a strong relationship 
between employment in small industry, and the general level of economic 
development of the states.
2 T
1.5 --
1 - -
0.5 --
1961
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1991
Figure 7.1 Z scores of percent employment in small scale industry by 
state, 1961 and 1991
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We can attempt to cany this analysis further by building a regression model, in 
which employment in the small scale sector is the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables are measures of social and economic development. The data 
used here relates to the states, and is based on the year 1981. The independent 
variables are shown in Table 7.1.
TABLE 7.1 Independent variables, and Moran's I-statistic
Moran I
- per capita State Domestic Product as % of All India average (SDP) [0.08]
- % rural population below the poverty line (rupov) [0.42]
- % urban population below the poverty line (urpov) [0.24]
- % labour force in the secondary sector (sec) [0.12]
- % labour force in tertiary sector (tert) [0.13]
- % urban population (urb) [0.08]
- % population literate (lit) [0.24]
- average food grain yields as % of the All India average (yield) [0.02]
- infant mortality rate (imr) [0.26]
Moran's I-statistic indicates low or moderate levels of spatial autocorrelation, 
except for rupov, suggesting that conventional statistical tests are safe to use 
(Goodchild 1986). The correlation matrix (Table 7.2) indicates that employment 
in small scale industry is significantly correlated with three variables - positively 
with urbanisation and literacy, and negatively with infant mortality - and highly, 
but insignificantly correlated with employment in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. The positive and significant correlation with literacy might be explained 
in terms of the common link with income and living standards. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that where incomes are higher, there will be a greater 
willingness to support children's education, and conversely where incomes are 
lower, school attendance may be seen as a low priority.2 At the same time, higher 
incomes suggest a larger market for goods, and hence more small industry as
2 An obvious exception to this is the case of Kerala, where a vigorous government campaign has 
resulted in near universal literacy. Kerala is however exceptional in this regard.
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compared with poorer areas where demand for and consumption will be lower and 
there will as a consequence be more limited opportunities for small enterprises. 
Much the same argument would lead us to expect a strong and negative 
relationship between small industry and infant mortality. The infant mortality rate 
is a fairly good indicator o f’development’, reflecting a variety of influences,
TABLE 7.2 Correlation matrix for Indian States, 1981
SDP SEC TERT URB LIT IMR YIELD RUPOV URPOV SSI
SDP 1.0000 .0848 .1241 .4554 .1634 -.3552 .5494 -.7153* -.6846* .4985
SEC .0848 1.0000 .2118 .6671* .1765 -.2592 -.2069 .2071 .1523 .5626
TERT .1241 .2118 1.0000 .3659 .5470 -.3935 -.0513 .0873 .0945 .5176
URB .4554 .6671* .3659 1.0000 .2205 -.3475 .0068 .0142 -.0067 .8168**
LIT .1634 .1765 .5470 .2205 1.0000 -.7770** .1608 .0115 .1337 .6205*
IMR -.3552 -.2592 -.3935 -.3475 -.7770** 1.0000 -.1254 .0071 -.0549 -.6021*
YIELD .5494 -.2069 -.0513 .0068 .1608 -.1254 1.0000 -.4456 -.1645 .1117
RUPOV -.7153* .2071 .0873 .0142 .0115 .0071 -.4456 1.0000 .8944** -.0517
URPOY -.6846* .1523 .0945 -.0067 .1337 -.0549 -.1645 .8944** 1.0000 -.0713
SSI .4985 .5626 .5176 .8168** .6205* -.6021* .1117 -.0517 -.0713 1.0000
N of cases: 15 I-tailed Signif: * -.01 **- .001
Sources: Secondary, tertiary employment, urbanisation and literacy from Census of India, 1981 
Infant mortality and yield of foodgrains, from CSO Statistical Abstract, 1985 
Urban and rural poverty from World Bank (1989) India: poverty, employment and social 
services
including the adequacy of nutritional intake, quality of living conditions and the 
local environment, and the adequacy and accessibility of health care. By and 
large, states with a high rate will tend on average to be poorer, while those with a 
low rate are likely to be characterised by higher average incomes and higher 
consumption levels, and again these may be the conditions which will tend to 
favour the growth of small industry.
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Having explored the correlation matrix, we can now go a stage further, and try to 
build a regression model, entering variables one at a time on the basis of their 
statistical significance. In step one, urbanisation (xu*) was regressed against 
employment in small industry (y), and this yielded the relationship 
y = 0.11 + 0.24xwb 
R2 = 0.667
with a T value of 5.10, the relationship is statistically highly significant (sig T = 
0 .0 0 0 2 ). In the next step, literacy, as the next most significant variable, was 
entered into the equation, producing the relationship 
y = -2 .885  +  0.213xurb +  0.0965x»
R2 = 0.871
Statistically, the relationship remains highly significant (sig T = 0.0009). For the 
remaining variables, the F values and their significance levels are too high to justify 
entering them into the equation, so we end up with a simple regression model, in 
which literacy and urbanisation are the best predictors of the level of employment 
in small industry at the scale of the states. And of those two variables, 
urbanisation is the single most important predictor, accounting for some 67% of 
the variation in the dependent variable.
A similar analysis was performed for 1961, and this revealed much weaker 
relationships generally. The regression of small manufacturing employment on 
urbanisation yields the equation
y = 0.240 +0.1849x
R2 = 0.52964 [Moran I ^  = 0.12 ssi = -0.2l]
With a T value of 3.376, this is significant (Sig T = 0.003), but the R2 value is 
considerably lower than for 1981. The increase in the R2 between 1961 and 1981 
implies a growing concentration of small manufacturing employment in the more 
developed, more urbanised states.
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It is no coincidence that the states with the highest levels of employment in small 
industry are the more urbanised and industrialised states in India. Maharashtra, 
West Bengal, Haryana/Punjab/Delhi and Tamil Nadu not only have higher levels 
erf* urbanisation, but also a larger share of the urban population in these states is 
concentrated into Class 1 cities ( population of more than 100,00) than in other 
states (Ramachandran 1989; Fig 5.1, 5.5). Moreover these are the states which 
contain the major metropolitan centres of India - Bombay; Calcutta, Delhi and 
Madras - which Misra and Chapman suggest are themselves now focal elements 
of evolving regional systems of industrial cities (Misra and Chapman 1991)3. 
These states account for 29% of India's total 1991 population, but fully half of 
industrial output and of value added by factory industry, bearing out Nigel Crook's 
argument that
".. cities are a necessary part of the industrialisation process; they are created
by it, and in turn they sustain it" (Crook 1993: 2).
The analysis presented here is that small manufacturing is sustained by an urban 
location, which affords access to inputs, to markets, to labour and to the general 
facilities of banking, transport and communication. Cities, in other words, present 
unrivalled opportunities for the growth of small industry.
This analysis of small manufacturing employment has yielded some interesting 
results, but it has to be acknowledged that the states which are the units of 
analysis used here, are very large and very heterogeneous. What we propose to 
do now is to change the scale of analysis and focus more closely on one particular 
state.
3 It should be noted that the inclusion of Delhi makes a significant difference to the rank of 
Haryana/Punjab. In 1961, Delhi had half as many workers in small industry as Punjab; by 1991 it 
had two-thirds as many workers. Excluding the data for Delhi results in Haryana/Punjab registering 
only slightly more than the national average level of employment in small industry in both 1961 and 
1991.
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Tamil Nadu
Tamil Nadu is one of the more developed and industrialised states of India. It may 
lack the resource base of some of the Northern states, but it has developed a 
sizeable factory sector. On the basis of per capita value added in manufacturing, 
value of industrial output, and manufacturing employment, the state ranked fourth 
in 1961 behind Maharashtra, West Bengal and Gujarat. By 1990 it continued to 
rank fourth behind Maharashtra, Gujarat and Punjab.
Several factors appear to have contributed to the overall growth and 
diversification of the industrial sector. First, since the 1950s a number of major 
public sector projects have been located in the State. According to Seth's 
calculations, in both 1961 and 1971, Tamil Nadu ranked fifth among fourteen 
states in terms of its share of public sector investment in relation to population 
(Seth, 1986: 345). By 1981 it had plunged to tenth place, for reasons we will 
touch on shortly. Such projects have not only had a direct impact on employment, 
but have also had significant multiplier effects, creating new opportunities for 
supply and ancillary industries. Secondly, in addition to, and perhaps because of 
central projects, the state has also benefited from the industrial licensing system, 
which has directed a stream of private industrial investment into the state. Over 
the period 1959/66, Tamil Nadu ranked third after Maharashtra and West Bengal 
in terms of the number of licenses issued for private sector manufacturing 
investment; and between 1976/1980 it ranked fifth, marginally behind Punjab and 
Uttar Pradesh (Seth 1986: 346).
A third factor contributing to the growth and diversification of the industrial 
economy has been the policy adopted by the Centre of imposing uniform delivered 
prices on a range of basic industrial inputs. Until early 1992, coal and steel have 
been subject to a regime of equalised prices at depots throughout India (Johnson, 
1966: 99) In effect under such an arrangement customers near coal and steel 
producing sites pay more for their supplies, subsidising more distant consumers 
who pay less then the 'real' transport costs. The effect of such cross-subsidisation
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is that, in India, states which are deficient in coal and steel producing capacity 
have not been at a disadvantage compared with producing states. On the 
contrary, consumers in the resource-poor states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat and 
Tamil Nadu have been able to buy basic inputs at much the same price as those in 
the major producing states such as Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Pricing 
policy has provided little incentive for industrial development to take place in 
these areas; rather investment has been diverted elsewhere and most especially to 
the major metropolitan centres of Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, enabling 
them, to maintain their dominance in the urban and industrial system (Sita and 
Chatteijee, 1989).
A further factor which may have contributed to industrial development has been 
the activities of the State Government itself. The Government of Tamil Nadu has 
established a number of agencies whose remit is to attract investment by the 
private sector. Amongst these public bodies are the Tamil Nadu Industrial 
Investment Corporation (TIIC) whose history dates back to 1948. Today, TIIC is 
primarily concerned with implementing the various concessional loan schemes 
funded by the Centre for small scale industries. The Tamil Nadu Industrial 
Development Corporation (TIDCO) was established in 1965 as a government 
owned enterprise whose original aim was to lobby for further public sector 
investment in the state. Since that time, its target has shifted towards encouraging 
joint projects between the State Government and the private sector. The third 
important state institution is the State Industries Promotion Corporation 
(SIPCOT). It has a dual role. On the one hand, it acts as an agent of the 
Industrial Development Bank of India, channelling concessional finance in the 
form of cheap loans to medium and large units. It also acts as a promotional body 
for the State by financing, with Central assistance, the development of industrial 
estates which cater for small industries, and growth centres which are aimed at 
attracting medium and large enterprises. There are now some 55 industrial
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estates, and seven industrial complexes, with an eighth currently in the early stages 
of development at Perundurai in Erode District.
The contribution that these state bodies have made to the industrial development 
of Tamil Nadu is open to question. One of the principal means by which they 
have attempted to promote development is through offering a range of 
concessions to industry, both small, medium and large, in the form of cheap loans, 
and subsidised power tariffs. Such concessional schemes are offered by all the 
states in India directed particularly at mobile medium and large scale investment 
projects, with only marginal differences in the level of generosity. The result is 
that these schemes probably cancel each other out. Any new concession offered 
by one state is quickly adopted by others, so that no state has anything other than 
a very short term advantage over its rivals for major new investments.
The factors outlined above, and especially the location of central projects in the 
state together with the pricing policy for basic inputs helped Tamil Nadu to 
develop its industrial economy in the decades after Independence. The 1950s and 
1960s were a period of sustained growth and diversification but the momentum 
slowed appreciably from the 1970s. After 1970, there was little change in the 
structure of the factory sector in the state (Fig 7.3). This reflected the general 
slowdown and stagnation of India’s industrial economy generally. But whereas the 
Indian economy generally witnessed faster growth in the 1980s, Tamil Nadu's 
industrial sector has continued to perform sluggishly, with industrial output 
growing at a rate well below that of India generally (Goldar and Seth 1989; 
Government of Tamil Nadu, Economic Appraisal, 1991: 136-138; ).
This divergence between national and regional economic trends has been 
examined by Swaminathan (Swaminathan 1994). He argues that compared with 
other leading states, Tamil Nadu has shown less dynamism and this is attributed to
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the low risk taking capacity of established business in the state, combined with a 
less aggressive state policy of industrial promotion (Swaminathan 1994: M-64). 
The evidence for the latter lies in the lower occupancy rates by small and medium 
units of SIPCOT's industrial estates, as compared with the better record of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. There is however, another and perhaps more important 
point to made about the Tamil Nadu economy. As one of the more developed 
states, it is characterised by a comparatively well developed infrastructure, except 
in relation to two vital elements - the state suffers more unreliable and expensive 
energy supplies, and lacking any major rivers, it is subject to periodic and severe 
water shortages.4 Power shortages, voltage reductions and unreliable water 
supplies are by no means unique to Tamil Nadu. But the state is distinguished by 
its relatively high electricity tariffs for industrial consumers (Table 7.4), and these 
in turn reflect the heavy cost to the State Electricity Board of the state 
government's policy of zero tariffs for agricultural producers (Harriss 1992: 223).5 
The combination of unreliable and expensive energy supplies together with 
periodic shortages of water are perhaps more potent contributors to the lack of a 
favourable climate for industrial growth than those identified by Swaminathan.
In the light of these continuing difficulties, it is possible to understand the 
modifications that have occurred in the late 1980s in the State Government's 
industrial policy. Until the beginning of the Fourth National Plan (1969/70), the 
States had limited room to devise their own development plans. State Plans were 
expected to follow the priorities laid down by the Centre, but from the Fourth 
Plan, this monolithic approach was modified to allow the States to formulate their 
own plans, embodying a strategy most suited to their particular needs and
4In the autumn of 1993, for example, the State Government commandeered several thousand private 
water tankers to supply Madras with water from wells up to lOOkms away. The water shortage led to 
serious political disturbances in the city.
5 In the early 1990s, this subsidy amounted to some Rs 4 billion. Gulati's study of agricultural 
subsidies by state shows that the financial cost of electricity subsidies was far higher in the states of 
Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu than elsewhere (Gulati, 1989).
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development priorities. In Tamil Nadu, industrial policy in the 1970s was 
essentially undiscriminating. There was little attempt to promote the growth or 
development of particular sectors, nor even an attempt to assess whether 
particular types of industry might, in the medium or long term, be better suited and 
more beneficial to the state's development (Mackie 1983: chap 5). Industrial 
policy sought quite simply to encourage the continued growth of industries 
already located within the state, and to attract new enterprises, regardless of their 
suitability. Confronted by the continuing power difficulties, the State Government 
has now begun to adopt a more selective approach, introducing a subsidy scheme 
to attract selected categories of industry, notably electronics, pharmaceuticals, the 
manufacture of solar energy equipment, and auto ancillaries. The rationale for this 
shift was spelled out in a report by a working party for the State Planning 
Commission in preparation for the Eighth Plan (Government of Tamil Nadu, 
Planning Commission, n.d.). The report concedes that the continuing power 
problem implies that there is very limited potential for the growth of energy 
intensive industries, and comes to the firm conclusion that "the major thrust of 
industrialisation of Tamil Nadu will have to be oriented towards the small scale 
sector" (p. 7), and in particular it highlights the need to develop small sunrise 
industries - special chemicals, electronics and scientific instruments - but the 
question of how such a shift is to be achieved is not addressed. It is a task made 
more difficult by the fact that Bangalore in the neighbouring state of Karnataka 
has built up a considerable lead as a centre of high tech industry, aided by the 
concentration of major scientific institutions and of public sector industries, many 
of which are involved in defence related work (Singhal and Rogers 1989; 163-65).
The growth of factory industry in the state has been accompanied by and indeed 
may have helped to foster the growth of small scale industry. Employment in the 
non-household, non-factory sector rose from some 640,000 or 5.4% of the 
working population in 1961, to 1.65 million in 1991, equivalent to 7.8% of all
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main workers. The structure of the small sector is revealed by the Census of small 
industry for 1987/8. It needs to be borne in mind that coverage in this census 
extends only to units which are voluntarily registered with the State Directorate of 
Industries and fall within a maximum investment ceiling. Table 7.5 shows the 
share of units, value of output and employment for the groups of industries 
recognised in the National Industrial Classification of industries. In terms of their 
contribution to the value of output, the most important individual branches of 
industry are leather, metal products, chemicals, and hosiery and garments, which 
together account for 52% of production. For All India, the pattern is slightly 
different, with food processing being the principal source of output, followed by 
chemicals and basic metals industries. Looked at in terms of employment, the 
picture that emerges is rather different. In Tamil Nadu, two groups dominate, 
chemicals and food processing, while for All India, the main employment sources 
in small industry are food processing, non-metallic minerals, and metal products. 
Rather than looking at individual categories, we can also look at broad groups, 
and here the importance of 'engineering' (i.e. groups 33-37 inclusive) stands out. 
In Tamil Nadu, it accounted for only a quarter of employment but almost 40% of 
output.
The Geography of Industry in Tamil Nadu
We have looked at the development of industry in Tamil Nadu from a general 
perspective, by way of providing a background to what follows. We now turn to 
look at the spatial distribution of industry, and especially small manufacturing in 
the state.
In an earlier section, we examined the distribution of small manufacturing among 
the states and it was argued there that industrialisation and urbanisation together 
create the conditions and opportunities for the growth of the small scale sector. 
We can make use of that proposition in looking at the dynamics of industrial
164
development within the state of Tamil Nadu. As before the data base remains the 
Census of Population to provide information relating to each of the districts within 
the state on employment in 'non-household industry'. The Annual Survey of 
Industries does not disaggregate its data on factory employment below state level, 
in order to preserve business confidence. Fortunately, such data is published 
annually by the Chief Inspector of Factories for each of the districts within Tamil 
Nadu, and is the data used here. The analysis covers the period 1961 - 19816, 
during which time, the number and consequently the boundaries of the districts 
changed. For this analysis, we have used the 1981 districts as a base (Map 7.3), 
and adjusted the 1961 (and 1971) data to conform to the 1981 boundaries. 
Between 1961 and 1971, a new district of Dharmapuri was created out of four 
taluks which had previously been part of Salem District. Taluk level data is 
available in the District Level Handbooks, and using that source it is 
straightforward to calculate what Dharmapuri’s population would have been in 
1961. The same method was used to recalculate the data for the two other 
districts, Pudukkottai and Periyar, which were created between 1971 and 1981. 
In the absence of taluk-level data, a similar straightforward recalculation of the 
factory employment data is unfortunately not possible, so it was necessary to 
guesstimate factory employment for the three new districts. In the case of 
Dharmapuri, we know that in 1971 it had slightly less than 1% of total factory 
employment in the state, and we have assumed that it had the same percentage in 
1961. Similarly, for the other two new districts that were created, Periyar and 
Pudukkottai, we have assumed that they had the same share of factory 
employment in 1961 as in 1981. For Dharmapuri, the assumption we have made 
is not too outrageous - the district was, and indeed largely remains backward, with 
little industry, and what industry it does have has come about through the creation
6 1991 Census data on employment in 'non-household industry' is available for the districts, but it 
has not (yet) been possible to make use of it, partly because the latest data on factory employment 
refers to 1987/8; and also because of further boundary changes, the details of which have not so far 
been published by the Census authorities.
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Tamil Nadu
Adm inistrative D istricts
1981
North Arcot
Dharmapuri
South Arcot
SalemPeriyar
Nilgiri
Coimbatori
Thanjavur
Madurai
Tirunelveli
50  m iles
MAP 7.3 Administrative Districts, Tamil Nadu, 1981
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of the major growth centre at Hosur whose development did not commence until 
1974. In the case of the Periyar and Pudukkottai, the assumption of a constant 
share of factory employment between 1961 and 1981 is perhaps more heroic. But 
like Dharmapuri, these two districts are also among the least industrialised 
districts; Periyar had 1.4% of total factory employment in 1981, rising to 1.6% by 
1987/88, while Pudukkottai had 0.8% and 0.9% for the same years. It may not 
be too heroic therefore to assume that the 1961 share was much the same as their 
share of factory employment in 1981. What is evident, is that in the absence of 
any sub-district breakdown of the factory employment data, making some sort of 
assumptions is unavoidable.
Maps 7.4 and 7.5 depict the distribution of factory industry among the districts in 
1961, and 1981, on the basis of employment. For each district the number of 
workers in factory industry is expressed as a percentage of the district labour 
force, and that data is expressed in terms of Z scores, showing standardised 
deviations around the mean. For the purposes of the analysis presented here, the 
data for the city of Madras has been amalgamated with that for the surrounding 
district of Chingleput. This is partly a reflection of geographical reality; part of 
the population and economic activity in Chingleput is 'overspill' across the 
boundary of the city into the adjoining district. In addition, inspection of the data 
reveals that Madras is an outlier on almost every count. Amalgamation of the two 
districts helps to reduce the exaggeration of this influential case.
What the two maps show is that factory employment is very unevenly distributed 
among the districts. In 1961, the two districts of Madras/Chingleput, and 
Coimbatore stand out with their above average levels of employment in factory 
industry. Together they accounted for rather more than half of all employment in 
medium and large factories. By 1981, the picture is much the same, with the same 
two districts accounting for 47% of total employment. Ramanathapuram also
168
emerges in 1981 as above average. By contrast, a number of districts have 
consistently below average employment in factories, and these include 
Dharmapuri, one of the poorest districts in the state, and South Arcot and 
Thanjavur both of which are relatively prosperous, intensively farmed areas. The 
broad conclusion one might draw from these maps is that over the 20 year period, 
there has not been any significant change in the distribution of factory industry. 
New localised clusters of factories have developed within some of the districts, 
for example at the SIPCOT-sponsored growth centre of Hosur within Dharmapuri 
district, and the emerging industrial complex around the port of Tuticorin 
(Tirunelveli district). The only significant change detectable at the district level is 
the emergence of Ramanathapuram, and this seems to be largely a reflection of the 
growth of the match and fireworks industry in and around Sivakasi and Sattur in 
the western part of the district. The salient feature is the continuing concentration 
of the factory sector in and around the principal urban centres of Madras and 
Coimbatore.
It has to be acknowledged that employment is not the only, nor necessarily the 
best way of depicting the distribution of industry. It might be preferable to look at 
such indicators as capital investment, value added, or value of output, but when it 
comes to looking at the geography of small manufacturing, such data are simply 
not available, and we have little option but to use data on employment. Maps 7.6 
and 7.7 show for each district the labour force employed in small manufacturing. 
In 1961, Madras/Chingleput was well above average, with Coimbatore and 
Tiruchirappalli just above the average for the state. Dharmapuri, Periyar, 
Pudukkottai and South Arcot, by contrast were well below average. By 1981, the 
pattern had been substantially changed. While Madras/Chingleput continued to be 
above average, a new feature is the emergence of a belt of three contiguous 
districts - Coimbatore, Periyar and Salem - with above average employment in 
small industry. It is these three districts, together with Madras/Chingleput,
169
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which have had the largest shares o f the total increase in small industry 
employment over the period 1961 - 1981 (Figure 7. 3 ). In their analysis o f the 
growth o f small scale industry over the period 1961/1971, Kurien and James also 
pointed to  the relatively high rate o f  growth o f employment in Coimbatore and 
Salem districts, but noting the difficulties o f accessing reliable information about 
the small scale sector, they offered no explanation for this (Kurien and James, 
1979: 122-125). There is however, a striking correspondence between the high 
grow th belt, and the
FIGURE 7 3
Share o f increase in employment in small industry by District, 1961/81
Chingleput '
Tirunelveli" ----------------------
P udukko tta i' _ .
Tanjore*
T iruch i'
M adurai'
NilgirT
C oim bato re ' ---------------
Periyar *
Salem ~
Dharmapuri^
S A rco t'
N A r C O tl -----------------------   T-----------------------------------------.----------------------------------------- 1
0 5 10 15 20
Share of total increase in small manufacturing employment
line o f  rapidly growing class one cities identified by M isra and Chapman 
suggesting that the growth o f small manufacturing employment may be related to 
the process o f  urbanisation (Misra and Chapman 1991:277).
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A simple correlation of employment in small industry with the level of urbanisation 
by district tends to support this (Table 7.6). The results suggest that small 
manufacturing employment was more urbanised in 1961, and became somewhat 
less so by 1981, whereas the opposite was the case for factory industry, where the 
trend was towards a closer association with urbanisation. In the case of small scale 
industry, simple regression of employment in small industry on urbanisation yields 
an R2 of 0.575 for 1961, and 0.421 for 19817. While the 'explanatory' power of 
urbanisation has apparently waned, the level of urbanisation remains statistically 
significantly associated with small manufacturing employment. The residuals from
TABLE 7.6
Correlation of employment in industry and urbanisation, 1961 and 1981
Correlation 1961 Correlation 1981
Facind Urb SME Facind Urb SME
SME .4945 .7576** 1.0 .6053* .6486* 1.0
FACIND 1.0 .6376* .4945 1.0 .7616** .6053*
* = significant at .01 ** significant at .001
5ME = small manufacturing employment
Facind = employment in factory industry
Urb = percentage of population living in urban areas
Moran's I for spatial autocorrelation:
SME = 0.11 SME = 0.17
Facind = 0.01 Facind = 0.30
Urb = 0.05 Urb = 0.06
regression for 1961 (Map 7.8) reveal that four districts had higher levels of small 
manufacturing employment than would be expected given their degree of 
urbanisation - namely, Madras/Chingleput, North Arcot, Tiruchirapalli and 
Kanyakumari. These areas do not appear to have any common characteristic, but
7 For 1961 the regression equation is y = 1.586 + 0.13 with T= 4.186 and sig T= .001 
For 1981 y= 3.84 + 0.13 withT= 3.07 Sig T = 0.0089
mmm
mmmmm000000
000000warn
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there are ad hoc explanations, or rationalisations that can be invoked. 
Presumably, the high level for Madras/Chingleput reflects the role of the city as an 
important industrial and commercial centre, and the concentration there of 
relatively affluent groups, creating greater openings for small manufacturers while 
North Arcot is well known as a district which has long specialised in tanning and 
the leather trades. The districts with lower than expected levels of small 
manufacturing employment, Dharmapuri and Nilgiri are easier to account for; 
Dharmapuri as pointed out earlier is the most 'backward' of the districts in the 
state, and presumably the lack of local purchasing power as well as a poorer 
infrastructure has inhibited the growth of modem small industry, while Nilgiri is 
relatively inaccessible.
For 1981, the residuals from regression present a different and rather simpler 
picture (Map 7.9). Relatively high negative residuals, indicating less than expected 
levels of small manufacturing are associated with Nilgiri and Dharmapuri and 
presumably for the same reasons as noted earlier. High positive residuals are 
associated with the three contiguous districts of Coimbatore, Periyar and Salem, 
the belt identified above as having a large share of the increase in small 
manufacturing
That these three districts do contain a significant concentration of small industry is 
corroborated by data from the Second Census of Small Manufacturing. While this 
data refers to a self-selected sample of registered small industries and is not strictly 
comparable with the data used above, it does support the analysis presented in the 
foregoing Table 7.7 provides data on the number of registered units per 1000 
of the population for each of the districts of Tamil Nadu, and it shows that five 
districts have above average numbers of registered small units - 
Madras/Chingleput, Coimbatore, Salem, Periyar and Ramnad. With the exception 
of the latter, the other four districts are identified in the analysis above, and this, in
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spite of - or perhaps because of - the differences in the make-up of the data helps 
reinforce the view that there is a striking concentration of small industry in a belt 
of territory covering the districts of Coimbatore, Periyar and Salem.
The Census of Small Industry provides useful information on the industrial 
structure of registered units in these three districts. It will be seen from Table 7.8
TABLE 7.7
Registered small scale industrial units per 1000 population, by District 
District Registered Units/1000 population
North Arcot 0.9
South Arcot 0.7
Chingleput/Madras 2.0
Coimbatore 2.4
Dharmapuri 0.8
Kaniyakumari 1.0
Madurai 0.9
Nilgiri 0.8
Ramnad 1.3
Salem 1.3
Thanjavur 0.6
Tiruchirappalli 0.9
Tirunelveli 1.0
Pudukkottai 1.0
Periyar 1.2
ite average 1.1
Source: Registered small units: Government of Tamil Nadu, Directorate of Industries and
Commerce, 1992. Population; Census of Population, 1981
that the structure varies between the three districts. In Periyar and Salem, the 
leading small industry, in employment terms, is food processing, whereas in 
Coimbatore District, the lead industry is hosiery and garments. The hosiery 
industry is localised in and around the town of Tiruppur, which has become an 
important export centre (Cawthome 1990). What is also remarkable is the much 
greater importance of the engineering industries (NIC groups 33 - 37) in 
Coimbatore District, accounting for some 42% of all employment in registered 
small industries in that district, compared with only 17% in Periyar and 18% in 
Salem. The only other districts in the state with a significant localisation of small
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engineering units are Madras and Chingleput, where 33% and 40% respectively of 
employment is in groups 33-37. These differences between districts in the 
structure of the small manufacturing sector seem to be related in turn to 
differences in the rural/urban location of registered small industry. The Census 
records that overall 71% of registered units in Tamil Nadu are located in urban 
areas. In Coimbatore, 90% of units are recorded as 'urban', while in Salem and 
Periyar, the proportion drops to 55% and 57% respectively. We may surmise that 
the higher proportion of rurally located units in these two districts reflects the 
preponderance of units engaged in food processing an activity which has close 
connections with the rural economy. It might be noted that Papola, on the basis of
TABLE 7.8
Sectoral distribution of employment in small industry 
Coimbatore, Salem and Periyar Districts
NIC Industry % of employment by district
Coimbatore Periyar Salem
20/21 Food products 3.5 31.1 32.3
22 Beverages and tobacco 0.3 0.6 1.2
23/5 Cotton etc textiles 2.2 4.8 4.6
26 Hosiery and garments 31.9 4.3 6.6
27 Wood, wood products 1.3 2.6 3.2
28 Paper, paper products 5.4 8.0 8.1
29 Leather 0.4 9.5 0.6
30 Rubber and plastics 3.0 4.0 3.4
31 Chemicals 3.2 3.8 2.6
32 Non-metallic minerals 2.6 6.2 7.8
33 Basic metals and alloys 8.8 2.4 1.6
34 Metal products 7.0 7.1 6.6
35 Non-electrical machinery 17.6 5.7 6.8
36 Electrical machinery 6.4 1.0 0.9
37 Transport equipment 2.3 0.4 2.5
38 Misc. manufacture 0.4 0.7 0.7
97/99 Repair services 3.6 7.8 11.5
Source: Government of Tamil Nadu, Directorate of Industries and Commerce, 1992
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his study of rural industrialisation suggests that differential rates of industrial 
growth in rural areas are due, not so much to differences in raw material supplies, 
but rather to differences in the growth of agricultural productivity, such that areas 
of more rapid growth of output are likely to be those with higher incomes, 
purchasing power and a larger potential investible surplus (Papola 1987: 103). 
Demand factors, rather than supply, seem to be crucial. In the present instance, 
however, the point is simply to contrast the profile of small industry in Periyar 
and Salem, with that in Coimbatore. In the latter case, the structure of the small 
scale sector is dominated by the garment and the engineering industries, which 
together account for some three quarters of employment. Within these sectors, 
there is likely to be a much greater division of labour and specialisation by product 
and process, and this may encourage greater geographical concentration in urban 
areas as compared with units producing and processing food products.
What does seem clear is that small industry is not a homogeneous category; rather 
it comprises a diversity of activities, with different organisational and locational 
characteristics. This further suggests that we need to move on from looking at 
small industry in general, to a more specific focus on particular branches of small 
industry.
We have looked in this chapter at aspects of the geography of small 
manufacturing. Small manufacturing industry is unevenly developed both among 
the states of India, and as we have seen in the case of Tamil Nadu, among the 
districts of the state. It has been argued that the level of urbanisation and 
industrialisation helps to explain this uneven development, with the more 
industrialised and urbanised areas offering greater scope and greater opportunities 
for the growth of small industries. The notion that small industry promotion would 
help alleviate regional imbalances lacks both theoretical and empirical support. 
The states which were already more developed in 1961 continued to be the more
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developed in 1991, and these more developed states contained a large and indeed 
growing share of small manufacturing. In 1961 the five more developed and 
urbanised states accounted for 50.1% of employment in small manufacturing 
industry, and for 59.1% in 1991. On the face of it, the more developed areas of 
the Union have witnessed a process of cumulative concentration which can hardly 
have helped to alleviate imbalances between the states.
However it is plausible that within the states, the growth of small industry may 
have contributed to reducing the disparities between city and countryside. The 
evidence from Tamil Nadu does not entirely invalidate the view that small industry 
can help reduce rural-urban imbalances. Overall, the distribution of small 
manufacturing among the districts is related to the level of urbanisation and 
industrial development generally, but the relationship is not a strong one. In trying 
to account for the pattern of small industry growth, it was found useful to 
disaggregate the small manufacturing sector into its components. The evidence 
suggests that certain sectors of small manufacturing, notably food processing seem 
to be more dispersed and less concentrated in urban areas. On the other hand, the 
engineering sector is more heavily concentrated into the urbanised areas, as shown 
in Maps 7.10 to 7.15, based on data from the State Directory of Small 
Manufacturing Industries. Generalising from this, we might conclude that some 
sectors of small industry are more ubiquitous, making use of locally available 
inputs and perhaps serving local demands, while other sectors of small industry 
show a more marked tendency to clustering.
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Ch a pte r  8 Sm a l l  E n g in e e r in g  in  Co im bato re
The previous chapter showed a local concentration of light engineering units in the 
city of Coimbatore. In this chapter, we explore the nature of this cluster of small 
manufacturing units in the light of the three models introduced in chapter 1. The 
competitive cluster is defined as one in which a multiplicity of small units is able to 
survive, but because of intense inter-unit competition, the prospects for growth 
and accumulation are severely attenuated. The non-hierarchically organised cluster 
approximates to the classical industrial district, in which small units exhibit a high 
degree of specialisation, generating external economies which benefit the cluster 
as a whole, allowing individual firms to grow, accumulate and adapt over time. 
The third model is that of the hierarchically organised cluster, where small units 
are tied to large firms as subcontractors, but in a way that is beneficial to the 
former through stable relationships and technology transfers. These three models 
all have a superficial plausibility in the Indian context. As an industrial city 
containing both a number of large scale enterprises, and a large small scale sector, 
Coimbatore, with a 1991 population of 1.1 million, offers an opportunity to 
explore these different models.
Industrial Coimbatore
Large scale, factory manufacturing in Coimbatore is dominated by the textile and 
engineering industries, all of them in the private sector. The first modem, steam- 
driven textile mill was established in 1890, but it was in the interwar years that 
the city’s manufacturing base came to be firmly established. The completion of the 
Pykara HEP scheme in 1934 provided a source of cheap local electricity at a time 
when the world depression was forcing grain prices down. Local Naidu 
landowners began to switch their attention away from agriculture and trade to 
industry, and especially to textiles, which would be able to make use of locally 
grown cotton (Baker 1976: 184). Cheap labour in the district helped to ensure
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that the mills were profitable, and aided by the friction of distance, the Coimbatore 
industry was more than a match for its counterpart in Bombay and Ahmedabad 
(Ramaswamy 1977: ch 2). By 1937, Coimbatore had 30 mills, a number which 
continued to grow after Independence, so that by the late 1980s there were some 
86 (mostly spinning) mills in the city. The textile industry in turn helped to 
stimulate the growth of the engineering industry to produce, maintain and repair 
machinery. Textile engineering remains significant today. Two of the biggest 
engineering companies in Coimbatore are Lakshmi Machine Works and Textool 
Co., the two largest (in terms of sales) suppliers of textile machineiy in India. 
Lakshmi with more than 3000 employees, claims to be one of the three largest 
producers in the world, manufacturing sophisticated computer-controlled 
equipment with Swiss collaboration .
A second impetus to the growth of the engineering industry lay, as John Harriss 
has pointed out, in the agricultural origins of the city's early industrialists (Harriss 
1982 :948). In 1924, Govindaswamy Naidu set up a foundry and workshop to 
produce centrifugal pumps to enable him and his fellow landowners to tap 
underground water for irrigation. A second pumpset manufacturer opened in 
1926, and the industry grew steadily until the late 1950s, since when it has grown 
at a more rapid pace (Cartillier, 1975) It is estimated that there are today some 
400 firms making pumps, pumpsets, and compressors, some 50/60% of total 
Indian production. In addition to their agricultural uses, pumpsets have a variety 
of other applications, including air-conditioning systems, refrigeration units and 
domestic water supply.
A further element in the engineering industry is the production of automotive 
components. The main centre of automotive engineering in Tamil Nadu is 
Madras, but Coimbatore has spawned several important component producers, 
among them Premier Instruments and Controls, makers of oil pumps and car
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instruments; L.G.Balakrishnan which specialises in producing timing chains for 
cars and trucks, while its sister company, Elgi Engineering, makes garage 
forecourt equipment, but its principal business lies in the manufacture of 
compressors, in which role it is the number one producer in India in sales terms.
Textile machinery, pumpsets and automotive components are the main identifiable 
branches of engineering in Coimbatore, but it has to be emphasised that the range 
of products and components is considerable. The concentration of engineering in 
the city has created its own supply industries, with firms making a wide range of 
equipment from rivets and screws to lathes, drilling machines and machine tools. 
Part of the service sector is also geared to serving industry; there are, for example, 
many traders who supply scrap metal for foundries, distributors of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals, of components and machinery, as well as accountants, 
advertising agencies, and transport operators.
The engineering industries are a significant component of Coimbatore's industrial 
economy, but in the absence of any comprehensive information, it is well nigh 
impossible to provide any estimate of the relative importance of engineering in the 
structure of the industrial sector as a whole. What can be said is that industry 
generally, and engineering also, is characterised by a structure in which there are a 
small number of large firms, and a large number of small firms. There are some 
1300 registered factories in the Coimbatore urban agglomeration, but of those 
less than a hundred could be described as large (i.e. employing more than 500 
workers), and the majority of these are textile mills. Nine large factories can be 
identified as involved in 'engineering'. The majority of units in the factory sector 
are small with up to 100 workers. Their number is dwarfed by the size of the 
small-scale sector. The Assistant Director of the District Industries Centre 
estimates there are some 40,000 small scale manufacturing units, some of which
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are registered, many of which are not. The number may well be exaggerated, but 
it gives some idea of the multitude of small units which litter the city.
Small Engineering Units in Ganapathi
Ganapathi is a district within municipal Coimbatore. It contains a mix of 
residential, retail, trading and industrial land uses. Within the area - whose 
boundaries are indeterminate - there are a number of textile mills, of large 
engineering factories, including the main Textool plant, as well as a multitude of 
small factories and tiny workshops. It was in this area that a questionnaire survey 
was undertaken (Chapter 1), the sample comprising
• 56 registered small scale units
• 10 units that were registered as small scale and factory units
• 25 unregistered units.
making a total sample of 91 units. These units vary considerably in terms of the 
types of activity engaged in, size, and mode of operation. They range from tiny 
workshops using simple basic equipment, to small factories in purpose-built 
premises, with a much greater range of plant and machinery.
The majority of units in the sample (86%) were owned by a single proprietor, with 
the balance of 14% being partnerships, usually of two people, but in two cases 
there were three partners and in two others, four. The larger partnerships were 
invariably family groupings, in which only one 'partner' took an active role in the 
day-to-day operation of the enterprise. In dual partnerships, on the other hand, 
both partners were usually involved in the day-to-day operation of the unit. The 
category of 'partnerships' created some difficulty in recording some information. 
It was not always possible to secure details of both/all partners, but an attempt 
was made to include data about 'active' partners, and to exclude 'sleeping partners'. 
What this revealed was that the majority of small manufacturers in the sample 
tended to be of local origin. Of the 120 owners/partners for whom information
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was available, 65% had been bom within the present Coimbatore Urban 
Agglomeration, but only 5% from the rest of the Coimbatore District. 21% had 
been bom in some other District within the state of Tamil Nadu - mostly the larger 
cities such as Salem, Erode and Trichy. 8% originated from the neighbouring 
state of Kerala. The remaining 1% comprised two individuals, one from 
Bangalore and one from Harsad in Northern India. The backgrounds of this 
group were overwhelmingly urban - only one individual had a background that 
was in any sense rural, having previously been a blacksmith in a village in Madurai 
District.
Multiple ownership of units is uncommon among the sample. It has been 
suggested that the existence of an upper investment ceiling beyond which 
registered small units lose access to concessions encourages the fragmentation of 
units under the same ownership (Cawthome 1993). In this sample only 15 out of 
91 units (17%) had a 'sister1 unit. The majority of units had been founded by their 
present owners, and constituted their sole enterprise.
Prior to setting up their present business, the majority of owners had been in some 
form of employment. The activity of the 120 individuals prior to the 
establishment of their unit is recorded in Table 8.1, Two-thirds of the group were 
previously employed, mostly in large scale manufacturing industry, with a minority 
having previously worked in small scale units. This background of employment in 
industrial work may be significant in several ways. Savings from wages and 
bonuses seem to be an important means by which capital can be accumulated to 
set up a small unit. Secondly, previous industrial employment is also a means by 
which skills and experience can be acquired, and no less important, it is a means 
by which contacts can be built up and subsequently exploited. A case in point is 
the TT Co. whose owner had worked for some years in a unit making synthetic 
gems. Not only had he acquired a considerable knowledge of the trade generally,
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he had contacts with other units in and around Coimbatore, which he was now 
able to capitalise on in his capacity as a manufacturer of high frequency induction 
hardening machinery.
Among those previously self-employed, almost all had previously been engaged in 
trade and distribution, particularly of manufactured goods and components. DT 
Ltd is an example. The owner was originally a distributor of electrical
TABLE 8.1 
Previous employment status
Status before setting up present unit:
Number %
Employed 78 65.0
Self-employed 16 13.3
Unemployed 17 14.2
Education 9 7.5
TOTAL 120 100
components. Using readily available components he began manufacture as a side­
line, eventually selling out his distributorship to concentrate on manufacture. 
Those who had previously been unemployed are an interesting group of 
predominantly educated unemployed individuals. Of this group of 17 individuals, 3 
possessed no educational qualifications, while 8 had a degree/diploma and 6 had 
completed secondary school. For this group, setting up a small unit may have 
been a way of avoiding continuing unemployment in an economy where the 
educated unemployed are a recognised problem.
The educational background of the sample as a whole is remarkably high (Table 
8.2). Of 120 owners/partners, almost half have a degree or diploma. Of the 58 
individuals in this group, 53 have a qualification in engineering or science. The 
sample also includes 30% of partners/owners who have completed secondary
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school. By comparison, the 1981 Census of Tamil Nadu reveals that only 8.35% 
of the population have completed secondary school, and 1.27% have a degree or 
equivalent. This highlights the exceptionally high educational background of the
TABLE 8.2 
Entrepreneurs' educational background
Education Number %
Secondary school leaving certificate 36 30.0
Industrial Training Institute certificate 8 6.7
Degree/diploma 58 48.3
None of above 18 15.0
sample. The number of proprietors with ITI certificates is surprisingly low. 
Industrial Training Institutes were set up to train craftsmen in a variety of trades, 
including engineering, but in this sample, relatively few of the vocationally-trained 
find their way into the small scale sector, at least at the level of proprietors.
A further striking feature of the sample concerns caste origins. The sample is 
heavily skewed. The relevant data, referring to 70 individual proprietors is given in 
Table 8.3 which shows that two-thirds are drawn from the Gounder and Naidu 
castes. As noted already, the Naidus (also referred to as Naicker) were the main 
landowning castes, who began to diversify their interests into industry in the 
interwar years, and are today the dominant caste, politically and economically, in 
Coimbatore. The Gounders (or Vellalas) were traditionally cultivators as were the 
Mudaliars, and with the Chettiars, traditionally traders and moneylenders, are the 
numerically dominant castes according to local sources. It is clear from the data
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TABLE 8.3 
Caste background of sample
Caste Number %
Gounder 24 34.3
Naidu 22 31.4
Pillai 5 7.1
Chettiar 4 5.7
Asari 4 5.7
Mudaliar 4 5.7
SC/ST 2 2.9
Other 6 8.6
TOTAL 70
that ownership of small units in the sample is heavily biased. The lower castes,
and especially the Asari, traditionally blacksmiths, are underrepresented.
According to the historian D. AWashbrook,
"It would generally be agreed by all who study Tamil Nadu that its 
society.... is particularly caste-ridden and that the question of caste 
affects most areas of social relations" (Washbrook 1989:205).
In the present context, the significance of caste seems to be related to several
factors. First, caste membership may be important in determining access to funds.
Individuals from the higher and wealthier castes can make use of their network of
family and friends to raise the capital needed to set up and subsequently expand a
manufacturing operation. Secondly, caste may be important inasmuch as members
of a caste community may find it easier to develop business relationships with
customers and suppliers who are members of the same community. Community
membership may entail greater trust than is extended to non-members, and in that
way membership of a particular caste may confer privileges that are not available
to 'outsiders'. In these ways, caste may have a pervasive influence, affecting
both entry into, and subsequent success in the small scale sector.
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What this brief overview of proprietors and owners of small engineering units in 
Coimbatore suggests is that they are drawn from a relatively small social circle. 
They tend to be local in origin, relatively highly educated and members of the 
dominant local castes.
The Production Units
One fifth of the units had been in existence for more than 13 years at the time of 
the survey, and almost half for more than eight years (Table 8.4). Only 13 units 
(14%) were less than three years old. The mean age of the entire sample is 8.9 
years, with
TABLE 8.4 
Distribution of units by year of foundation
Year of start No. of units Percent Cumulative %
1960/70 7 7.7 7.7
71/75 4 4.4 12.1
76/80 8 8.8 20.9
81/85 26 28.6 49.5
86/90 33 36.3 85.7
91/93 13 14.3 100
TOTAL 91
a standard deviation of 6.7. The data in Table 7.4 throw some light on our earlier 
discussion in Chapter 6 on the relationship between the growth of small 
manufacturing and the wider macro-economy. It was suggested there that the 
growth of the small engineering sector was likely to have been constrained in the 
period of industrial stagnation from the mid-1960s until the late 1970s by raw 
material shortages and transport problems, whereas the more dynamic 1980s 
provided a more supportive environment for the small manufacturing sector. The 
data above, albeit of a limited nature, does suggest that as far as surviving units
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are concerned, the level of unit foundation was considerably higher in the 1980s as 
postulated.
There is a significant difference in the age of registered and unregistered units as 
is shown in Table 8.5 below, with the
TABLE 8.5
Registered and unregistered small scale units by age
Mean Age S.D. N
Registered small scale units 10.07 6.61 56
Factory and SSI registered 12.40 8.82 10
Unregistered units 4.76 3.88 25
F ratio = 7.96 DF2 88 Sig at 0 005.
latter being considerably younger than the two registered groups of units. There is 
a plausible argument that the smaller mean for the unregistered group simply 
reflects a delay between the time that the unit was established and its subsequent 
registration. The mean differences may thus be 'technical' rather than substantive. 
While data was not collected systematically, it is worth noting that the majority of 
registered units reported that they had registered at the time of their establishment 
in order to take advantage of the available concessions for small units. None of the 
unregistered units expressed any desire to register, preferring their anonymity to 
the lengthy bureaucratic process of registration and what some of them perceived 
to be the highly questionable benefits that registration is supposed to confer.
Just as the units vary in age, so too do they vary in terms of size. 'Size' can of 
course be measured in a number of different ways. Table 8.6 provides data on 
size of unit in terms of the number of employees. The number of employees
191
TABLE 8.6 
Distribution of units by number of employees
-----Coimbatore----- -------NCAER
Number of employees No of units % of units No of units % of units
1-5 35 38.5 195 29.7
6-10 34 37.4 218 33.2
11-15 9 9.9 3
16-20 6 6.6 ] 158 24.0
21-25 2 2.2 3
26+ 5 5.5 86 13.1
Total 91 657
ranges from one to 35, with a mean of 8.99. Three quarters of the units provide 
employment to 10 or fewer workers, and these relatively small units in turn 
provide 45% of all employment. At the other extreme, ten units each have more 
than 20 workers, and together they employ 32.5% of all employees.
Table 8.6 also contains comparative data from a recent large-scale survey 
undertaken by the National Council of Applied Economic Research and the 
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (NCAER 1993). This survey covered some 657 units 
in eight industrial groups1 in 17 different locations, including Coimbatore, 
throughout India. Their results show a similar though less pronounced 
predominance of small units - in their sample 60% of units employ 10 or fewer 
workers. On the other hand, their survey also includes a much larger number of 
large units, employing more than 26 people. Part of the reason for the 
discrepancy may lie in the different sectors of manufacturing covered in the two 
surveys, and part may also be due to differences in the sample frameworks. The
1 The groups are garments; plastics; paints; detergents; handtools; agricultural implements; 
electronics; and auto parts.
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NCAER survey included a much smaller proportion of unregistered units - only 69 
out of a total sample of 657 (or 10.5%) as opposed to 25 out of a total of 91 
(27.5%) in the Coimbatore sample. The salient fact is that unregistered units tend 
to be tiny. For the sample of engineering
TABLE 8.7
Mean employment for registered, unregistered and factory units
Type of unit Mean number of employees S.D. N
Registered SSI 8.73 5.19 56
Unregistered units 3.52 1.90 25
Factory and SSI reg 24.10 7.61 10
F ratio = 63.95 DF 2,88 Sig = .001
units in Coimbatore, unregistered units are appreciably smaller in size than 
registered small scale units; and in turn registered small scale units are appreciably 
smaller than those units which are also registered under the Factory Act, as shown 
in Table 8.7.
The majority of units are tiny in terms of the number of people employed. They 
are also tiny in terms of fixed investment. Table 8.8 shows the distribution of units 
by investment in plant and machinery. Investment levels for the whole sample 
vary considerably, from a minimum of Rs 5000 to a maximum of Rs 6 million, 
with a mean of Rs 448,000. 84% of the sample of engineering units have fixed 
investment of less than half a million rupees, which is remarkably similar to the 
NCAER sample where 87% of units fall into the same category of tiny* units. 
However, the NCAER sample contains a substantially larger proportion of units in 
the smallest size category, probably reflecting the different industrial composition 
of the two samples. It might be expected, a priori, that engineering units would
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have a higher level of investment than units in, for example, the garment or 
handtools sectors. In both samples the salient feature is the concentration of units 
in the tiny sector. Among Coimbatore engineering units, only one had capital 
investment of more than Rs 3.5 million; in the NCAER sample, only three firms 
fall into this size category. Very few units, in other words, come anywhere near 
the investment ceiling for registered small scale industries which currently stands
TABLE 8.8 
Distribution of units by level of investment
Coimbatore NCAER
Investment in plant Number % Number %
and machinery (Rs 00,000) of units of units
Up to 2 53 58.2 405 67.8
2.1-5.00 24 26.4 113 18.9
5.1 - 10.0 8 8.8 36 6.0
10.1-35.0 5 5.5 40 6.7
35.1 + 1 1.1 3 0.5
Total 91 597
at Rs 6 million. The existence of this ceiling has been widely criticised because 
once it has been exceeded, units are no longer able to claim special treatment. The 
ceiling is therefore seen as a disincentive to the growth of individual units. What 
the data from both the Coimbatore and the NCAER samples suggest, is that this 
’disincentive’ effect is highly marginal. Not only do the overwhelming majority of 
units in Coimbatore fall below the ceiling of Rs 6 million, which has operated since 
1992, but the overwhelming majority fall below the ceiling of Rs 3.5 million that 
prevailed between 1985 and 1992. If there is a disincentive, it affects the minority 
of large, small enterprises. It might be claimed that the limit prevents small firms 
from adopting the most modem technology. A modem CNC (computer 
numerically controlled) machine tool costs some Rs 1.5 million, so the acquisition 
of modem equipment could quickly take a firm up to the limit. In practice
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however, few small firms are in a position to be be able to afford such 
investments. If there are limits to the installation of new machinery, they lie in the 
capital market and the highly protected nature of the Indian economy
The differences noted above in terms of employment between registered and 
unregistered units are also evident in relation to investment levels. The category 
of unregistered engineering units has a mean investment level of Rs 83,600; the 
group of registered small units has a mean of Rs 447,732, while the Factory and 
small scale industry registered units have a mean fixed investment of Rs 1.4 
million. Analysis of variance reveals that there is a statistically significant 
difference (F ratio = 9.498, DF2 g8 significant at 0.005) between the three 
groups.
A final measure of size is the value of sales. A question was asked about monthly 
sales, and the results are reproduced in Table 8.9. The value of sales varies from a
TABLE 8.9 
Value of monthly sales
Average monthly 
value of sales (Rs)
Number of units %
Less than 50,000 53 58.2
50,001 - 100,000 20 22.0
100,001 - 150,000 6 6.6
150,001 -200,000 4 4.4
200,001 + 8 8.8
TOTAL 91 100
minimum of Rs 2500 to a maximum of Rs 600,000, with a mean for the total 
sample of Rs 79,802. The NCAER survey does not provide a breakdown of sales 
figures, but it reports a mean monthly value of production for units in its sample of 
Rs 66,000. It will be seen from Table 7.9 that rather more than half of the sample
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have sales of less than Rs 50,000 per month, and 80% have sales of less than Rs 
100,000. A select group of eight units, on the other hand, have sales in excess of 
Rs 200,000 per month. Again, there are statistically significant differences 
between the groups of small units. Unregistered units tend to have lower sales 
values - mean sales are Rs 17,080, compared with a mean for registered small 
units of Rs 92,232. Units which are registered as small industries and also come 
under the Factory Act tend to have much larger sales, the mean being Rs 167,000. 
Analysis of variance indicates that these means are significantly different (F ratio 
= 9.34: with DF2 88 significant at 0.005).
The three measures of size considered above reveal a consistent pattern, in which 
a majority of the units are ’tiny1, whether measured in terms of employment, fixed 
investment or sales. The pattern is brought out in Table 8.10 which categorises 
units according to their investment levels. ’’Tiny" units, defined as those with 
fixed investment of up to Rs 500,000, constitute 84% of all units in the sample,
TABLE 8.10 
Employment and sales by investment levels
Fixed investment 
level (Rs 00,000)
No. of 
units
% % total 
employment
% total 
sales
Up to 2 53 58.2 40.1 38.3
2.1 -5.0 24 26.4 30.3 37.2
5.1 - 10 8 8.8 13.7 4.1
10.1-35 5 5.5 14.7 16.3
35.1+ 1 1.1 1.2 4.0
Total 91 100 100 100
and contribute 70% of employment and 75% of sales generated by all of the units 
in the sample. "Tiny” units predominate with the unregistered units comprising 
the tiniest; 84% employ fewer than five workers, and 96% have less than Rs
200,000 investment in plant and machinery. At the other end of the scale is a
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small group of large units - which might more accurately be described as small 
factories. Such units, with fixed investment of more than Rs 1 million, constitute 
only 7% of the sample, but generate 16% of total employment, and 20% of total 
sales.
Production activities
The units in the sample cover a wide variety of activities. Table 8.11 provides 
some idea of this diversity, classifying units according to their principal activity.
TABLE 8.11 
Units by major type of activity
Main activity/product Number 
of units
Main activity/product Number
of units
Pumps 13 Sheet metal working 4
Textile machinery/spares 9 Moulds and dies 3
Castings 8 Springs 3
Machining 7 Compressors/motors 3
Agricultural machinery 7 Electroplating 2
Gears/gear assemblies 6 Plastic moulding machinery 2
Welding 6 Steel furniture 2
Wet grinders 5 Other 11
Among the category of'other' are units making foundry equipment, electric timers, 
paint, washing machines and gem hardening equipment. Out of the 91 units, 23 or 
25% produce reserved items.
We can distinguish between those units which specialise in manufacturing finished 
products, such as pumps or wet grinders (used by South Indian households for 
grinding lentils and particularly rice in the preparation of idli) or components; and 
those which specialise in performing a particular process such as turning and 
grinding, or welding. The two categories of product and process specialisation 
are not mutually exclusive; among the welding units for example, are several with
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a profitable sideline in the making of security grilles for doors and windows, and 
decorative ironwork. An alternative and more useful distinction can be made 
between those units which make finished products and those which are involved in 
making intermediate products (i.e. components) or performing intermediate 
processes. Of the total sample 34 units (37%) can be categorised as producers of 
finished products, while 57 (63%) are intermediate producers.
There is an interesting relationship between type of specialisation and size of unit, 
as shown in Table 8.12. What this suggests is that tiny units with five or fewer
TABLE 8.12 
Type of specialisation by size of unit
Number of units by size of unit (employees)
Type of specialisation: <6 6-11 12+
Finished products 7 (20.0) 19 (54.3) 8(38.1)
Intermediate goods 28 (80.0) 16 (45.7) 13(61.9)
employees are more likely to specialise in the production of intermediate goods, 
than either small or larger units. There is clearly no simple relationship between 
size and specialisation, but statistically the data in Table 8.12 are significant - the 
Chi-squared value is 8.7963 with two degrees of freedom, which is significant at 
0 .01.
As we have already seen there is a wide variation in the level of investment in 
plant and equipment among the sample units. Only 4 units make no use of 
powered machinery. Two of these are tiny welding units which use oxy-acetylene 
equipment (the other welding units use electric arc equipment), while the other 
two units are small foundries. Some idea of the type of equipment can be gleaned 
from Table 8.13 which indicates the more common kinds of machinery in
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TABLE 8.13 
Usage of types of powered machinery
Type of equipment No. of units
Lathe 45
Drilling machine 54
Grinding machine 31
Welding equipment 26
Metal cutting machine 26
Milling machinery 12
Power/hydraulic press 13
by these units. Typically the units use a combination of equipment, as indicated in 
Table 8.14. Most workshops tend to have several different pieces of machinery, 
none of which could be described even remotely as high-tech. A number of the 
larger units have automatic or semi-automatic lathes, but none has anything
TABLE 8.14 
Common machine combinations
Machine combinations Number of units
Lathe, drilling, grinding and welding equipment 14
Lathe, drilling and grinding 12
Lathe and drilling machinery 11
Lathe, drilling and milling machinery 6
Lathe, drilling and welding 6
Drilling and welding equipment 6
Milling and grinding machinery 7
Drilling, cutting and grinding machinery 4
Cutting, welding and drilling machinery 4
Total 70
approaching a computer numerically controlled machine tool, which, in terms of 
cost is way beyond the means of the units in this sample. In general the type of 
machinery in use is old - indeed obsolete - and often difficult to maintain because 
of badly worn and missing parts. The quality and consistency of output
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consequently tends to be low and this is one of the major complaints levelled at 
the small manufacturing sector. However, the type of machinery in use lends itself 
to a variety of different end uses, and as such could be described as highly flexible. 
This goes against the grain of some contemporary writers who regard 
technological flexibility as contingent on the greater use of microprocessors and 
high-tech manufacturing systems (Leborgne and Lipietz 1988: 276). As Gertler 
has remarked, even the 'lowly screwdriver1 is a potentially flexible tool, with a 
variety of possible applications (Gertler 1988: 429).
That there is 'flexibility' in production is borne out by some of the survey results. 
Among the units in Coimbatore, 31 (34%) are currently involved in a different 
activity compared with what they did when they were originally set up. One unit, 
for example, was originally involved in making perforations in sheet metals and 
has now developed into a manufacturer of washing machines. It buys in motors 
from other manufacturers, but the basic in-house processes remain essentially 
those of working with sheet metals, to make the drum and the body. The shift 
from a veiy limited activity to a more profitable line was aided in this particular 
case, not by any technological development, but by building on the existing 
equipment of the unit, and in particular by exploiting the existing metal working 
skills of the labour force. Gertlefs comment on flexible technology seems to be 
particularly apposite:
"At a very basic level, flexible technologies have been with us, albeit in more 
simplified form at least since the industrial revolution. Examples would include 
the lathe, whose product range is considerable, and limited largely by the 
ingenuity and skill of the operator" (Gertler 1988 : 429).
It is to the skills and characteristics of the labour force that we now turn.
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The Labour Force
The original intention of the survey was to elicit information on precisely what 
jobs were performed by individual workers, in order to classify the labour force 
into the familiar categories of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. It quickly 
became apparent that such an approach was inappropriate. It is not difficult to 
distinguish between the skilled machine operator, and the unskilled general 
labourer involved in fetching and carrying. It is more difficult to distinguish the 
semi-skilled worker from the skilled worker. The categories which are familiar to 
social scientists through census classifications are not objectively defined 
categories, but assessments of the degree of training and experience required to 
perform a particular activity or set of activities. The difficulty in applying such 
fine distinctions to small scale units is that smallness means that there is a premium 
on being able to engage in a variety of different activities as and when required. 
Judging whether a particular individual is skilled or semi-skilled requires a 
considerable amount of data on how that individual's time is allocated between 
various activities. Collecting that data proved to be very time-consuming, 
particularly when some of the early interviews involved units with more than a 
dozen employees. To get round these difficulties, we resorted to the simpler 
expedient of asking the owner how many employees were skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled. Even this simplification proved problematical, as a number of 
proprietors seemed equally unsure about the definition of'semi-skilled'. It proved 
much easier to ask simply about the number of skilled and unskilled workers. This 
appeared to have greater resonance among the respondents, and broadly 
corresponded to the distinction between workers who could operate machinery 
effectively and without supervision, and those who could not. The gap between 
the former and the latter should not be underestimated. A "skilled" machine 
operator requires not just experience in the use of particular types of machines, 
but also requires some understanding of the characteristics of different types of 
metals, and a passing familiarity with the concepts of measurement. The turner
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must know at what speed to operate the lathe for a particular job, and, with the 
kind of non-automatic lathes in general use, set the gears manually to produce the 
appropriate speed of rotation. Whether the machined product is acceptable 
depends on the worker’s ability to make fine measurements, and equally fine 
adjustments on machinery that is old, worn and temperamental. Skilled workers 
are highly skilled, and highly prized by their employers.
Using this broad distinction between the skilled machine operator and the 
unskilled general labourer, we find that out of a total permanent labour force of 
817 employees, 65% are deemed to be skilled workers, and 35% unskilled labour.
TABLE 8.15 
Usage of skilled workers
% of skilled workers Number of units %
<25% 6 6.6
26 - 50% 28 30.8
51 - 75% 25 27.5
> 76% 32 35.2
The figure for skilled labour may seem extraordinarily high, but it is not out of line 
with the findings of the NCAER survey, which classified 66.7% of workers in its 
sample as being skilled and semi-skilled (NCAER 1993: 115). The utilisation of 
skilled workers is shown in Table 8.15. In two thirds of the units, more than half 
the workforce is considered skilled, while in one third of the units, more than 
three-quarters of workers are considered as skilled. There are no clear 
relationships between the proportion of skilled workers and size of unit, however 
size is measured. Table 8.16 shows the mean percentage of skilled workers by 
level of investment in plant and machinery. The data suggests that it is the tiny 
and the large units that employ a larger proportion of skilled workers, but analysis 
of variance suggests that the differences in the means are not
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TABLE 8.16 
Employment of skilled workers by size of unit
Size (investment in Mean % skilled workers Sd N
plant and machinery, Rs)
< 200,000 67.9 27.0 53
200,001 -500,000 58.1 27.4 24
>500,001 68.3 21.5 14
Analysis of variance DF2 8 8  F= 1.265. Sig = 0.3
significant. We have to conclude that employment of skilled workers is 
independent of size.
The educational background of the workforce provides a slightly different way of 
looking at the skills of employees. We have already seen that employers tend to 
be a relatively highly educated group, and this seems to be true also of the people 
they employ. Almost half of those employed (44%) have completed secondary
TABLE 8.17 
Educational qualifications of employees
Workers with: Number of workers % of total
Secondary School certificate 195 23.9
Industrial Training Institute cert 122 14.9
Degree/diploma 42 5.1
None of above 458 56.1
TOTAL 817 100
or higher level of education, with 5% holding a degree or equivalent diploma. 
This latter figure includes some who are related to the owner, but mostly they are
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non-family members, who see employment in a small enterprise as a way of 
developing the hands-on experience needed to start up on their own account.2
That a large part of the labour force is well-educated seems to reflect the 
particular recruitment practices employed by small units. The recruitment of 
unskilled general labour is not a problem, as such labour is both plentiful and 
readily available locally. There is however, a serious problem mentioned by many 
of the employers in the survey, of recruiting skilled workers. James Bema in his 
study of entrepreneurs in Madras and Coimbatore in the 1950s remarked that
"... the general policy of the firms studied is to hire "raw hands" that is village
boys with no previous factory experience, and train them in the plant" (Bema
1960 : 96).
Berna's study was confined to moderately sized Coimbatore factories, employing 
50 to 250 workers. Among the sample covered in the present survey, none 
actively recruited from any distance, but the owners showed a distinct preference 
for recruiting educated young men who could be given on the job training. In a 
situation of short supply, workers with skills and experience tend to look to the 
large engineering companies able to offer better rates of pay with bonuses - as well 
as other perks, such as canteens. Small units seem to create their own skilled 
labour and they do so by recruiting workers with a good educational background, 
in the belief that such people possess not just the basic skills of literacy and 
numeracy, but that they are more adaptable and quicker to learn. This is not a 
strategy of choice, rather it is a matter of Hobson's choice, the result of a shortage 
of skilled, trained manual workers. Training is not something that most small 
proprietors are either well-equipped or anxious to undertake. Training is costly, 
not only in terms of time, but also in terms of wasted raw materials, of broken and
2 The general issue of support, including training, for small industries in Coimbatore is considered 
in more detail in a later chapter.
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damaged machinery. Most small employers are noticeably ambivalent about the 
question of training. On the one hand, most recognise the need for training to 
equip themselves with competent machine operators, but there is also an 
apprehension that, once trained, workers will move on to better paid work 
elsewhere, or will set up on their own account in competition with their former 
employer. Training is regarded as a burden, especially by the smaller units; it is 
among the units with fewer than ten employees, that complaints about the 
shortage and high cost of skilled labour were most common. Interestingly enough 
it is also among this group of units that the employment of family workers tends to 
be relatively high. Only a small proportion of owners in the sample - 23%, or 21 
out of 91 units - have members of their family working with or for them, and they 
tend to be concentrated in the smaller sized units. There may be several reasons 
for this, including the possibility that family labour may be cheaper labour; that 
preference is given to employing family members because they are known 
individuals, rather than unknown outsiders, and there is also the possibility that 
family members may be preferred because, once trained, they can be prevailed 
upon to show greater loyalty than non-family members. Suffice it to say that 
recruitment of skilled labour is a problem for small units, a point that will be taken 
up again at a later stage.
Table 8.18 shows the mean level of employment of qualified workers (i.e. those
TABLE 8.18 
Qualified workers by size of unit
Size category Mean % educated workers SD N 
(employees)
<5 workers 39.7 41.1 35
6 -1 0  workers 45.5 36.9 35
>11 workers 47.9 33.1 21
Total 43.8 37.5 91
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who have completed secondary or higher education) by size group of unit, where 
size is measured in terms of the size of the workforce. The data suggest that the 
larger units tend to employ a larger proportion of more educated workers than the 
tiny units. However analysis of variance indicates that the differences in the means 
are not statistically significant. With DF2 88 the F ratio is 0.36 which is not 
significant. Taking the specific case of workers with a degree/diploma, the mean 
percentage of such workers tends to be higher in small factories (i.e. those with 
more than 11 workers) than in the tiny units, as shown in Table 8.19. Statistically, 
however the differences in the means between the
TABLE 8.19
Percent workers with degree/diploma, by size of unit
Size category 
(employment)
Mean % of workers 
with degree/diploma
SD N
<5 4.3 17.7 35
6 -1 0 4.4 10.2 34
> 11 7.5 9.0 22
Total 5.1 13.3 91
Analysis of variance; DF2 g8 F ratio = 0.4
groups is not significant.
Flexibility
What we have seen from the foregoing is that the technology used by small 
engineering units is characteristically flexible. None of the machinery is 'dedicated' 
to a single purpose, but rather is of a general type that could be put to a range of 
uses, producing any number of components and finished goods. We have also 
seen that the labour force employed in these small units tends to be highly skilled 
and well-educated. Almost two-thirds of workers are deemed to be skilled, and 
in two thirds of the units, more than half the total workforce is skilled. Out of a
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total of 817 employees, 43% have completed secondary or so form of further 
education. It would be tempting to conclude that just as the technology is flexible, 
so is labour. Asheim makes the point that 'labour flexibility' means different 
things to different people. He argues that there are two distinct elements to 
flexibility - functional flexibility "which concerns the skills of the workers and the 
number of different tasks they can perform”; and numerical flexibility which 
concerns the size of the workforce and the ease of adjusting numbers to changes 
in circumstances (Asheim 1992: 48).
On the question of functional flexibility, the basic point that needs to be 
emphasised is that the majority of units in the sample are small in terms of the total 
number of workers employed. As we saw above (Table 8.6) three-quarters of the 
units employ fewer than ten people, and rather more than a third employ fewer 
than five workers. Size alone suggests that in most units there is little room to 
permit individual workers to specialise in performing particular narrowly defined 
tasks. Rather, workers are likely to be expected to master a number of different 
activities. Indeed, observation showed that skilled workers were adept at 
operating different pieces of machinery, and moreover, they also engaged in 
helping unskilled workers with tasks such as loading and unloading, and fetching 
and carrying. Such functional flexibility is aided by the absence of work 
contracts, job specifications and trade union organisation. For most workers in 
small enterprises, the work is what the boss tells them to do. Nor is it just 
employees who work flexibly, but the proprietors themselves. In 77% of the units, 
the owner(s) not only looked after the paperwork, but was also actively involved 
in production on the shopfloor. As Table 8.20 shows, in the two smaller size 
categories, the majority of owners take part in the production process. Even 
among units with more than eleven employees, in more than half such units, the 
owner still took part on the shop floor. Statistically, the evidence suggests that 
there is a relationship between size and owner participation in production; the chi
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square value for the tabulation is 6.339, with 2 DF, which is significant at the 
0.05 level. This reinforces the point made earlier, that in small units, the bulk of
TABLE 8.20 
Owners involvement in production by size of unit
Owner's role 
in production
Size of unit (employees): 
<5 6 -10 >11 N
Yes 30 (85.7) 28 (80.0) 12 (57.1) 70 (76.9)
No 5(14.3) 7 (20.0) 9(42.9) 21(23,1)
( Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
the sample, there is likely to be a high level of functional flexibility. In small and 
tiny units, there is limited scope for an advanced intra-firm division of labour, 
beyond the elemental division between skilled and unskilled tasks. It is in the 
interests of the employer to make the maximum possible use of labour, especially 
valuable skilled labour, by encouraging maximum flexibility. As the size of firm 
increases, so does the scope for more pronounced internal specialisation by 
employees and by employer. What the data in Table 8.20 capture is the 
quantitative change in employer participation, but observation suggests there is 
also a qualitative change as size of unit increases. Among tiny and small units, 
the proprietor actively participates in the operation of machinery, whereas among 
the larger units, participation takes the form of supervision.
The second aspect of flexibility is numerical flexibility - the ability to adjust 
employment levels to changes in workload. One of the principal ways that small 
units can achieve this is through the use of occasional, or casual workers. 32 of 
the 91 units, 35% of the sample used such workers, with the number ranging from
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TABLE 8.21 
Use of casual workers by size of unit
Size of unit (employees)
<5 6-10  >11 N
Units without
casual workers 25(71.4) 23(65.7) 11 (52.4) 59
Units with casual
workers 10(28.6) 12(34.3) 10(47.6) 32
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
two to nine, with an average of 3.6 per unit. Invariably, occasional workers were 
recruited as general labourers, to help with such jobs as packing, loading and 
unloading. Table 8.21 shows the use of occasional workers by size of unit, where 
size is measured in terms of permanent workers. In the tiny category, 29% of 
units use casual workers, compared with 34% in the small unit group and 48 % 
among small factories. On the face of it, the larger units make greater use of 
occasional workers than the smaller ones. Statistically, however,
TABLE 8.22 
Use of casual workers by investment level
Size (fixed investment)
< 200,000 Rs 200,001 - 500,000 Rs >500001 N
Units not using
casual workers 41 (77.4) 12(50.0) 6(42.9) 59
Units using
casual workers 12(22.6) 12(50.0) 8(57.1) 32
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
the differences are not significant. Chi-squared test indicates a value of 2.108, with 
2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant. If however, we measure size in 
terms of capital investment, there is a statistically significant relationship between 
size and use of occasional workers. Table 8.22 shows that 23% of tiny units make
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use of casual workers, compared with 50% of small units and 57% of small 
factories. A chi-squared test produces a value of 8.9286, which, with two degrees 
of freedom is significant at the 0.025 level. Owners of small factories tend to 
explain their use of casual labour by referring to the need to periodically hire 
additional labour to cope with packing and despatch of orders, and the unloading 
of supplies, which take the from of heavy and bulky materials. Presumably, the 
lower volume of production and sales among the tiny units means that there is less 
need to take on extra labour to deal with such eventualities.
Linkages
In this section, we examine the relationships between small units and their wider 
environment. Referring back to Table 8.11 showing the main products of the 
units in the sample, it is possible to identify various production linkages. There 
are, for example, specialised units making dies and moulds for foundries. The 
foundries in turn produce rough castings on order to other specialised workshops 
and pump manufacturers, who undertake grinding and drilling operations. To 
understand the organisation of small units, we concentrate in particular on their 
supply and market linkages. In doing so, we shall be concerned to see whether 
small units are subcontractors to larger units, or whether there is evidence of 
cooperation among specialised small units similar to that found in Italian industrial 
districts.
Supply linkages.
Of the 91 units in the sample, four units are involved in what is referred to as 'job 
work'. This refers to the practice in which a customer provides the raw materials 
needed to complete an order. It is a practice used by larger units to ensure that 
suppliers do not use materials of inferior quality. 87 units thus buy in their own
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raw materials. For 59, or two-thirds of those units, the most important bought in 
materials are ferrous and non-ferrous metals. These include aluminium, caste iron, 
copper and especially steel, both mild and stainless, acquired in a bewildering 
variety of forms - plates, flats, angles, bars and rods. The remaining one third of 
units buy in, in addition to metals, a significant amount of previously manufactured 
parts and components. Included in this group are units making pumps and 
compressors. There are 16 units engaged in this type of activity. All of them rely 
on purchasing rough castings from local foundries, but they also buy in bearings, 
valves, pistons, springs, bolts and electrical wire. None of the units in the sample 
relied exclusively on bought in components. In all cases, the units are engaged in 
the process of manufacture, rather than simply assembling already finished 
components.
The inputs used by the sample firms are predominantly locally sourced, as shown
TABLE 8.23 
Geographical sources of main inputs
Source of supply of main inputs Number of units %
Local 70 80.5
Tamil Nadu, outside Coimbatore 2 2.3
South India outside Tamil Nadu 2 2.3
Elsewhere in India 13 14.9
Total 87 100
Note: excludes 4 units engaged in job work
in Table 7.23. While 81% of units purchase their inputs from local sources, some 
units purchase from much further afield. Plastics, for example, are bought directly 
by two firms from a manufacturer in Madras. Several units buy bearings from 
manufacturers in Bombay, while one of the two electroplating units buys its 
supplies of chemicals from an import agency in Bombay.
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Local suppliers fall into two categories. Firstly, suppliers can be local 
manufacturers. An obvious example are the foundries which are the principal 
suppliers to makers of pumps and compressors. Secondly, suppliers also take the 
form of merchants and traders. These are the principal suppliers of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals, of the scrap used in some of the foundries, and of 
manufactured components, notably bearings - a monopoly of the large scale 
manufacturing sector - but also valves, seals, nuts and bolts - supplies which are 
themselves manufactured by local small units. Why some small units in the sample 
buy components such as valves, from traders while others buy directly from local 
small manufacturers is not entirely clear. What is clear is that traders and 
merchants play a very important role in supplying small industry with a large part 
of its raw material requirements. Coimbatore, as mentioned already, has a very 
large and diverse trading sector. The Steel Authority of India has a substantial 
depot in Coimbatore, which supplies large engineering factories and traders with a 
range of ferrous products. None of the small scale units in our survey dealt 
directly with SAIL, nor did any of them make any use of the SIDCO depot, set up 
specifically to supply small units. Rather, it tends to be the smaller private trading 
organisations which are important. Some idea of the size of this trading sector can 
be gleaned from the Signpost Industrial Directory of Coimbatore3. This 
commercially produced directory lists, among other things, 81 steel traders, 14 
distributors of non-ferrous metals, 25 scrap metal dealers, and 62 distributors of 
ball bearings. This multiplicity of suppliers may be significant - it suggests a highly 
competitive trading sector, and competition between traders reduces the likelihood 
of being able to resort to monopsonistic practices to the detriment of small scale 
producers.
3 The Directory makes no charge for entries, so it does not necessarily discriminate against the small 
trader. It is not, however, by any means a comprehensive listing of manufacturers and suppliers, but 
it does provide some indication of the scope of industry and industrial support in Coimbatore.
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Market Linkage
Table 8.24 reveals the main customers for the sample engineering units. What is 
apparent is that market linkages are complex. Holmstrom's generalisation that 
"(T)ypically, small firms depend on large ones for markets" is far too general as a 
statement of the pattern of linkages in the small scale sector (Holmstrom 1984 
:112). The single most important outlet for small units is the large factory sector. 
A quarter of units sell their output to the factory sector, but a further 21% sell to 
other small units. The third most important market consists of traders who 
provide the main outlet for 12% of the units in the sample. Open market sales 
refer to sales directly to (usually) private buyers. Of the eight units using the open 
market, one produces steel furniture, and five are welding units, where part of the 
business comes from providing a service to other industries, including transport,
TABLE 8.24
Main outlets
Main outlet Number of units %
Small units 19 20.9
Factory units 21 23.1
Traders 11 12.1
Open market 8 8.8
Government 1 1.1
Factory and small units 11 12.1
Traders and open market 6 6.6
Factory and small units and traders 6 6.6
Factory units and traders 2 2.2
Small units and traders 6 6.6
Total 91 100
and part arises from the making of customised security grilles and decorative 
ironwork. The State Government is the main, indeed sole, customer for one unit, 
which manufactures agricultural spraying equipment. For a third of the units,
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there is no single major outlet; rather these units supply some combination of 
small/large units and traders.
One factor which may help to cut through the apparent complexity of market 
outlets is the type of activity that small units are engaged in. Those which 
produce finished goods might be expected to have strong links with traders, while 
those specialising in producing intermediate goods are likely to be
TABLE 8.25
Main outlet for finished and intermediate goods producers
Main Customer Finished goods 
producers 
Number %
Intermediate 
producers 
Number %
Small units 2 5.9 17 29.8
Factory units 6 17.6 15 15.3
Traders 7 20.6 4 7.0
Open market 4 11.8 4 7.0
Government 1 2.9 0
Factory and small units 2 5.9 9 15.8
Traders and open market 6 17.6 0
Factory and small units and traders 2 5.9 4 7.0
Factory units and traders 1 2.9 1 1.8
Small units and traders 3 8.8 3 5.3
Total 34 100 57 100
most strongly linked to other small and/ or factory units. Table 8.25 suggests that 
this is indeed the case. Among producers of finished goods half sell primarily to 
traders and/or the open market. Among intermediate producers, two-thirds have 
linkages with the categories of small and/or large units. To test whether these 
differences are significant, it has been necessary to amalgamate some of the 
categories as in Table 8.26 which distinguishes sales to other small units, to 
factory units, to traders and/or the open market, while the various combinations 
of small/large/traders are included in the category ’other'. What we see from Table 
8.26 is that the main outlet for units making finished products is the category of
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'traders and/ or open market'. Half of the finished goods producers - i.e. makers 
of pumps, wet grinders, washing machines and agricultural machinery - sell their 
products in this way. By comparison, units which make intermediate goods sell 
more or less equally to
TABLE 8.26
Main outlet for finished and intermediate goods producers
Main customer
Units producing: 
Finished products Intermediate products
Small units 2 (5.9) 17(29.8)
Factory units 6 (17.6) 15 (26.3)
Traders and/or open market 17 (50.0) 8 (14.0)
Other 9 (26.5) 17 (29.8)
Total 34 57
small units, to factory units or to the combination category of 'other1. A Chi 
squared test reveals that there is a highly significant difference in the marketing 
linkages of finished and intermediate goods producers. With 3 degrees of 
freedom, the chi squared value is 16.651, which is highly significant at 0.005.
What light does this data throw on the issue of subcontracting? It will be recalled 
that a particularly prevalent view, represented by Holmstrom among others, is that 
small units are essentially subcontractors to large factory units. Small units are 
seen either to produce components or provide a particular service to the large 
firms in the factory sector; while small units producing finished goods sell to big 
companies which market those goods under their own brand name (Kurien 1992: 
298/299). The motivation for such subcontracting is seen to lie in the desire of the 
factory sector to capitalise on the lower labour costs, absence of unions, and lower 
overheads in the small scale sector. Subcontracting thus boosts the profits of the 
large scale sector at the expense of the small, thereby preventing a dynamic
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growth process from taking place in the small sector. There are two separate 
issues here. One concerns the extent of subcontracting. To what extent do small 
units have close links with the large scale sector? The second and separate issue 
concerns the consequences for small units of subcontracting. As we saw in the 
case of Japan, subcontracting may be undertaken for reasons other than simply 
capturing the benefits of cheap unorganised labour, and it can be beneficial for 
small units, inasmuch as such linkages can promote technology transfer. For the 
moment we simply consider the extent and nature of subcontracting.
Whether a unit can be classified as a 'subcontractor' depends in part on how one 
chooses to define the term. There is no definition of subcontractor which 
unambiguously distinguishes 'subcontractor' from 'regular supplier'. In narrow 
legalistic terms, subcontracting implies the existence of a contract for the supply of 
goods and /or services over a period of time. If we accept that definition, then 
only three of our sample of 91 units is engaged in subcontracting, all being units 
engaged in job work for large factories. If we broaden the definition to refer to 
units which supply another unit or small group of units, and have been doing so 
regularly for some time, we arrive at a rather larger estimate of the extent of 
subcontracting. Applying this definition firstly to units producing finished goods, 
we find that twelve of our 34 units can be deemed to be subcontractors (Table 
8.27). Two units are 'tied' to specific firms in the factory sector. Both 
manufacture pumpsets, and the whole of their output is regularly sold to a 
particular large manufacturer who markets the pumps under its own brand name. 
Four other pumpset/compressor manufacturers can be regarded as subcontractors, 
having regular sales to a small number of specific large producers in this field. 
The remaining six units have maintained market links with a small group of 
traders, through whom they market their wet grinders, and agricultural machinery.
216
Surprisingly perhaps, subcontracting among producers of intermediate goods is no 
more common than among finished goods producers. Seventeen out of a total of
TABLE 8.27 
Units engaged in subcontracting
Subcontracting by : finished goods intermediate goods
producers producers
Number of units Number of units
Job work for factory unit 0 4
Job work for small units 0 1
Tied subcontractors - factory unit 2 3
Tied subcontractors - small units 0 0
Subcontractors to factory units 4 3
Subcontractors to small units 0 5
Subcontractors to traders 6 1
Total 12 17
57 units in this category can be described as subcontractors. Four units undertake 
job work for large factories - two make spare parts for specific textile mills, and 
the third undertakes grinding work for Textool Ltd. This was the only unit in the 
sample which was able to report receiving any positive help - in the form of 
technical advice - from its parent company. A further unit, also a grinding and 
finishing specialist, is engaged in job work for a relatively small number of small 
units. The tied units include two which make components for a large engineering 
firm, and a small foundry. Of the five units serving other small industries, most 
are specialised machining shops.
In total, out of 91 units, we can describe 29 as subcontractors, 32% of the total. 
This result is comparable with John Harriss' study of light engineering in 
Coimbatore, which found that in a sample of registered and unregistered units, 
35% were engaged in subcontracting (Harriss 1982: 952). His conclusion that
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"subcontracting in the engineering industry in Coimbatore is extensive" seems 
somewhat at odds with his own findings, as well as those of the present survey 
(Harriss 1982: 953). It is of course feasible that subcontracting is far more 
widespread than the data presented above suggest; those units which supply other 
small units may in turn subcontract to other large units. The possibility of such 
chains feeding in to the large units cannot be discounted, but such chains are 
difficult to uncover in a sample of units.
For the sample in this study, roughly a third of the total units are deemed to be 
subcontractors, in the sense of maintaining a relationship with another specific 
unit, or small group of units over a reasonably prolonged period. Not all of these 
units subcontract to large factories, and the reasons for subcontracting are not 
necessarily to do with capitalising on cheap labour. Sixteen out of the twenty nine 
subcontractors - 55% - to the factory and the small scale sector are specialist 
machining and engineering shops, and it is perhaps as much their expertise as their 
cheap labour and low overheads that is in demand.
The majority of units are not subcontractors, but suppliers. They supply finished 
goods, components or services on order to a group or groups of customers whose 
composition changes over time. While some concentrate on seeking work from a 
range of large units, others cultivate contacts with other small units and more than 
a third of the sample (Table 8.24) seek orders from a diversity of sources - from 
small and large, from traders and middlemen, as well as on the open market. FPS, 
for example, employs twelve workers making gears and gear assemblies. The unit 
secures occasional orders from large engineering companies, but the proprietor 
also sells through traders and directly to other small units who require replacement 
parts for their own machinery. FPS seems to be typical of many of the small units 
in Ganapathi, seeking orders from as wide a range of outlets as possible. 
Subcontractors and suppliers operate in highly competitive markets, but the
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difference is that subcontractors enjoy the benefits of regular orders. Suppliers on 
the other hand lack stable marketing arrangements. Whether this difference 
affects the growth possibilities of small units is a question we return to later.
A final aspect of marketing among our sample firms has a more directly 
geographical dimension. It is often assumed that small units produce and sell in 
predominantly local markets. This is not wholly true for this sample. For the 
sample as a whole the sales profile was that on average, Coimbatore accounted for 
57% of sales, the rest of the state for 19% and the rest of India for 24%. Table
8.28 gives a breakdown of the basic data. 29 units (32%) sell their
TABLE 8.28 
Geographical distribution of sales
% of sales
Number of units with sales: 
within Coimbatore Tamil Nadu
outside Coimbatore
Rest of India
0 8 47 43
1 - 25% 17 15 16
26 - 50% 20 20 18
51 - 75% 12 4 5
>76 % 34 5 9
entire output within Coimbatore, while 45 units, half the total in the sample, 
dispose of less than half of their production locally. 44 units sell in the rest of the 
state outside Coimbatore, and 48 sell some part of their production in the rest of 
India. In the main, sales to the rest of India tend to be concentrated in other 
Southern states, especially the neighbouring state of Kerala, and to a lesser extent 
in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.
One factor that may discriminate between local and non-local sales is the type of 
production. It might be expected that intermediate goods producers will tend to
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sell on a more localised basis than those units producing finished goods. Table
8.29 reveals that this is indeed the case. Sales in Coimbatore for finished goods
TABLE 8.29
Local sales by finished and intermediate goods producers
Mean % of sales 
within Coimbatore
N
Finished goods 36.5 34
Intermediate products 70.1 57
Total 57.5 91
average 36.5%, while for intermediate producers, local sales account for 70%. 
Statistically, the differences in means are highly significant - the F ratio is 21.812, 
with DFj 89 , which is highly significant at the 0.001 level. There also seems to be 
a relationship between size of unit and the level of sales. Defining size by size of 
workforce, tiny units, with fewer than five employees have a higher mean level of 
local sales, than either small units (6 to 10 employees) or large units with 11 or 
more workers. When we control for type of production activity, size turns out to 
have no significance in statistical terms. We may conclude that type of activity is 
more important than size in explaining the level of local/non-local sales.
In this chapter we have attempted to build up a picture of the organisation of light 
engineering units in Ganapathi. The area contains both small workshops, as well 
as medium and large factories. Among the numerous small scale enterprises, 
there is considerable evidence of inter-firm division of labour, with some units 
specialising in the manufacture of particular components, others providing equally 
specialised engineering services. A second category of units concentrates on the 
manufacture of finished goods, buying in components - either directly, or 
indirectly through traders - produced by other small firms. Intermediate producers 
have strong local linkages with other small units, with large factory units and with
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the trading community. Producers of finished goods have their roots in locally 
produced components, but their market is geographically more extensive. Small 
manufacturers are not wholly dependent on large factory units. Rather they exist 
within a network of relationships; they interact with each other, with large units 
and with the trading community. There are strong competitive pressures, both in 
product markets, and in the market for labour.
The picture of a network of small, highly competitive and specialised producers 
using general purpose machinery and highly skilled and adaptable labour points in 
the direction of a flexibly specialised industrial district, comparable with those 
described for Italy, Southern Germany and elsewhere. Before jumping to the 
conclusion that flexible specialisation is an accurate characterisation of small 
industrial producers in Coimbatore, we need to extend the analysis a bit further. 
Descriptions of flexibly specialised industrial agglomerations lay great emphasis on 
the way that raw competition is moderated by cooperative forms of behaviour. 
Through cooperation, small firms are collectively able to enjoy access to technical 
and market intelligence, which individually they are unable to enjoy. Collaborative 
behaviour ensures the survival of individual firms and enhances the 
competitiveness of the collectivity, enabling constituent enterprises to accumulate 
and grow. In the next chapter, we shall examine the issues of growth.
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Ch a pte r  9  Th e  g r o w th  of  sm all  en g ineer in g  u n its
Thus far we have concentrated on building up a picture of the structure and 
organisation of light engineering units in Coimbatore. The picture that emerges is 
of an agglomeration of small units with some of the elements of 'flexible 
specialisation'. These units employ a highly skilled and well educated labour force, 
working in specialised activities with linkages both with each other, with large 
factories and with the trading community. Specialisation and division of labour 
among small units, evident in the types of specific activities they undertake, 
appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Writing in 1960, James Bema 
remarked on
"..the marked tendency towards "self-sufficiency" on the part of even the 
smallest engineering unit. A visitor to the firms studied is immediately struck 
by the fact, for instance, that each small manufacturer has his own foundry 
complete with cupola, even though it be of only one-half ton capacity and used 
for casting only every ten days.... There are understandable reasons for the 
present situation. Until recently light engineering industry in the region was 
not sufficiently well developed to make it worthwhile for anyone to specialise 
in casting only" (Bema 1960: 99/100).
That self-sufficiency no longer exists. The growth of industry in post-war 
Coimbatore has permitted and encouraged a much greater division of labour, such 
that today there are units which undertake only casting, some specialising in 
aluminium die casting, others in cast iron, and several that specialise in the casting 
of special alloys. Many other units, as we have seen, also concentrate on a 
particular process such as the drilling and grinding of components and castings, 
electroplating, the cutting of gear wheels, while others specialise in manufacturing 
particular components or finished goods. Specialisation by process and by 
product is well developed. One of the consequences is that the conditions of 
entry into light engineering, although still higher than in other areas of small scale 
manufacture, are probably lower than they used to be. Because units no longer
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need to be "self-sufficient", they no longer need substantial amounts of capital to 
set up their own foundry, or to make all the components required in the 
manufacturing process. Lower entry conditions in turn make it easier for more 
small specialised units to proliferate, but as the number of units multiplies, 
competition inevitably sharpens. The smaller foundries in Coimbatore compete 
with each other for the business of both large and small units, but they also face 
competition from the large foundries in the city. The makers of pumpsets likewise 
face stiff competition from the 400 or so other local manufacturers. Such 
competition can be the spur to innovation, encouraging the adoption of improved 
techniques and newer technologies but it can also be pernicious, undermining the 
viability of small units with their limited access to resources, forestalling 
investment and growth. Competition can encourage accumulation and 
development, but it can also be destructive.
In this section, we consider the growth experience of our sample small units. 
Sample surveys are not the best method of examining the dynamics of growth. 
They provide a snapshot at a particular point in time, when what we need is in the 
nature of a history of small units and their experience over time. We can go some 
way to shifting from a static to a dynamic analysis by incorporating questions 
about change - especially changes in investment, in employment and in the types of 
activity units engage in - in order to assess whether a process of development has 
taken place.
Table 9.1 shows responses to a question about changes in the number of 
(permanent) employees and in the stock of powered machinery since the unit was 
first established. It will be seen that rather more than half of the units in the 
sample have increased their level of employment, while 6 units have contracted 
and now employ fewer people than when they were first established. Table 9.1
223
also shows that just over a third of the units have increased the stock of machinery 
at their disposal, while two thirds continue to use the same
TABLE 9.1 
Changes in employment and investment
Change in the number of employees Change in stock of machinery 
No. of units % No. of units %
Increase 54 59.3 34 37.4
Decrease 6 6.6 0 0
No change 31 34.1 57 62.6
Total 91 100 91 100
type and number of machines as at their foundation. Of the 34 units which have 
expanded their stock of machinery, 4 have multiplied the existing type of 
machines, for example adding an additional lathe; 27 units have diversified their 
range of machines, while the remaining 3 have adopted both strategies.
Table 9.2 shows the relationship between these two dimensions of change. 24 
units (26% of the sample) now employ more workers and at the same time have 
increased their investment in machinery, while a further
TABLE 9.2
Relationship between change in employment and in investment
Change in number Changes in the stock of powered machinery:
of employees: Increase No change
Increase 24 (26.4) 30 (33.0)
Decrease 0 6 (6.6)
No change 10 (11.0) 21 (23.1)
( Figures in brackets are percentages of the total sample)
30 units have increased their labour force but without any additional investment in 
plant. This may reflect either a shift to more labour intensive activities, or a better
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use of existing capacity. A further ten units have invested in additional plant, but 
without expanding the size of the labour force; all are units which have diversified 
the range of installed machinery. That additional new machinery is operated by 
the same group of workers is a further pointer to the existence of a high level of 
functional flexibility. Six units in the sample employ less labour than they used to, 
and none has increased investment. There is no common characteristic to all of 
these units: one is a tiny unregistered unit, while the other five are more 
substantial and seemingly viable units, employing between four and thirteen 
employees. The final group of units comprise 21 firms which continue to operate 
with the same number of workers and the same level of investment as when they 
began. The pattern of change is thus varied. Almost three-quarters of the units 
(64) have expanded their labour force and/or their level of investment while 21 
show no change and a small minority of 6 units have shed labour.
The interesting question is whether we can explain why some units have grown 
and others have not. In trying to answer that we need to bear two points in mind. 
First, we need to recognise that some of the significant determinants of firm 
growth are beyond the control of the individual proprietor. Growth is conditioned 
by the level of demand and the state of the economy generally which the individual 
owner has to take as given. A poor monsoon may depress farmers' incomes and 
reduce the demand for agricultural machinery, and there may be little the small 
manufacturer can do about that. But even if, secondly, market conditions are 
favourable, and our proprietor has access to the necessary capital to permit 
expansion, we should be wary of assuming that the aim of all small manufacturers 
is to grow and expand. In discussing women's employment activities, Grown and 
Sebstad usefully distringuish between survival as a basic goal (Grown and Sebstad 
1989: 941). Once survival is assured, then the goal may switch to security, where 
an entrepreneur may try to diversify into new markets. And finally, for those who 
have achieved security, the goal may then shift towards growth. Growth and
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accumulation is not necessarily the principal objective of small firms. Growth can 
magnify the problems and difficulties - of labour recruitment, of access to markets 
and suppliers, of opportunism, cheating and sharp practice that may beset the 
owner of the small enterprise. Context is also important here, for where firms exist 
within a cooperative network, the growth of the individual unit may be less 
problematical than in those circumstances where the unit cannot rely on others to 
help and support.
With these caveats in mind, let us now look at some of the specific factors that 
might explain the observed pattern of growth. One factor that may influence 
growth is the length of time the unit has existed. Older units might be more likely 
to have grown compared with younger units, if only because older units have had 
more time in which to build a network of contacts, to establish a reputation and so
TABLE 9.3 
Change in size of workforce, by age of unit
Change in size Age of unit in years:
of workforce: <3 4-7 8-11 >12
Increase 5 (38.5) 21 (63.6) 16 (66.7) 12(57.1)
No change 7 (53.8) 11 (33.3) 7 (29.2) 6 (28.6)
Decrease 1 (7.7) 1 (3.0) 1 (4.2) 3 (14.3)
Total 13 33 24 21
( Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
build up sales. Table 9.3 shows the number of units in different age categories, and 
changes in the size of the workforce. There is little suggestion in the data that 
longer established units are more likely to have witnessed growth. Statistically, a 
chi-squared test bears this out. Collapsing the ‘no change' and the 'decrease' 
categories into a single category to avoid cells with fewer than 5 observations, 
chi-squared is 3.177 with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant. Similarly 
there is no statistical relationship between increases in the stock of machinery, and 
age of unit (Table 9.4).
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TABLE 9.4 
Change in investment level and age of unit
Change in stock 
machinery: < 3 years
Age of units: 
4/7years 8/12 years >12 years
Increase 4 (30.8) 12 (36.4) 10(41.7) 8(38.1)
No change 9 (69.2) 21 (63.6 14 (58.3) 13(61.9)
Chi-squared = 0.45035 3 degrees of freedom Sig=0.9
The proportion of units that have increased their stock of machinery varies 
relatively little between the age categories. Nor is there any relationship between 
growth and the type of specialisation. 59% of units which specialise in making 
finished products have increased their workforce, compared with 60% of 
intermediate producers.
We can quickly pass over the question of whether size is related to growth. 
Statistically, there is a highly significant relationship between size, whether 
measured in terms of capital or number of employees, but on reflection, such a 
statistical relationship is less than meaningful. The question asked in the survey 
was whether the size of the labour force and the stock of machinery had changed 
since the foundation of the unit. What the responses show is that the units that are 
now large in employment terms have indeed taken on more labour, and those that 
are now large in terms of their capital investment have invariably increased their 
inventory of plant and machinery. What this tells us is simply that today's larger 
units had humbler beginnings, but such an observation simply begs the question of 
why some units grow and others do not. Present size of unit cannot provide an 
explanation of that. With hindsight, it might have been more useful to have asked 
about changes in workforce and investment over a particular period of time - say 
the last two years- and to have then compared responses according to size.
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We might ask whether market linkages have any influence over growth. Table 9.5 
shows change in the size of the workforce, by main customer. It shows that 76% 
of units whose main customers comprise factory sector units have taken on more
TABLE 9.5 
Change in employment by main customer
Main customer:
Change in Small Factory Traders/ Large and Other 
workforce: unit unit open market small units
Increase 8(42.0) 16(76.2) 11 (44.0) 9(81.8) 10(66.7)
Decrease 3 (15.8) 0 1(4.0) 1(9.1) 1 (6.7)
No change 8 (42.1) 5 (23.8) 13 (52.0) 1 (9.1) 4(26.7)
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
labour, and 82% of those whose customers are both large and small units have 
also grown. On the other hand, only 42% of units supplying other small units and 
44% of those supplying traders and/or the open market have grown. To test for 
significance, we have to collapse the full table above, by combining the row 
categories of 'decrease* and 'no change', and combining the last two columns. 
With the reorganised data, the chi-squared value is 9.8859, with 4 degrees of 
freedom, which is significant at 0.05. This relationship holds even when we 
control for the effects of other factors. Among the 'other factors' which might 
help to explain the observed relationship between growth and type of customer is 
the size of unit. We have already pointed out that size is positively related to 
growth, but the exact meaning of that relationship is uncertain, given the question 
that was asked. However, if we control for size, we find that among 53 tiny units 
with less than Rs 200,000 investment, 22 (42%) have grown, while 31 (59%) 
have not (Table 9.6). Of those which have increased their workforce, a third 
supplied the factory sector, a further third supplied the mixed category, while only 
a fifth supplied traders, and less than a tenth supplied other small units. At the
TABLE 9.6
Changes in workforce by main customer among tiny units
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Units with investment of < Rs 200,000 
Change in Main customer:
workforce: Small units Factory units Traders/open market Other N
Increase 2(9.1) 7(31.8) 5 (22.7) 8(36.4) 22
Decrease/Same 10(32.3) 3(9.7) 13(41.9) 5(16.1) 31
Chi-squared = 9.9395 3 Degrees of freedom Significant at 0.01.
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of row totals)
other end of the scale, among the 14 large units with more than Rs 500,000 
investment, 12 (86%) have increased the size of their labour force (Table 9.7). 
Interestingly, none of these now large units use the small-scale sector as their 
principal outlet. Rather growth appears to be associated primarily with serving 
the mixed category and the factory sector. While the frequencies in Table 9.7 are 
too small to draw any statistically significant conclusions, the evidence conveys 
the impression that the type of market linkage does have a real effect on growth 
prospects.
Particularly interesting is the finding that a high proportion of units with links to 
the factory sector have grown. This contradicts, or at least gives no support to 
the prevailing view that relationships between small and large parent units are 
necessarily exploitative and result in the marginalisation of small manufacturers. 
As far as light engineering units in
TABLE 9.7
Changes in workforce by main customer among large units
Units with investment of > Rs 500,000
Change in Main customer:
workforce: Small units Factory units Traders/open Other
Increase 0 4(80) 2 (66.7) 6 (100)
Decrease/same 0 1 (20) 1 (33.3) 0
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Coimbatore are concerned that notion seems to have little validity. Three quarters 
of the units with links to the factory sector have expanded, and this includes all the 
units that were designated in a previous chapter as 'subcontractors'. By contrast 
units supplying other small units appear to have a poorer growth record. Some 
corroboration for this finding is provided by Ghosh and Bharadwaj, who write, in 
the context of rural employment generation in India, that
"Small industrial units (in the unorganised sector) attached to large units (in the 
organised sector) have been relatively more successful than independent small 
enterprises" (Ghosh and Bharadwaj 1992: 161).
The reasons for this difference in performance may lie in the size and stability of 
demand, and the superior marketing network of large units. With their 
established marketing network and established brand names, large units might be 
able to provide more sustained demand, and thereby create more favourable and 
secure market conditions, enhancing the viability of small subcontractors and 
suppliers, and increasing the likelihood of growth. Dependence on traders and the 
open market also seem to be associated with poor growth prospects; in the case of 
open market sales, unstable demand may be an important limit over growth. In 
the case of traders, there may be a parallel between their role vis-a-vis small 
manufacturers, and the role of traders in relation to agricultural producers. 
Barbara Harriss for example has pointed to the way that agricultural traders 
siphon resources away from agricultural producers, making it difficult, but not 
impossible, for producers to improve techniques of production (Harriss 1990: 98). 
In similar fashion, small scale manufacturers dependent on traders as a means of 
disposing of their production may also find themselves at a disadvantage, because 
of the discounts that traders usually demand. And tiny units may be particularly 
disadvantaged by this practice; they need to maintain their cash flow, and may 
have few opportunities to seek out alternative outlets for their wares.
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That links with large units may provide a sounder foundation for the growth of 
small units is also suggested by Table 9.8. This shows the relationship between
TABLE 9.8
Change in investment by type of main customer
Main customer:
Change in Small units Factory units Traders/ Other N
investment: open market
Increase 4(21.1) 11 (52.4) 8 (32.0) 11 (42.3) 34
No change 15 (78.9) 10 (47.6) 17 (68.0) 15 (57.7) 57
Total 19 21 25 26 91
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
change in investment in plant and machinery and type of customer. Slightly more 
than half the units whose main customers are in the factory sector have increased 
their investment in machinery, compared with less than half in the 'other' category, 
a third of units supplying traders and/or the open market, and only a fifth of units 
whose main customers comprise other small manufacturers. Statistically, 
however, the relationship is not significant; with three degrees of freedom, the chi- 
squared value is 4.7625. It nevertheless is remarkable that on both dimensions of 
change, those units supplying the factory sector have a better record of growth, 
both of employment and of investment, while those supplying traders and/or the 
open market, and small units, have a much poorer record of growth.
A different line of enquiry is suggested by looking at the educational background 
of owners of small units. Table 9.9 shows the changes in size of workforce by 
level of educational attainment of owners. The table indicates a striking contrast 
between units whose owner(s) have completed secondary or higher levels of 
education, and those who have not. Three quarters of units where the owner(s) 
have a degree have taken on more labour at some time, compared with almost 
two-thirds of units where the owner has completed secondary school, but slightly
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less than a quarter of units where the owner has no secondary or higher education. 
Moreover a quarter of units where the owner lacks secondary education have 
reduced the size of the labour force, compared with only two percent of units 
whose head has a degree, and five percent of units where the proprietor has a
TABLE 9.9
Change in workforce and educational attainment of owner
Number of units whose owner(s) have:
Change in Secondary school ITI cert. Degree Other
workforce certificate /diploma
Increase 13 (61.9) 3(42.9) 34(75.6) 4 (22.2)
Decrease 1 (4.8) 0 1 (2.2) 4 (22.2)
No change 7(33.3) 4(57.1) 10 (22.2) 10 (55.5)
Total 21 7 45 18
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
secondary school leaving certificate. To test the relationship statistically it is 
necessary to amalgamate the first two columns - SSLC and ITI certificate - and to 
amalgamate rows two and three to minimise the number of cells with frequencies 
of less than five. A chi-squared test for the adjusted categories yields a value of 
15.2385, with two degrees of freedom, which is highly significant at the 0.005 
level.
Table 9.10 shows owners' education and changes in the stock of machinery. On 
the face of it, a similar pattern is evident as in the case of changes in the number of 
workers - a higher proportion of units whose owners have completed secondary 
or higher education have increased their stock of machinery, compared with the 
group of units whose owners have not. Statistically, however, educational 
attainment of owners seems not to be related to changes in investment. The chi- 
squared value for the data in Table 9.10 is 0.8846, and with two degrees of 
freedom; this is not significant.
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TABLE 9.10
Change in investment and educational attainment of owner
Number of units whose owners have: 
Change in stock of SSLC/ITI Degree/diploma
powered machinery
Other
Increase 11 (39.3)
No change 17 (60.7)
Total 28
18 (40.0) 
27 (60.0) 
45
5 (27.8) 
13 (72.2) 
18
( Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
The finding that educational attainment and changes in employment levels are 
related leads us to speculate about possible connections. Are we to understand 
that education encourages greater ambition and a determination to grow? Or is 
'education* a proxy for some other factor or complex of factors?
One possibility is that underlying these relationships is the pervasive influence of 
caste. In the world of industry and commerce caste may exercise considerable 
influence. Those drawn from the more affluent castes are more likely to be part of 
a network of kin and friends which provides readier access to capital as well as to 
business expertise and contacts. In these ways, as John Harriss amongst others 
has observed, caste may be a crucial factor "influencing both the possibilities of 
survival, and even more, the possibilities of expanded reproduction" (Harriss 
1982: 950). Table 9.11 provides data on changes in the size of the workforce by
TABLE 9.11
Change in employment and caste
Change in size 
of workforce:
Caste of owner:
Naidu Gounder Other
Increase 
Decrease 
No change
Total
14(63.6) 15 (62.5) 11 (45.8)
1 (4.5) 1 (4.2) 2 (8.3)
7(31.8) 8 (33.3) 11 (45.8)
22 24 2424
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caste of owner. It reveals that two-thirds of the units owned by a member of the 
Naidu and Gounder communities, have increased in size, compared with rather 
less than half the units belonging to other caste groups. Statistically, the 
relationship with caste is not significant. Collapsing the workforce change 
dimension into two categories, the resultant chi-squared value is 1.9135, which 
with two degrees of freedom, is not significant.
This examination of growth in the labour force and expansion of investment in 
plant and machinery reveals that no statistically significant relationships can be 
shown for change in investment, but change in size of workforce is significantly 
related to two factors - education of owner, and type of main customer. While it 
is possible to rationalise each of these relationships individually, it is worth asking 
whether these two factors exert an independent influence over growth, or whether 
there is some other, underlying connection between them. A crosstabulation of 
these two variables yields some interesting results (Table 9.12). For owners with
TABLE 9.12 
Owner's education and main customer
Main customer:
Owner's education:
SSLC/ITI Degree/diploma Other N
Small units 5 (17.9) 7 (15.6) 7 (38.9) 19
Large units 
Traders and/or
5 (17.9) 12 (26.7) 4 (22.2) 21
open market 11(39.3) 10 (22.2) 4 (22.2) 25
Other 7 (25.0) 16 (35.6) 3 (16.7) 26
Total 28 45 18 91
(Numbers in brackets are percentages of column totals)
a degree, the two main customers are the 'other' category, characterised by some 
combination of large/small units and traders; and factory units. Of those with a
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secondary school leaving certificate or ITI certificate, the main outlet is the 
category of traders and/or the open market'. Among those who do not fall into 
either of those categories, the main outlet is other small units. Looked at in the 
other dimension, of the units which supply large factories, 57% (12 out of 21) of 
their owners have a degree. Of the units supplying traders and/or the open market, 
the single largest category (44%) consists of those with the SSLC/ITI, while the 
major supplier in the 'other category* again consists of those with a degree. 
Among those with no formal educational qualifications, the single largest group 
(37%) supply other small units. While the pattern is not absolutely clear, there 
does seem to be some selection or market segmentation according to educational 
background. Graduates seem more likely to supply large units, those with 
SSLC/ITI to supply traders, while the non-qualified group seem to be most closely 
linked to supplying other small units.
There is a plausible explanation for such a pattern of segmented markets. One of 
the main complaints levelled against small units is their inability to maintain 
consistent quality control standards. The issuing of job work is one way of trying 
to ensure quality; another may be to select those small units whose owners possess 
technical qualifications in the belief that they not only possess the necessary 
technical skills, but are also more likely to understand the need for consistency in 
quality. At the other extreme, those owners without educational qualifications 
are less likely to be acceptable as subcontractors or suppliers to large units, and 
may find themselves relegated to supplying other, less discriminating and less 
demanding customers.
It is then feasible that small units occupy discrete positions in the marketplace, by 
virtue of the varying technical qualifications of their owners. The more technically 
educated are better placed to secure orders from large units, and they in turn 
benefit from a relatively assured market. The unqualified resort to supplying other
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small units, and in the absence of an assured regular demand, the prospects for 
growth are that much reduced. Unfortunately, this interpretation is not entirely 
supported by the available data. While there seems to be a relationship between 
level of education and main customer in Table 9.12, the relationship is not 
statistically significant. The value of chi-squared is 7.9576, with six degrees of 
freedom, which is not significant. These calculations are likely to be affected, 
however, by the low frequencies in the "other" category, so we might conclude 
that the evidence does not disprove the interpretation offered above.
Changes in Activity and Designs
So far we have examined the quantitative dimensions of change. Slightly more 
than half of the units in the sample have taken on more labour, but only a third 
have expanded their stock of plant and machinery. It does not of course follow, 
that those units which have not increased their workforce or expanded the level of 
investment have necessarily stagnated. Other forms of 'change' may occur, 
without requiring more labour or more machinery. Included here are changes in 
the type of activity that units specialise in, and changes in the type of designs 
which they use. Such changes may be indicative of the adaptability and flexibility 
of small units while at the same time enhancing their viability.
Changes in what a unit produces may arise because of competitive pressures, 
reducing the profitability of some lines of manufacture, encouraging units to shift 
into newer and more profitable activities, but they can also come about as 
proprietors respond to changing market demands. Changing the design of a 
product or component is an attempt to improve and broaden its potential market. 
In this section we examine these forms of adaptability.
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For the whole sample, 31% of units have changed their main product since setting
up the unit. Sixty units, or two-thirds of the total continue to produce the same
commodity or engineering service as when they were established. An example of
such changes was given earlier - a unit which originally produced perforated metal
sheets moved into the production of washing machines. Other examples include
SISM Ltd, originally established to make textile spares, and now specialising in
making springs mostly but not exclusively for use in the textile industry. Several
units which initially produced motors have since moved into making wet grinders.
The production of washing machines and wet grinders seems to be a good
example of responsiveness to the emergence of new markets for engineered
products. Both types of product are aimed at the relatively affluent middle class in
Southern India. Producers of finished goods are no more likely to have changed
their line of activity than producers of intermediate goods - 38% of the former
now produce something different, but 32% of intermediate goods producers have
also switched. Nor is there any relationship with age of unit. Surprisingly
enough, a third of units in existence for less than three years have changed their
main activity, the same proportion as among longer established units.
It seems plausible that one factor which may differentiate between units which
have changed their line of activity, and those that have not is owners' education. It
might be expected that the more educated owners may have greater awareness of
new opportunities and new market trends. 40% of units whose owners possess a
TABLE 9.13 
Change in activity by size of unit
Number of units with fixed investment in machinery (Rs): 
Activity: <200,000 200-500,000 >500,000
Change in activity 14(26.4) 8(33.3) 9(64.3)
No change 39(73.6) 16(66.7) 5 ((35.7)
Total 53 24 14
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degree have switched their line of activity compared with 30% of non-graduates. 
Statistically, however, the relationship between education and change is not 
significant. There is a significant relationship by size of unit (Table 9.13). Only a 
quarter or so of tiny units have changed production, compared with a third of 
small units and two thirds of large units. Statistically the relationship is significant 
- chi-squared is 7.0792, with two degrees of freedom, which is significant at 0.05. 
In trying to explain this relationship, it might be argued that units which are now 
large have been able to grow by switching from presumably less to more profitable 
activities. Growth might then be considered, at least in part, a function of the 
ability to exploit new opportunities in the marketplace. This was indeed the case 
for the unit which switched from sheet metal working to the manufacture of 
washing machines. In other instances, however, the relationship is quite different. 
Larger units may have better access to resources, skills and information enabling 
them to switch more easily from one activity to another. A case in point is a 
relatively large unit making motors which gradually shifted over to making 
compressors. The relationship between size and activity change is not therefore 
simple and straightforward. In some instances changing the line of business 
seems to have contributed to subsequent growth, but in other cases the past 
record of growth seems to have made change easier.
Changes in the design of both finished and intermediate products may be a further 
way of improving a unit's commercial success by enhancing the marketability of its 
output. Overall, 51% of units use their own designs, 40% produce according to 
customers' specifications, while only 9% use standard designs. There are 
significant differences between producers of intermediate and producers of 
finished goods (Table 9.14). Surprisingly, 76% of finished goods producers use
TABLE 9.14 
Source of designs by type of specialisation
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Source of designs:
Type of specialisation: 
Finished products Intermediate goods N
Own 26 (76.5) 20 (35.1) 46
Others 5 (14.7) 31 (54.4) 36
Standard 3 (8.8) 6(10.5) 9
Total 34 57 91
their own, rather than standard designs. For some goods national standards do not 
yet exist, but even where they do, as with pumpsets, relatively few small producers 
observe the specifications laid down by the Bureau of Indian Standards1. Among 
intermediate goods producers, the designs used are either those supplied by 
customers, or, to a lesser extent, the proprietors’ own. Superimposed on these 
variations between types of specialisation, there are also differences by
TABLE 9.15 
Source of designs by size of unit
Number of units with fixed investment (Rs):
Source of designs: <200,000 200 - 500,000 >500000
Own 26(49.1) 14 (58.3) 6 (42.9)
Customer 24 (45.3) 7 (29.2) 5 (35.7)
Standard 3 (5.7) 3 (12.5) 3 (21.4)
Total 53 24 14
size of unit (Table 9.15). 95% of tiny units rely on their own or customers 
designs; very few make use of standard designs, a consequence of the type of 
specialised machining work undertaken on order to other units. Only a third of
1 The question of quality and testing is pursued later.
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tiny units produce finished goods, and very few of them appear to utilise standard 
designs. Use of standard designs is more common among small and especially 
large units in the sample. Use of own designs seems to vary only marginally 
across size categories, while use of customers’ designs tends to decline with 
increasing size of unit. Statistically, the relationship between size and source of 
designs is not significant. For the data in Table 9.15, the chi-squared value is 
4.6300, and with four degrees of freedom is not significant. That result is, 
however, likely to be distorted by the number of cells with low frequencies.
For the sample as a whole, 59 units (65%) reported that they had at some time 
changed the designs they used, while 35% reported no change. Invariably, such 
changes were intended to be an improvement, to make the product more 
marketable. Overwhelmingly, such changes were one-off rather than part of a 
continuous process. In a minority of cases, units had changed their designs several 
times, mainly because the initial change had not turned out to be an improvement, 
requiring further changes. A much higher proportion of tiny units (64%) had 
altered their designs, compared with 43% of the large units. To some extent this 
reflects differences in the use of standard designs. A higher proportion of large 
units make use of standard designs, and thus may not feel the same need to 
introduce alterations to make their goods marketable. More important however, 
is the fact that tiny units encompass a number of machining shops undertaking 
specialised work for a variety of different customers. For such units, there may 
not be a set and predictable design to follow; each job may involve its own 
particular set of specifications and designs. For such units, designs are constantly 
changing. Machining units therefore seem to be in a different category from other 
units making either standard components such as gears or motors, and those 
producing finished goods. In the latter cases, design changes are likely to be much 
less frequent, and undertaken not as a matter of course, but exceptionally and for 
reasons of improved sales.
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If we exclude the 21 specialised machining, metal-working units from the sample, 
and only consider those units making components and finished products, we find 
that 45 units (64%) have changed their designs at some time, while 25 (36%) 
have not. Among this subsample of 70 units, there are no discernible statistically 
significant relationships with any other characteristics of the units. Three-quarters 
of the units producing finished goods have altered their designs, compared with 
just over half of those producing components, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, owners' education has no effect on design change. While 
69% of graduate owners have altered their designs and 67% of those with 
SSLC/ITI certificate, only 46% of those with other educational qualifications have 
done so, but the differences could have occurred by chance. None of the measures 
of size shows any relationship, nor does age of unit. Units which are less than 
three years old are no less likely to have changed their designs than those which 
are longer established.
That design change appears to be random is in itself remarkable. A plausible 
explanation for this is that, in the absence of standardised designs, small units seek 
to gain a competitive advantage by introducing design changes. Such changes, as 
respondents indicated, may not always be for the better, but where a change gives 
a unit an advantage in securing sales, it may well be mimicked by competitors. 
This process is made all the more possible within an agglomeration such as 
Ganapathi, where there are plentiful opportunities for small owners to interact 
with each other, to swop news and gossip, and to keep an eye on what rivals are 
up to. There is a comparison to be drawn with some of the Italian industrial 
districts in this regard. Brusco, for example, points to the "continual informal 
interaction in cafes and bars and in the street. In this way, new ideas are formed 
and transmitted" (Brusco 1990:16). Ganapathi may lack the bars, but there is a 
vibrant street life and a great deal of informal interaction. Such interaction has not
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led to a process of endogenous technological development, nor indeed to the kind 
of sharing of work and machinery among firms in the event of large orders, or 
machinery breakdown. In the literature on industrial districts, such co-operative 
behaviour is cited as an example of the development of relations of trust between 
entrepreneurs. In Coimbatore, such informal co-operation seems to be lacking, so 
that if machines break down, orders are quite simply delayed. Considerable 
ingenuity is evident in keeping in operation machinery that is often old and well 
past its prime but there is no evidence that small units have developed their own 
technologies* nor significantly adapted existing machinery. Interaction has not set 
in train a process of continuous technological innovation, but rather seems to 
encourage relatively simple design alterations on a fairly wide scale. That such 
redesigns may be important to the survival of small units, although this is not 
supported by the available survey data. Table 9.16 refers to the relationship 
between design change and change in the size of the workforce for the sub-sample 
of 70 non-machining units. It shows that two thirds of the units which have 
engaged in some form of redesigning have also increased the size of their 
workforces, while only a third of those which have not altered their designs have 
taken on more labour. However, the table also shows that among firms that had 
shed labour, the same proportion had introduced design changes, while half of
TABLE 9.16
Change in design and change in workforce
Changes in designs:
Changes in workforce: Yes No N
Increase 
Decrease 
No change
Total
30 (68.2) 
4 (66.7) 
11 (55.0) 
45 25
14 (31.8) 44
2 (33.3) 6
9 (45.0) 20
70
( Figures in brackets are percentages of row totals)
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those those showing no change in employment levels had introduced design 
changes, the remainder having not done so. The data do not bear out a 
relationship between design change and change in the labour force. We might 
nevertheless be justified in maintaining that design changes increase the likelihood 
of survival, even while they are insufficient as the basis for growth and 
accumulation.
To summarise, there is evidence of change among the sample units. Rather more 
than half have expanded their workforce, but only a third reveal any sign of 
accumulation in the form of additions to their stock of machinery. Two thirds of 
units have changed the designs used for making components and finished goods, 
and a third of the units have changed their line of business since the time when 
they were first established. These various changes need to be seen in the context 
of the fierce competition that exists within a relatively large agglomeration of 
small, medium as well as large units. There is no hard information about the 
number of small units that have succumbed to competition, but among this sample 
of 'survivors', there is evidence of adaptability and flexibility. Widespread 
redesigning of products, shifting from less to more profitable activities as the 
opportunity arises are both forms of response to competitive pressures. Such 
forms of adaptation may help individual units to survive, but they do not 
necessarily lead to growth. Among the units that have grown in terms of the 
number of workers employed, two factors appear significant. One is the owner's 
educational level, and the second is market linkage. While the relationship 
between educational level, main customer and workforce change is weak 
statistically, it seems plausible to suggest that a process of market selection by 
educational background does occur. Large units may place greater faith in the 
abilities and competence of technocrats' to act as suppliers, benefiting them 
through regular orders; the least well qualified proprietors tend to be more 
dependent on supplying other small units, where low volume and irregular demand
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are less conducive to expansion. A third of the units, irrespective of age, have 
increased their stock of machinery, and there are no obvious statistically 
significant relationships with other features of the sample. Providing an 
explanation of why some units have been able to increase their level of investment 
in machinery and others have not proves much more difficult. While we should 
avoid assuming that accumulation and growth are the prime objectives of all 
proprietors of small scale industries, there is a striking contrast between the 
relatively small proportion of units which have increased their stock of machinery 
compared with the proportion of units increasing the size of their labour force. A 
plausible explanation for this is that hiring more labour is a cheaper option than 
investing in fixed assets. Before jumping to such a conclusion, we ought to 
consider the range of problems that confront small enterprises. It is to these 
problems, and efforts to overcome them that we now turn.
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Chapter  10 The  suppo r t  sy st e m  f o r  sm a ll  m a n u f a c t u r in g
Explanations of why some small units grow while others fail or stagnate can look 
either to the characteristics and motivations of individual entrepreneurs, or to the 
external environment in which firms operate. These are not mutually exclusive 
frameworks, and in this chapter we concentrate on the extent to which small firms 
are able to take advantage of external support and assistance. Such support 
systems may be vital for small firms, which as pointed out in chapter 2, lack the 
resources, expertise and time to search out technical, and market information, and 
whose needs for capital can be neglected by the financial institutions. In India 
both the Central and State governments have developed an elaborate system of 
assistance to address these perceived disadvantages of the small manufacturing 
sector. The issue raised here is whether state support does meet the needs of 
small manufacturers, and their perception and evaluation of such assistance. Here 
it needs to be borne in mind that state assistance should not be considered as an 
aim in itself; there is the risk that in limiting the aim of policy to providing support 
for small firms, the state simply creates a sector of dependent units. The discussion 
in Chapter Two stressed that public policy can contribute to the development of a 
dynamic small scale sector where, through its activities, it is able to contribute to 
the development of greater collaboration and cooperation among small firms by 
acting as a social catalyst. In this respect, we also need to consider the extent to 
which small manufacturers have developed their own forms of self-help through 
the development of credit unions, joint marketing arrangements and trade and 
industry associations. Small industry associations do exist in India, and especially 
in urban areas, where there are concentrations of small industries; indeed 
clustering may be seen as the essential pre-requisite for their development. Their 
existence raises the question of whether they supplement, or compliment state 
assistance; or whether they are they a substitute for it? Are they simply political
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pressure groups, or are they evidence of the ability of small manufacturers to 
operate in a collective manner?
The problems of small engineering units
Some idea of the problems confronting small engineering units can be gleaned
from Table 10.1, which shows responses to an open question about "the main
problem confronting your unit". These responses are disaggregated by size of
unit. TABLE 10.1
Main problem by size of unit
Units with fixed investment of:
Main Problem:
< 200,000 Rs 200 - 500,000 Rs V o o © 0 1 N
Capital 19(35.8) 4 (16.7) 2 (14.3) 25
Power 14 (26.4) 6 (25.0) 4 (28.6) 24
Skilled labour 10(18.9) 6 (25.0) 4 (28.6) 20
Marketing 9 (17.0) 5 (20.8) 1 (7.1) 15
Late payment 1 (1.9) 1 (4.2) 2 (14.3) 4
Raw materials 0 2 (8.3) 1 (7.1) 3
Total 53 24 14 91
Twenty five units (27.5 %) identified their main problem as inadequate access to 
capital. The second most widely reported problem is that of power - the 
complaints referring to occasional blackouts, frequent voltage reductions, and 
high and rising tariffs for electricity, all of which are seen as disrupting production, 
and in the case of tariffs jeopardising the ability of small units to export to 
neighbouring states. The third most widely perceived problem is the supply of 
skilled labour. Many small units reported a shortage of skilled workers, and 
consequently the high cost of employing them. Marketing was the main problem 
for a further group of units. Irregular demand, too much competition, the 
difficulty of finding new customers were all aspects of the marketing problem.
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Two further problems mentioned by a minority of units concerned raw materials, 
and delayed payment by customers creating cash flow difficulties1.
The problems identified here can be compared with those identified by the 
NCAER study of small units. The latter used a structured question, rather than an 
open one, asking proprietors whether a particular issue was a problem or not. The 
results showed that access to capital ranked first, followed by infrastructural 
problems, raw material supply ranked third, with marketing and labour supply 
ranking fourth and fifth (NCAER/FNS, 1993: Chapter IV). While there is some 
overlap in the types of problems identified, there are important differences, notably 
that the kind of infrastructural problems mentioned in the NCAER concerned 
shortage of space, water supply and waste disposal, probably reflecting their 
inclusion of the paint and varnish, and detergent industries. Among the 
Coimbatore sample, while workshops are often cramped, the main infrastructural 
problem is that of power, barely mentioned in the NCAER study. It seems that 
power is a more pressing local issue within Tamil Nadu, as mentioned earlier. We 
shall briefly and selectively review some of these difficulties, as a prelude to 
considering the institutional support available to small manufacturers in 
Coimbatore.
Finance
A shortage of finance is a major problem for small units. This was the most 
widely mentioned "main problem" among the sample units. When asked about 
'other problems' a further 43% of units mentioned finance. The problem is one of 
inadequate working capital with which to purchase raw materials, pay wages and 
other overheads; and the difficulty of securing capital for expansion. While 
affecting most units, finance seems to be a particularly severe problem among tiny
1 Legislation introduced in April 1993 sought to overcome this problem by making buyers liable to
pay interest on late payment for deliveries.
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units. As Table 10.2 above shows, twice as many small units refer to it as their 
main problem compared with the two larger size categories. Intense competition 
means that tiny and small units are unable to generate surpluses to cushion them 
against irregular demand, and to finance growth. External sources of financial 
assistance seem inadequate to help overcome these difficulties. In the sample as a 
whole, 56 units had succeeded in borrowing money from one source or another. 
The most widely used source of external funds are the commercial banks, followed 
by informal lending from friends and relatives. State financial institutions, which
TABLE 10.2 
Sources of external financing
Units borrowing from:
Number %
Commercial bank 36 39.6
Friends and relatives 25 27.5
Moneylender 6 6.6
State government 2 2.2
are supposed to be a major source of capital for expansion, do not appear to make 
much contribution on the evidence of this sample (Table 10.2). Analysis of 
borrowers suggests that tiny units are at a considerable disadvantage. It is the 
larger units that make most use of banks, and they also make most use of the 
informal method of borrowing from friends and relatives. By comparison, only a 
quarter of tiny units have succeeded in securing a bank loan, and less than a fifth 
have been able to tap the resources of friends and relatives (Table 10.3). 
Statistically, the relationship between size of unit, and borrowing from a bank, and 
from friends and relatives is statistically highly significant. For bank borrowing, 
the chi-squared value is 13.0967, with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant 
at 0.005; for borrowing from friends and relatives the chi-squared value is 9.5269, 
and with two degrees of freedom, this is significant at 0.01.
248
TABLE 10.3 
Sources of borrowing by size of unit
Number of units by level of investment:
<200,000 Rs 200-500,000 >500,001
Borrowing from a bank
Yes 13 (24.5) 13(54.2) 10(71.4)
No 40(75.5) 11 (45.8) 4(28.6)
Borrowing from friends/relatives
Yes 9 (17.0) 8(33.3) 8(57.1)
No 44(83.0) 16(66.7) 6(42.9)
Borrowing from a moneylender
Yes 2(3.8) 2(8.3) 2(14.3)
No 51 (96.2) 22(91.7) 12(85.7)
That tiny units have greater difficulty in securing bank loans is not surprising, and 
arises for two reasons. First, under the Priority Lending Scheme, the banks are 
required to reserve a proportion of their lending to certain categories of borrowers 
including small scale industry. The easiest and perhaps the least risky way of 
meeting that (generally unwanted) social obligation is to lend relatively large sums 
to relatively few larger units. In doing so, the banks reduce the risks of default 
and minimise the administrative costs of lending relatively small amounts to large 
numbers of borrowers. Secondly, tiny units also fare badly because of the 
bureaucratic obstacles to applying for a bank loan. The application form currently 
being used in Coimbatore comprises twenty pages of detailed questions on past 
performance, and future prospects. Few owners of tiny units maintain any kind of 
written records, and fewer still have much experience of producing a business 
plan. The whole system of bank lending is discriminatory, and that discrimination 
works to the disadvantage of tiny units.
249
A further important factor which appears to have some influence over external 
funding is caste. Table 10.4 shows the relationship between borrowing and caste 
of owner, for a subsample of 70 units. The data suggest that the two economically 
dominant castes, the Naidu and Gounders, find it easier, presumably because of 
better family and community connections, to negotiate bank loans than the castes 
in the 'other* category. Surprisingly, on the other hand, the Naidu make much less 
of family borrowing than the Gounder, or indeed the 'other1 category. Statistically, 
the relationships in Table 10.4 are not strong - for bank borrowing, the chi- 
squared value is 2.4257 with two degrees of freedom, while for family borrowing 
the chi-squared is 3.0267, neither of which is significant. Nevertheless, the data in
TABLE 10.4 
Sources of external finance and caste background
Caste:
Naidu Gounder Other
Borrowing from bank
Yes 9 (40.9) 11 (45.8) 6(25.0)
No 13(59.1) 13 (54.2) 18 (75.0)
Borrowing from friends/relatives
Yes 4(18.2) 10(41.7) 7 (29.2)
No 18(81.8) 14 (58.3) 17 (70.8)
Table 10.4 are suggestive of the role of caste and family connection in influencing 
access to finance, and hence a unit's ability both to survive and to grow.
Marketing
Fifteen units reported that marketing was their main problem, but as with finance, 
when asked about 'other problems', a sizeable number of units indicate difficulty in 
securing regularity of sales. "Irregular demand", "too much competition", "getting 
regular sales" are among the kind of comments made by many of the tiny and
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small units. Large units on the other hand are less likely to mention such 
problems. Large units seems to have more stable marketing linkages, but this 
does expose them to another problem, that of delays in payment for goods 
supplied. That marketing is a major problem among small firms is borne out by a 
number of studies. The Second All India Census of Small Scale Industrial Units 
contains an analysis of the reasons for the closure of small industries, showing that 
the principal reason for failure is "financial problems", followed secondly by 
"marketing problems" (GOI, Report on the Second Census of Small Scale 
Industrial Units, 1992: Table 16.2). In reality, it is of course difficult to 
disentangle 'financial* and 'marketing' problems; a unit that is faced with declining 
or erratic sales is also likely to have serious cash flow problems.
Raw materials
Past surveys of small industry have tended to identify the shortage of basic raw 
materials as the major problem facing small manufacturers in India. That position 
has eased considerably with the general improvement in industrial output over the 
last decade or so, and that improvement is reflected in the present survey where 
only three out of ninety one units mentioned 'raw materials' as their major 
problem. Moreover, it was not a shortage so much as the poor quality of raw 
materials that was cause for concern. All three units complained of high prices 
being charged by local traders for low quality inputs. Among some of the large 
factory managers in Coimbatore, there is a view that the use of inferior raw 
materials is widespread among small industries, and because of that, and the lack 
of proper quality control there is some reluctance to make use of small units as 
subcontractors. Rejection rates of components bought in from small units can be 
as high as 30%, hence their caution. Poor quality among producers of components 
and of finished goods also seems to contribute to the sector's marketing problems. 
Those small units producing reserved items are free from competition with large 
producers and can, as it were, get away with poor quality production. But as we
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have seen, most small units, including those in this sample, do not produce 
reserved items and in the absence of protection, they face stiff competition in the 
production of components as well as finished goods such as pumps. While the 
quality of production among large scale factories may not be particularly high by 
world standards, because of better quality control, higher quality raw materials 
and more modem equipment, they do have some advantage over small units where 
testing of materials, inspection of output, adherence to relevant industrial 
standards, are far from the norm. Such 'sub-quality manufacturing’, to use 
Nanjundan's phrase makes it difficult for small units to maintain let alone improve 
sales (Nanjundan 1994: M62).
In summary, there are a number of major difficulties confronting small 
manufacturers. The problems of identifying market opportunities; of developing, 
maintaining and extending sales; inadequate access to finance; the difficulty of 
recruiting and holding on to skilled manual workers, which was referred to earlier, 
are common among small manufacturers not just in India but in many other parts 
of the world too. On top of these obstacles, small units in Coimbatore face the 
added vicissitudes of an uncertain and relatively expensive supply of power.
The question that arises from this brief review is - what, if anything, is being done 
to overcome these difficulties? What support systems are available to small units, 
and how effective are they in addressing these problems? What, if anything, are 
small units doing collectively to resolve their common difficulties?
The State Support System for Small Scale Industry.
The Indian government provides an impressive array of services for small industry, 
as we saw in an earlier chapter. Both the Centre and the state governments have 
pursued an active role in protecting and promoting the growth of small industries. 
The chief protective mechanism is the system of product reservations, under which
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the Centre designates items which are reserved exclusively for production by small 
industry. The promotional measures have grown over the years, and now include 
both long and short term financial assistance, raw material procurement, testing of 
materials and products, government purchasing schemes, entrepreneurial 
development schemes, marketing and technical intelligence, and industrial estates. 
The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation describes India as 
having "one of the most comprehensive programmes of SSI support in the world" 
(UNIDO 1990:120). As the UNIDO report goes on to acknowledge implicitly, 
there are real questions about whether this support system does address itself to 
the problems and concerns of small industry, and whether the delivery of services 
is effective. The same questions arise in relation to non-governmental support 
systems. Educational and research institutions, Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, and 'self help' organisations of small industries are all, at least potentially, 
able to play a role in the growth and development of small industry by providing 
technical support, marketing intelligence, general management know-how and a 
supply of appropriately trained labour.
In this section, we examine some of the more important providers of services for 
small engineering units in Coimbatore, attempting to assess their role and their 
significance for the development of the sector as a whole. Particular attention 
will be paid to the government-sponsored District Industries Centre; the 
Coimbatore and District Small Scale Industries Association; and local educational 
and research institutions, using data collected in the course of interviews with 
representatives of these organisations in Coimbatore.
The Government Support System for Small Industiy
The District Industries Centres were established in India from 1978 onwards, as 
the local focal point for the delivery of government support services for non- 
factory industry. The organisation and functions of the DICs are laid down
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centrally, and there is little scope for local variations. Each DIC comprises a 
General Manager assisted by seven deputies, each of whom has specific functional 
responsibilities. The functions of the DIC are wide ranging and include:
i. the production of economic intelligence reports, which assess existing 
industries in the District, and attempt to identify potential new areas for 
development
ii. appraising and advising on proposals for specific industrial projects
iii providing advice on the availability and sources of supply of plant and 
machinery
iv monitoring the supply of important local raw materials, and arranging for 
the purchase and distribution of materials in short supply to local industries
v. advising on and sanctioning applications to both commercial banks and 
State Financial Corporations for loans
vi providing market information to small units, and liaising with government 
procurement agencies for the marketing of products
vii arranging training programmes for intending and existing entrepreneurs
viii the registration of new units
The scale of the task confronting DICs is quite formidable. The Coimbatore DIC 
is expected to provide advice and assistance to all registered small industries 
across the entire District, as well as to khadi and village industries. In practice, 
with a staff of eight principals, and a limited amount of administrative back-up, the 
DIC has been set an impossible task, as the Deputy Director, Mr Sivaraman, 
acknowledged. In common with DICs elsewhere, the two main priorities lie in the 
registration of new units, and the organisation of Entrepreneurial Development 
Programmes.
Registration is an important, time consuming and bureaucratic activity, from the 
point of view both of the DIC and that of small manufacturers. Non-registered
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units are not eligible to make use of the services provided by the DIC. In 
particular, it is virtually impossible to secure loans from banks or from government 
without the DICs sanction, so that there is a strong incentive for units to register, 
but registration is a lengthy and complex process. Depending on the type of 
industry, it can involve securing clearance from as many as 24 different 
government departments, including the Municipality, the Town Planning 
Department, the Pollution Control Board, local Sales Tax Officer, the 
Superintendent of Central Excise, the Income Tax Officer, the Municipal Fire 
Officer, the State Electricity Board, the Registrar of Companies etc. etc. One of 
the aims in setting up DICs was to establish a central single window where all of 
these formalities could be completed on the spot, with the DIC acting on behalf of 
other government departments. In practice, this has failed. The DIC vets 
proposals for setting up new units and provides all the necessary documentation 
for the clearances that are required for registration, but the unwillingness of other 
departments to delegate authority to the DICs means that the individual 
entrepreneur, having received preliminary clearance from the DIC, then has to visit 
the appropriate offices of the various branches of government involved. 
Lakhanpal's study of registration in Himachal Pradesh revealed that this whole 
process took, on average, 167 days (Lakhanpal 1990). From the perspective of 
the Coimbatore DIC, the system of registration, involving the initial vetting of all 
proposals, and the provision of guidance as to the necessary clearances required, 
takes up a large share of the Centre's available resources. Each year, it deals with 
between 1000 and 1500 applications for registration.
The second priority for the Coimbatore DIC is implementing Entrepreneurial 
Development Programmes. Introduced in 1990, these programmes form part of a 
national scheme to encourage 'self-employment' among specific target groups, 
namely women, scheduled castes and tribes, and the educated unemployed. The 
Centre runs three courses per year for women, one for SC/ST, and two for
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"technocrats" (unemployed graduates and ITI certificate holders). Demand for 
these courses is high. During 1993, the average number of applicants for each of 
the technocrat course was 144, and for women's courses it was 178. Each 
applicant is required to submit a project proposal which is assessed by the Deputy 
Director for Economic Intelligence, who selects a maximum of 40 candidates per 
course. Initially, the courses were of two weeks duration, designed to make the 
candidates aware of the procedures, and the benefits, of setting up a small unit. 
The success rate was not encouraging, with fewer than 1 in 5 participants entering 
self-employment. An innovation has been to extend the length of the course to 
include a six to eight week placement, arranged with the local small industry 
association, and this, according to the Deputy Director, has pushed the success 
rate up towards 50%.
Training schemes for prospective entrants, and the registration of new small units 
are the principal activities undertaken by the staff of the DIC in Coimbatore, 
taking up a disproportionate amount of the limited time and resources available. 
The corollary is that relatively little time or resources are available to provide 
support to existing small units. Extension visits to units in the field seem to have 
been abandoned. During several hours of interviews with staff at the DIC, no 
information was volunteered about field visits, yet as an extension service, it is 
expected that a regular programme of visits will be maintained. The Coimbatore 
DIC is not unusual in apparently carrying out very little extension work. The 
NCAER study revealed that less than a fifth of its sample units had received a field 
visit from any government organisation in the preceding three years; and of those 
visited only a quarter reported the visit as being useful (NCAER 1993 : 219). 
Among the light engineering units sampled in Coimbatore, only two out of 91 
proprietors was able to recall ever having been visited by a representative of the 
DIC or other government body concerned with small industry.
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There seem to be two basic problems which seriously compromise the 
effectiveness of the DIC. One problem lies in the way that a small number of 
activities have come to dominate the work agenda. It needs to be emphasised that 
the Centre's priorities are not locally determined. DICs are part of a national 
bureaucratic system which seems to have a preoccupation with increasing the 
number of start-ups, at the expense of providing the types of positive support 
needed by established units. Related to this is the second difficulty, that of under- 
resourcing. With limited staffing and a tightly controlled budget, the resource base 
for the DIC is slender. It is quite inconceivable that a single individual can be 
expected to possess anything like a comprehensive knowledge and understanding 
of the technical requirements of every industry in a District, from agricultural 
processing to wire drawing,. Yet this is what is expected of the Deputy Director 
(Machinery and Equipment). The Coimbatore DIC maintains a library which 
contains a number of technical journals, together with a small number of textbooks 
of varied vintages. Beyond that, the Deputy Director has few resources to acquire 
up-to-date technical information or to keep abreast of technological development 
through training courses. Likewise, there is no data base of marketing information 
that can be plugged into, nor any independent capacity for searching out 
marketing intelligence. What marketing information is available is limited to 
government procurement schemes.
The experience and comments of the proprietors of our sample of light 
engineering units shed some light on the perceived effectiveness of the DIC. 
Without exception, all the proprietors were aware of its existence. It occupies a 
prominent position in the centre of the city, and is highly accessible. Of the 91 
units in the sample, only 19 (21%) had had any contact with the DIC other than 
for the purposes of registration; excluding the 25 non-registered units whose 
status bars them from taking advantage of government support, 19 out of 66, or 
28.8% had either used, or attempted to use, the services provided by the DIC. Of
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those 19 units, eight had sought assistance with securing loans, seven had sought 
technical advice while the remaining four wanted help with new marketing 
contacts. Tiny units were no more and no less likely to use the DIC than larger 
units. In fact the proportion of units of units using the DIC was relatively constant 
across size groups. Educational level of owner does seem to have some bearing 
on use of the DIC; 43% of owners with a Secondary school leaving certificate or 
m  certificate had been in contact with the DIC, compared with 29% of degree 
holders, but only 9% of those without educational qualifications. Limited usage 
among the less well educated might reflect apprehension at tangling with the 
bureaucracy, while limited use by graduates may be a comment on the quality of 
the service offered.
The perceived value of the DIC in providing support to small industry was not 
particularly high. Three units deemed contact with the DIC to have been Very 
important' for their business; interestingly these were all units which succeeded in 
securing bank loans. Eight units considered the DIC had been 'important', and a 
further eight considered it of 'no importance at all'. Included in this last group 
were all four of the units which had sought help with marketing, and four which 
had sought technical advice. None of these eight had much to say that was 
complimentary about the services provided by the DIC. Among 66 units, 
therefore, only 14 or a fifth of registered units, perceived the DIC to be 'important' 
or 'very important'.
Much the same picture emerges in relation to other government support agencies. 
Like the DIC, these other agencies suffer the same shortage of staff and resources. 
Coimbatore has a small local branch office of the Small Industries Service 
Institute. Its advisory, counselling and training services for small units duplicate 
those provided by the DIC, and seem no better in quality. Its most widely used 
service in Coimbatore is the Regional Testing Laboratory. This facility is available
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to all industrial units, regardless of size, to investigate the physical and chemical 
properties of raw materials, and also to test motors. In practice, large companies 
in Coimbatore tend to have their own testing facilities but the high cost of 
acquiring such equipment puts it beyond the reach of small and medium size units. 
Potentially the Regional Testing Laboratory is an important facility for small units, 
but relatively few seem to take advantage of it. Only ten units in our sample had 
ever used any of the services provided by SISI; of those, nine had made use of the 
testing facilities, and one had sought marketing guidance. Interestingly, it tends to 
be the larger units in the sample who use SISI facilities. 29% of the units with 
more than Rs 500,000 invested in machinery had had contacts with SISI, 
compared with only 7% of tiny units with investment of less than Rs 200,000. 
This may reflect different perceptions of the need for testing and quality control. 
Of the 10 units with experience of its facilities, five ranked SISI as providing 'a 
very important1 service and five ranked it as 'important’.
The third important source of government assistance for manufacturers in 
Coimbatore is the State Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO). In 
addition to providing marketing assistance, SIDCO's main roles are to act on 
behalf of the State Financial Corporation in providing loans to small units, and to 
operate a depot in the city through which a variety of raw materials is distributed. 
In the past when raw material shortages were more acute, this facility was very 
important. It continues to attract support if only because the quality of supplies 
tends to be higher and more reliable than is available from private traders. 
Seventeen units in the sample had dealt with SIDCO, 8 for the purposes of 
securing financial assistance, and 9 for raw materials. As in the case of SISI, it 
tends to be the larger units which make greater use of SIDCO. 43% of large units 
(investment of more than Rs 500,000) had had contacts with SIDCO, compared 
with only 6% of tiny units with investment of less than Rs 200,000. The owners 
of five of these 17 units considered that SIDCO was 'very important' to their
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business, 11 considered it 'important', and one expressed the view that it was not 
at all important.
Overall, 21 out of 66 registered units (32%) had made use of the services of one 
or more of the three government agencies. Six units had made use of all three 
agencies. While utilisation rates are relatively low, the level of awareness of 
government services in Coimbatore is high, and reflects the easy diffusion of 
information between proprietors within an industrial agglomeration. While all the 
proprietors, including those of unregistered units, knew of the existence of the 
DIC, SISI and SIDCO, there was a general perception that anything to do with a 
government agency would inevitably involve filling out long and complex forms, 
with little prospect of any definite outcome. Of the units which have used the 
services of these agencies, the greatest satisfaction seems to be in the area of 
provision of raw materials, and of testing facilities. The area where government 
agencies seem to have the lowest credibility is the provision of technical and 
marketing assistance. As we saw earlier, marketing is a particular difficulty for a 
large number of the sample units, and the apparent inability of government 
agencies to address this problem does little to inspire confidence in them. We may 
note finally that there is no relationship between contact with government agencies 
and growth of individual units, Taking the sub-sample of registered units, there is 
no statistically significant relationship between either change in size of the 
workforce, or change in the level of investment, and the use of the services 
provided by the DIC, SISI or SIDCO.
From the evidence of this survey, it would be difficult to adjudge the government 
support system as entirely satisfactory. Only a third of units were found to have 
made use of public agencies but fewer seems to derive any tangible benefit. A 
large majority had made no use of the services on offer from any of these 
agencies. There does not appear to be any directly comparable data available from
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other surveys. The NCAER survey asked about specific services provided by 
government agencies, and found that relatively few of the 657 units had availed of 
them. Only 10% of units, for example had sought technical assistance, and 6% 
had sought economic intelligence (NCAER, 1993: Table 7.10). And of those 
units which had made use of government agencies, two-thirds rated them as 
unsatisfactory (NCAER 1993: 217). The NCAER came to the general conclusion 
that government institutional support for small industry has become "unwieldy, 
rigid and inflexible" (NCAER 1993: 250).
The bureaucratic nature of the government support system, together with chronic 
underfunding helps create a situation in which the technical and professional 
expertise of these agencies loses credibility. Moreover, the priorities of these 
agencies, and especially of DICs seems to lie in encouraging new start-ups, rather 
than addressing themselves to the needs of already established units. The upshot of 
this is that the agencies are not considered to be ’relevant' to the needs of the 
generality of small units.
Self Help and the small manufacturing sector
In India, a variety of non-governmental agencies now provides help of some kind 
to small manufacturing industry. In Coimbatore, there are several such 
organisations. Some represent specific industrial sectors, such as the South India 
Steel Furniture Manufacturers Association, the South India Engineering 
Manufacturers Association, and the Coimbatore Small Foundry Association. The 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry draws its membership predominantly from 
among large industrial units in the city, although smaller units are eligible for 
membership. Indeed, among our sample, 12 units, mostly the larger small units, 
had had contacts with the Chamber of Commerce. The most active and widely
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known organisation working with and for small engineering industry is the 
Coimbatore and District Small Scale Industries Association (CODISSIA).
CODISSIA was founded in 1969 by a small group of owners of light engineering 
units. Today, it has a paid-up membership of 3300 units, of whom 95% are 
located within the city itself. It operates on several different levels. In the first 
instance it acts as a pressure group, representing the views of its members to 
other, and especially to government bodies. CODISSIA has regular bi-monthly 
meetings with the General Manager of the DIC, and with the District Collector to 
review the progress of small industry, and to urge action in specific areas. A 
current major issue is electricity supply. Through the District Collector, the local 
representative of the state government, CODISSIA had been pressing for an 
improvement in supply. During fieldwork in late 1993, CODISSIA and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry had arranged a joint meeting for their 
members with the Chairman of the State Electricity Board. It proved an 
uncomfortable encounter for the Chairman.
A second important function undertaken by CODISSIA is to organise the kind of 
support services which other organisations are unable or unwilling to provide. A 
regular programme Of courses is provided on a variety of managerial and technical 
topics, including basic accounting and bookkeeping, computing, and management 
skills. A more specialised service has been set up under which members of the 
Association with experience of exporting provide practical help and 
encouragement to others. A further significant development, proposed and 
sponsored by CODISSIA in association with the Southern Region of the 
Engineering Manufacturers' Association, has been the establishment in 1988 of the 
Small Industries Testing and Research Centre (SITARC), discussed further below.
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An equally practical service has been the establishment of a triennial trade fair. 
The major industrial trade fairs in India are held in Bombay and Delhi, to the 
disadvantage of Coimbatore's industrialists. Small manufacturers find it both 
costly as well as inconvenient to absent themselves for several days visiting such 
gatherings, so the idea of holding a trade fair in Coimbatore itself was well 
supported. Beginning in 1988, it is now a matter of considerable pride to the 
Association that it has developed into a major event in South India. It provides an 
opportunity for Coimbatore manufacturers to exhibit their wares, while at the 
same time, companies from elsewhere in India can show off their latest machinery 
and equipment. It functions as both an opportunity to develop market contacts, 
and a forum for the difliision of technological information. The 1991 trade fair 
involved a total of some 300 exhibitors, of which 86 were local. The big names of 
Indian engineering were represented, as well as two firms from Japan and a 
German manufacturer. With liberalisation, CODISSIA hopes that in future years, 
there will be more foreign exhibitors, leading on to growing collaboration between 
local and foreign investors. Over a nine day period, the 1991 fair attracted some 
75,000 visitors from all over Southern India, helping to promote CODISSIA's 
name, and also providing the organisation with the funds to acquire land and set 
up a permanent exhibition site with space for 500 exhibitors to be used for the 
1994 Industrial Trade Fair.
A third area in which CODISSIA is active is in its programme of liaison with 
other local institutions. It is through the offices of CODISSIA that the DIC 
arranges placements for its Entrepreneurship Development Programme. There are 
strong links with some local educational institutions, as part of which CODISSIA 
members are encouraged to propose specific technical problems as the basis for 
student projects.
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In sum, CODISSIA is an active organisation on a number of fronts. Among the 
sample of light engineering units in Ganapathi, thirty five (38.5%) were members 
of the organisation attracted by its high profile in the city, and the range of real 
services provided. Twenty of the thirty five ranked CODISSIA as "very 
important" and fifteen ranked it as "important" to their business. This level of 
support suggests that CODISSIA has more credibility and is regarded as more 
effective than the government-run agencies. Some evidence for this can be drawn 
from our sample; 13 units had made use of the services of both CODISSIA and 
the DIC. Among this subsample, 7 described CODISSIA as 'very important' and 6 
as 'important'. Only three considered the DIC "very useful", five considered it 
"useful" and five believed it was "not at all useful". The more favourable 
evaluation of CODISSIA presumably reflects the differences in the organisation of 
government and self-help agencies. As a grassroots organisation CODISSIA's 
activities reflect the needs and interests of its members. It is likely therefore to be 
more responsive to local small industries than bureaucratically organised 'top- 
down' government agencies. That local government agencies are part of a 
national bureaucratic structure perhaps goes some way to explaining why 
CODISSIA's campaigning and lobbying activities have stopped short of 
campaigning for an improvement in the delivery of government services. The kind 
and quality of state support available locally is a matter for national, rather than 
local determination, and in the absence of an effective national campaigning body, 
local small industry associations have little alternative but to develop as alternative 
local sources of assistance.
One question that arises from this description of CODISSIA's activities is how 
representative is it of small industry in general? The President of CODISSIA, Mr 
Sundaram, acknowledged that the membership of the Association was drawn from 
among the larger small units. His own unit is registered both as a small scale 
industry, and under the Factory Act, and he suggested this was typical of the
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membership generally. That view is supported by the data collected from small 
units in Ganapathi (Table 10.5). Just under a quarter of tiny units were members,
TABLE 10.5 
Membership of CODISSIA by size of unit
Investment in plant and machinery (Rs):
< 200,000 200 - 500,000 > 500,001
Member of
CODISSIA: 12 (22.6) 13 (54.2) 10(71.4)
Non-member: 4 1 (11 A) 11(45.8) 4 (28.6)
rising to over half among small units and three quarters of large units. 
Statistically, the relationship between size of unit and membership of CODISSIA 
is highly significant; the chi-squared value for the data in Table 10.5 is 14.53386, 
with two degrees of freedom. Caste does not seem to be an important 
consideration in membership of CODISSIA, but owner's education does. Almost 
half of those owners in the sample with a degree/diploma claimed membership, 
compared with a third of those with SSLC/ITI certificate, and only a fifth of those 
without formal educational qualifications.
The profile that emerges of CODISSIA members is that they tend to be better 
educated 'technocrats', representing the larger end of the spectrum of small 
manufacturers. Tiny units are by no means discriminated against but there seems 
to be a process of self-selection in which CODISSIA attracts the more successful 
and the more ambitious small manufacturers, who recognise its potential utility in 
furthering their ambitions. While the membership is skewed in favour of the 
larger more successful enterprises, it can be argued that there is some degree of 
commonality in the problems facing small industries regardless of size, and to that 
extent CODISSIA represents not merely the self-interest of an already successful
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minority, but does address itself to the problems of small units generally. Thus in 
campaigning for improvements to the supply of power, CODISSIA is acting on 
behalf of small industry in general. On the other hand, it is also the case that 
certain activities are vehicles for the interests of larger units, and this is certainly 
true of the Industrial Fair. Only the larger and more successful small units are in a 
position to afford the stall rentals which range from Rs 10,000 up to Rs 37,500. 
The same comments apply to CODISSIA's encouragement of export activity. 
There is no inevitable connection between size of unit and exports, but in practice 
most tiny units are more preoccupied with survival in the domestic market than 
seeking the key to export success.
In their report on small manufacturing enterprises, the NCAER also considered 
the role of small scale industry associations. On the basis of data relating to 41 
trade and district associations, the NCAER came to the general view that
"The development work done by them in terms of providing support 
services seems to be quite limited in spite of their making big claims 
about it. Most associations may be involved in a large array of services 
offered, but the services offered in terms of quantity and quality are not 
adequate" (NCAER 1993: 252).
The report goes on to acknowledge that 'a few industry associations are doing 
very good work1 (NCAER 1993:255). Whether CODISSIA belongs to this 
category is an unanswerable question in the absence of a more comprehensive and 
comparative study. Certainly it is an energetic organisation, whose credibility 
ranks high not least because of the innovatory initiatives it has launched. It 
remains however, something of an 'elite' rather than a mass organisation.
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Education and Training.
Recruiting and retaining experienced and skilled industrial workers is, as noted 
already, a major headache for many small units. The labour market is highly 
competitive, and dominated by large factoiy units. By paying better rates, they are 
in a position to cream off the better qualified. Small units have little choice but to 
recruit relatively well-educated personnel and provide on-the-job training, a task 
which they are neither keen nor particularly well-suited to undertake. At root, the 
problem lies in the deficiencies of the system of technical education in India.
The link between education and development was explicitly recognised in the 
Government of India’s Science Policy Resolution of 1958, which stated :
"The wealth and prosperity of a nation depend on the effective utilisation of its 
human and material resources through industrialisation. The use of human 
material for industrialisation demands its education in science and training in 
skills... India's enormous resources of manpower can only become an asset in 
the modem world when educated and trained” (GOI, Ministry of Education 
and Culture, quoted in Jha 1985).
While there has been considerable expansion of education at all levels, much 
remains to be done to achieve the aim of an educated and trained labour force. By 
1991, a third of all men, and almost two thirds of women were illiterate (GOI 
Census of India 1992: Statement 17), while at the other extreme, it is claimed that 
India has the third largest pool of scientifically trained personnel in the world 
(Mitra and Sanyal 1989: 2)2. These two facts are not unrelated. The enormous 
expansion of higher education has preempted a growing share of the educational 
budget at the expense of the aim of achieving universal basic mass literacy; at the 
same time, graduate unemployment is a growing and acknowledged problem, even 
while there is a shortage of trained personnel to meet the requirements of the
2 This achievement is perhaps less remarkable when seen in the context of the sheer magnitude of 
India's population.
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labour market (Balasubramanyam 1984: 29. Chitnis 1993: 404). We shall briefly 
explore some of these paradoxes in the context of Tamil Nadu, before looking 
more closely at labour supply in Coimbatore.
In Tamil Nadu, expenditure on primary education has dropped from 60% of the 
total educational budget in 1955/56 to less than 50% by the late nineteen-eighties, 
while the share of spending on collegiate education has more than doubled (MIDS 
1988: 271). Within higher education, it is in arts and commerce that the greatest 
expansion has taken place, while technical education has languished. By 1991/2 a 
quarter of a million students in Tamil Nadu were enrolled in arts and commerce 
compared with 42000 students in 1956. By comparison, public sector technical 
education at post-secondary level has expanded at a much slower rate. Enrolment 
in polytechnics has grown from 820 in 1956 to 58,427 in 1991, while in 
engineering colleges student numbers have grown from 500 in 1956 to 24,422. 
That the social return on investment in technical education is considerably greater 
than investment in arts and commerce is shown by data on graduate 
unemployment. In 1991, 382,000 of those on the job-seekers register were 
graduates; 43% of those had a qualification in arts or commerce compared with 
less than 5% of those qualified in engineering (Government of Tamil Nadu, 1992: 
Table 8.16). The apparent failure of higher education to adapt to the needs of the 
economy is due, according to Chitnis, to a combination of political and populist 
pressures to expand higher education on the one hand, and budgetary limitations 
on the other. The result is that
"Universities have been finding it difficult to accommodate the large flow of 
students that has been pouring in for admissions. Unable to provide them with 
education in fields like medicine, engineering and others immediately relevant 
to development, because education in these fields is expensive, they have, in 
desperation, made room for them in the traditional arts, commerce and science 
faculties" (Chitnis, 1993: 403).
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Other commentators see the bias against technical education as arising from "an 
elitist dislike of manual work" (MEDS 1988: 273), and aspirations to white collar 
employment (Adiseshiah, 1978:11). Whatever the reasons, it is not only in higher 
education that technical education has been accorded a relatively low priority. 
There has long been criticism of a similar failure at secondary level to ensure a 
correspondence between what the educational system provides and the 
opportunities for employment. In Tamil Nadu only a third of the population 
between the ages of 14 and 17 attends secondary school, and one of the reasons 
for this - but by no means the only reason - is because secondary education "is not 
perceived by young people or their parents to be relevant and useful" (MDDS 
1988: 273). Specifically the criticism is that secondary education offers 
insufficient opportunities for technical and vocational training, and achieves little 
in preparing young people for available work.
These criticisms of the shortcomings of the system prompted the Centre to 
introduce two new initiatives in the 1970s. The number of Industrial Training 
Institutes, which provide training in a variety of crafts and trades from plumbing 
and car maintenance to engineering, was greatly expanded after 1970. In Tamil 
Nadu, there were 10 such institutes in 1961; by 1973 there were 31 with an intake 
of 13000, and today there are 44 with 15000 students. Alongside this, efforts 
have been made to introduce 'vocationalisation' into general secondary education 
to make it more relevant to the wider world. Tamil Nadu has adopted this 
approach rather more readily than many other states, but the results are far from 
encouraging. Of the 5000 secondary schools in Tamil Nadu, less than a fifth have 
adopted Vocationalisation'; moreover, more than 50% of the students involved are 
pursuing courses in business and commerce, and less than 20% in engineering and 
technology, according to the Directorate of School Education.
269
These initiatives have failed to rectify the mismatch between education and 
employment, with the result that
even under severe conditions of unemployment, many vacancies notified by 
employers remain unfilled and are eventually cancelled due to the non­
availability of suitable candidates  Maximum skill shortages are noted in
the technical and professional occupations at the higher level and in the 
occupational category of craftsmen and production workers at the lower level” 
(Raza 1990 :135).
Generally technical education has been accorded a relatively low priority both in 
India and in Tamil Nadu3. Not only does the formal education system have a poor 
record of producing sufficient numbers of technically qualified personnel and 
especially of trained manual workers, the qualitative deficiencies of the public 
education system have been widely remarked on. Virtually all spending in the 
public sector is earmarked for wages and salaries, leaving less than 10% for the 
purchase of necessary teaching materials and the replacement of obsolete 
equipment, contributing to what Balasubramanyam describes as the "lamentably 
poor quality of education" in the public sector (Balasubramanyam, 1984: 29). The 
deficiencies of the technical education system have received official 
acknowledgement. The Eighth Plan document promises a major thrust in
"strengthening of vocational education so as to relate it to the emerging needs 
in the urban and rural settings" ( GOI, Planning Commission, 1992: volume 2: 
285).
What the Plan does not spell out is how attention to local needs can be 
accommodated in the highly centralised and bureaucratic public education system. 
On a more positive note the Eighth Plan refers to the implementation of a 
Vocational Training Project, supported by the World Bank, for the modernisation 
and improvement of vocational training institutions, including the Industrial
3 It is an interesting comment that no data is available, either for Tamil Nadu or for India generally, 
on spending on technical education. Alone among Asian countries, the data supplied by the 
Government of India for the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook does not distinguish technical from 
higher education.
270
Training Institutes (GOI, Planning Commission 1992: volume 2 :154), a project 
originally proposed in the Seventh Plan, but postponed for lack of finance.
In Coimbatore, there is on paper at least, an impressive array of educational 
institutions which might be considered to be of relevance to the labour needs of 
the engineering industry. There are
7 Industrial Training Institutes
7 Polytechnics
2 Colleges of technology
3 Universities
Of the three universities - Bharatiyar, Avinashilingam and the Agricultural 
University - only the latter makes any provision for engineering through its 
Department of Agricultural Processing. The main local sources of trained 
technical personnel are the Industrial Training Institutes, the Polytechnics and the 
Colleges of Technology. The ITIs recruit young men (sic) of 15 plus, and provide 
them with a basic six months training course as fitters, welders, turners, sheet 
metal workers, alongside more traditional crafts such as watch and clock 
repairing. The polytechnics are the main source of students with a diploma in 
either electrical or mechanical engineering, while the Colleges of Technology 
produce graduate level engineering and technical personnel. In considering the 
supply of labour, it is useful to bear in mind the distinction between public and 
private provision. The State government is responsible for five of the ITIs, two 
polytechnics and one of the colleges of technology. The remaining institutions are 
’autonomous' - i.e. either entirely private, or grant aided by the government. In 
practice, most of the private institutions, especially the polytechnics, are small and 
specialise in 'glamorous' areas such as electronics and computer engineering. 
There is however one major 'autonomous' institution, the PSG Institute. This, 
together with the government-run establishments, dominates the supply of 
technical personnel in Coimbatore.
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The government-run institutions of education and training in Coimbatore suffer 
the same kinds of difficulties as public educational institutions elsewhere in India. 
Their major problem is that of lack of resources. The polytechnics, college of 
technology and the Industrial Training Institutes are burdened with obsolete 
equipment, which they are hard pressed simply to maintain. Limited budgets make 
the acquisition of teaching materials problematical; library facilities are poor, as is 
the opportunity for students to gain practical hands-on experience in the use of 
modem machinery. Limited resources are not the only problem. The curricula for 
state-run institutions are centrally administered and allow of little local flexibility. 
There is no incentive within such a bureaucratic system to respond to the specific 
needs of local industry. The government-run ITIs, for example, continue to enrol 
young men to learn watch and clock repairing irrespective of likely employment 
opportunities. There seems to be no liaison or consultation between the public 
education system and local firms. In spite of these defects, the majority of students 
with some engineering background have no difficulty in securing employment 
locally. Most of the students from the ITIs are taken on by local large textile 
and engineering companies as apprentices, who undergo a further two years 
training, during which they instructed in the use of machinery, and taught 
engineering drawing and mathematical calculation. Only at the end of a successful 
apprenticeship are they regarded as skilled workers. That firms regard this extra 
training as essential is itself a significant comment on the quality of formal public 
sector training.
The quality of education in the private, or autonomous, sector is very variable, but 
in Coimbatore, there is an example of high quality technical education. The PSG 
Charities Trust was established in 1926 after the death of P.S.Govindaswamy 
Naidu, founder of Coimbatore's pumpset industry. The foundry and factory he 
started were gifted to the Trust, and form the nucleus of the PSG Industrial 
Institute. The Institute was set up with two aims - first, to serve as an educational
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centre for the training of craftsmen, artisans, mechanics and engineers, and 
secondly, the Institute operates as a major industrial production centre, the profits 
from which are devoted to promoting education. Today, PSG Charities Trust, 
using the profits from the Institute's output of pumpsets and advanced machinery, 
and with grant aid from the State government, runs a large educational empire in 
Coimbatore. In addition to basic schools, and a Higher Secondary School, PSG 
encompasses a College of Arts and Science, an Institute of Medical Science, an 
Industrial Training Institute, a College of Performing Arts, a Polytechnic and a 
College of Technology. The College of Technology, with 2200 students at 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and the Polytechnic with 800 students, are 
larger than their state-run equivalents, but the overriding contrast is in terms of the 
range and quality of the facilities available to students in the PSG institutions, and 
the very different underlying ethos.
The laboratories and workshops available to students are well-equipped with up- 
to-date machinery, which is regularly modernised to ensure that students are 
familiar with the latest technological developments. In addition to CNC machine 
tools etc., there is also a specialised machining centre which combines facilities for 
the design, drafting and manufacture of prototypes and components. An advanced 
machine tools engineering facility was funded by the UN Development 
Programme, while a CAD/CAM Centre was set up in 1983 with support from the 
Ministry of Education.
Not only are the PSG Institutions considerably better endowed than their 
government counterparts, there is also a much greater emphasis on active 
involvement with local industry. All students in the ITI, the polytechnic and the 
college of technology spend a minimum of one session per week working their 
way through the various production and management departments of the PSG 
Institute, gaining first hand experience of a commercial industrial enterprise.
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Diploma and degree students all undertake a project in their final year and 
encouragement is given to projects which involve collaboration with local firms. 
To that end, there is regular contact with both the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and CODISSIA, whose members are encouraged to suggest suitable 
student projects. Beyond that, the facilities of the institutions are available in 
other ways to help and support local industry. The CAD/CAM centre for 
example, mounts short courses for people working in local industry as a means of 
promoting the wider use of modem engineering methods, while the Product 
Development Centre is active in helping local firms to redesign products and 
components. Such local involvement is noticeably absent in government-run 
establishments.
Both the public and the autonomous institutions are important training providers, 
but they are not exclusively geared to providing labour for local consumption. 
The polytechnics and colleges of technology recruit from the whole of Tamil Nadu 
and only a small proportion - an estimated 15 -20% - find work locally on 
graduation. In our sample of light engineering units, we found that 58 
owners/partners, almost half the total sample, had a degree or diploma, generally 
in engineering or science. Given that 73% of these were bom in Coimbatore, and 
a further 20% in the rest of the state, it seems a reasonable assumption that most 
would have received their education within Coimbatore itself. On this evidence, 
the colleges are an important source of local entrepreneurship.
The educational system seems to be much less successful in providing local 
industry with trained manual workers. Table 10.6 shows the educational 
background of those working in the sample units in Coimbatore. The Industrial
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TABLE 10.6 
Educational attainment of workers in sample units
Workers with: Number of workers % of total
Secondary School certificate 195 23.9
Industrial Training Institute cert. 122 14.9
Degree/diploma 42 5.1
None of the above 458 56.1
TOTAL 817 100
Training Institutes in Coimbatore appear to have a better record of supplying 
labour to small industry than is the case in India generally. The Second Census of 
Small Scale Manufacturing Industry revealed that only 1.1% of all workers 
possessed an ITI certificate, rising to 2.6% in the engineering sector, suggesting 
that the ITIs had not lived up to their aims of becoming a major source of trade 
and craft workers (GOI Second Census of Small Scale Industrial Units, 1993: 
Table T-53). The secondary schools are another important source of supply but 
with only just over a third of the relevant age group attending secondary school in 
1981, neither ITIs nor secondary schools are able to satisfy the demand for labour. 
Most small units prefer to recruit the better-educated in the belief that they are 
easier to train and quicker at picking up skills, but because of the general shortage 
of trained/well educated personnel, small units also have to recruit less well- 
educated workers. The lack of outside assistance - in the form of day release, for 
example - places a heavy burden of training on small firms with no guarantee that 
in a highly competitive labour market, such training as is provided will be 
rewarded. The prospect of poaching, and the lack of training expertise among 
small manufacturers are strong incentives to provide minimal on-the-job training.
We conclude from this consideration of the training system in Coimbatore, that 
much is being done, especially in the PSG Institute to supply technical personnel, 
but the emphasis is weighted towards producing technicians at the graduate and
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diploma level, A much lower priority seems to be accorded to producing the 
skilled manual/craft workers which the engineering industry, both large and small, 
requires. In this respect, Coimbatore is a mirror of the priorities of the formal 
education system in India generally.
Technology transfer, testing and product development
The small scale sector in India has a reputation for poor quality output and, 
among large firms, for chronic inability to meet quality control standards for 
components.4 The shortage of well-trained skilled workers, the reliance on 
obsolete equipment, the inability to afford testing equipment for raw materials or 
for products - all contribute to the low and variable quality of production among 
small units. In this section we will briefly look at the support available to small 
industry in the areas of technology transfer, product development, and quality 
control.
The earlier discussion of small industiy in Japan pointed to the way that small 
manufacturing in that country had benefited from the subcontracting system 
through the transfer of new technologies from large parent organisations. In 
India, there is little evidence of the operation of similar transactions. In the sample 
of Coimbatore units, only one out of a total of ten subcontractors to large factory 
units was able to report having received technical assistance. This particular unit 
supplied a large engineering firm with machined components, which were 
monitored for quality. It was the practice for the parent company's engineers to 
visit their suppliers periodically, especially if the reject rate rose, in which case 
they offered technical advice and support.
4 Large industrialists in Coimbatore report that reject rates of less than 5% are acceptable, but small 
units have difficulty in meeting that target. In some instances, reject rates of up to 30% have been 
recorded. Such units invariably find themselves looking for new customers.
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Further insight into the relationship between small and large firms is offered by 
Nadar’s study of engineering units in Coimbatore (Nadar, 1985). Using 
information supplied by seven of the large engineering companies, Nadar was able 
to collect data from a sample of small units actively involved in subcontracting. 
What Nadar's results showed was that technical co-operation was of a very limited 
and rudimentary nature. Large firms usually provided technical drawings and 
samples, but beyond that there was little positive help. Three out of 45 small units 
reported receiving some assistance in buying second-hand (and presumably 
therefore old) machinery at concessional rates; while eighteen had received a visit 
from a parent company engineer (Nadar 1985: 80/81). Asked about the quality 
of the technical assistance received, six reported receiving no assistance, a further 
thirty replied that they had been provided with some ’but not enough'; only 9 units 
reported receiving plenty of technical help (Nadar, 1985: 141). It would seem 
then, that while bemoaning poor quality and high reject rates, large firms are 
remarkably unwilling to adopt a proactive approach to helping small units 
overcome their deficiencies.
The provision of technical assistance is one of the functions of the District 
Industries Centre, and the state-run Small Industries Development Corporation. 
In practice, as noted already, their ability to discharge that responsibility 
effectively is limited by the shortage of staff, the lack of access to up-to-date 
technical intelligence, and the lack of opportunities for professional development. 
A basic problem is that the DIC and the SIDCO are expected to be able to provide 
often detailed technical advice and assistance to the whole range of industries. As 
the number and scope of small industries has expanded in recent decades, the 
range of technical expertise has also increased beyond the capabilities of a single 
Deputy Director. By contrast, as we saw earlier, Italian industrial districts have 
evolved a network of specialised centres, catering to the needs and requirements 
of the particular branches of industry in particular localities. Specialised clusters
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are matched by specialised advice centres, whereas in India, the DICs remain jacks 
of all trades.
The one technical service provided by government that seems to function 
adequately is the Regional Testing Laboratory. Run by the Small Industries 
Service Institute, this provides facilities to test the composition of raw materials, 
and of finished products and components. Relatively few units in Ganapathi used 
this facility (9 of 91), partly because the facility is inconveniently located on the 
southern edge of the metropolitan area on the SIDCO Industrial Estate. Typical 
of many government institutions, the Laboratory strives to provide a service to 
industry with obsolete equipment. It is rapidly being overshadowed by a new 
venture promoted by CODISSIA and the South India Engineering Manufacturers 
Association. The Small Industries Testing and Research Centre (SITARC) was 
set up in 1988 with financial support from the Industrial Development Bank of 
India as a non-profit making body. It provides modem testing facilities, but it has 
ambitions to go beyond that limited role and undertake product research and 
development as part of a strategy to raise quality of production in small industry. 
As noted earlier, relatively few small units pay much heed to formal quality 
standards even where they exist, preferring to use their own designs and set their 
own standards, which too often tend to be low. An estimated 75% of pumpsets 
manufactured in Coimbatore fail to meet the standards laid down by the Bureau of 
Indian Standards, having an efficiency of only about 55%. Moreover, the problems 
of servicing and repairing non-standard equipment militates against successful 
marketing of small firms’ products. SITARC’s role is to encourage wider 
adherence to agreed standards in the belief that with the trend towards 
liberalisation in the economy generally, small units cannot afford to remain 
complacent about quality. Research is under way into developing new fuel 
efficient designs for pumpsets and these are being distributed to manufacturers for 
a nominal fee. While it seems to be the larger small manufacturers who have
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shown greatest interest in this programme so far, as standards are raised through 
better designs there will be growing pressure on the smaller units to follow suit.
There are several other encouraging examples of product development work being 
undertaken in Coimbatore. The Product Development Centre within the PSG 
College of Technology works closely with local industry to develop appropriate 
machinery. Alongside projects concerned with hi-tech CNC machine tools and 
industrial robots, an important project has been the design and manufacture of a 
heavy duty lathe suitable for use by small firms. Now in commercial production, 
the fact remains that many small units are unable to afford the cost of new 
equipment, and continue to use obsolete and inefficient second-hand museum 
pieces. Postgraduate students in the Department of Agricultural Processing at the 
Agricultural University have also worked closely with fanners and with local small 
engineering units to develop a range of relatively simple agricultural aids for 
sorting, cleaning and grading agricultural produce, while a further collaborative 
project with local small industry concerns the application of alternative energy 
sources in agriculture. At the instigation of small manufacturers, research has 
been undertaken into the merits of alternative materials for the production of 
biogas holders.
A further institutional source of new product technology has been the South India 
Textile Research Association (SITRA). Financed partly by the Government of 
India, and by major textile producers in India, the Middle East and East Africa, 
this industry association provides training courses for managers and executives, 
offers general economic intelligence and advice, as well as more specialised 
advisory services in labour relations, financial management, and so on. 
Additionally, it conducts engineering and instrumentation research of relevance to 
the industry. Arising from this, SITRA has developed a range of specialised 
machines and quality control instruments. Of the eight major pieces of equipment
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developed at SITRA, seven are now in commercial production. A two-for-one 
doubling machine is now in large scale production under licence by Lakshmi 
Engineering in Coimbatore, while the remaining six machines, for which demand is 
more limited, are produced locally by small scale units under supervision by 
SITRA. The Deputy Director, Dr Kalyanaraman, emphasised that regular 
checking of production standards among small units was essential to protect 
SITRA's good name and the performance guarantee that it offers customers. 
Implicit in this is the familiar criticism that small manufacturers do not pay 
sufficient attention to quality standards.
This chapter has attempted to define the major problems facing small engineering 
units in present-day Coimbatore, and to assess the extent to which those problems 
are being addressed. Small units are confronted with the interconnected problems 
of low levels of technological development, limited supply of trained labour, poor 
quality, poor marketing networks and inadequate credit facilities. Government 
agencies have not been in a position to address these issues satisfactorily. The 
government's small industry policy has tended to emphasise financial concessions, 
notably excise duty exemption, as a principal means of encouraging a healthy and 
growing small scale sector. While such concessions may have had some impact on 
the overall growth in the number of small units, they ill serve the aim of 
encouraging dynamic and self-sustaining growth. The failure of state agencies to 
provide effective support to small industry has, but only to a limited extent, 
encouraged the growth of self help. While CODISSIA seems to be an energetic 
organisation which has pursued a number of important initiatives, its membership 
is limited to the more dynamic and already more successful firms. What is 
remarkable is that there is very little evidence of other forms of collective action 
by the generality of small enginering units. The kinds of reciprocal cooperation 
which are seen to be the hallmark of the industrial network, are absent. There is 
no evidence of the existence of credit unions, of joint marketing organisations, or
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of collective attempts to improve the supply of trained workers. In the next 
chapter, we shall attempt to explain the limited development of cooperation and 
collaboration.
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Chapter  11. Su m m a r y  a n d  Co n c l u sio n
The broad aim of this dissertation has been to examine the Government of India's 
policy for small scale industry, and in particular to evaluate the role of the policy 
in relation to the growth of the small scale sector, its geographical distribution and 
its viability. It was undertaken on the basis that these issues have not received the 
attention they deserve.
1. The growth of the small scale sector
A major aim behind the government's promotion of small manufacturing industry 
rested on the belief that small manufacturing is labour intensive, so its promotion 
would greatly aid the generation of much-needed employment and contribute to 
the absorption of labour. Analysis of available data on the small scale sector 
suggests that there has been substantial growth of employment (Chapter 4). Over 
the period 1961 to 1991, employment by small manufacturing enterprises with 10 
or fewer workers grew from 4.5  million to 13.5 million. Extending the definition 
of small to include enterprises with 4 9  or fewer workers suggests that total 
employment increased from 5 million in 1961 to 15 million in 1991. Successive 
governments claim this impressive achievement as a vindication of the policy, one 
of whose major aims was to promote the growth of the sector as a means of 
absorbing 'surplus' labour. However, this achievement needs to be seen in the 
context of the rapid growth of both the total and the working population. Over 
the same period, the total population doubled, and the number of men in the age 
group 15-59 increased by 65 million between 1961 and 1981. In that context, the 
increase of 10 million jobs in the small scale sector is a relatively modest 
achievement. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 6, there is some doubt about what 
contribution the government's policy has actually made to that achievement. The 
major elements of the policy were already well established by 1960, and 
subsequent changes were largely marginal. Against the background of a relatively
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stable policy framework, the growth of the small scale sector has been very 
uneven over time. Measured by employment, the small scale sector as a whole 
grew more rapidly in both relative and absolute terms over the 1970s compared 
with more modest growth in the 1980s. This pattern of growth is at odds with the 
general evolution of the economy generally, which tended to stagnate in the 
1970s, and registered much more buoyant growth in the 1980s. A disaggregation 
of the small scale sector suggest that it was those branches of small industry 
related to the rural and agricultural economy that grew most rapidly in the 1970s, 
while the metals and engineering branches grew relatively slowly, presumably 
reflecting the slower growth of the industrial economy over that period. By 
contrast there is some evidence that the latter grew more rapidly in the 1980s as 
the industrial economy expanded. While the limited data do not allow any firm 
conclusions to be drawn, it does appear that the growth of the small scale sector 
has been more strongly conditioned by the development of the economy generally 
than by the specific government policies towards the small scale sector. If the 
small industry policy has had an influence, it may well have been perverse. There 
is some evidence that the slowdown in employment growth in the 1980s may be 
explained by greater capital intensity, a trend which may itself have been 
encouraged inadvertently by government policy. One of the remarkable features 
of that policy is that the government has made cheap credit available for small 
entrepreneurs to purchase plant and machinery, but there has been no attempt to 
tie the provision of credit to the creation of employment. The result of that lacuna 
may well have been to encourage greater capital intensity at the expense of 
employment creation.
2. Regional balance
A second aim behind the small industry policy was founded on the belief that 
promoting the growth of the small scale sector would help to alleviate 
geographical imbalances in the economy. It has been asserted by successive
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governments that the policy would help to overcome inter-regional and intra- 
regional disparities, by creating employment opportunities in ’backward' areas and 
states , and in rural areas. The theoretical and empirical basis for such arguments 
is very weak (Chapter 7). Analysis of data for the major states shows that in both 
1961 and 1981, there is a strong and positive relationship between employment in 
the small scale sector, and levels of urbanisation; indeed the relationship became 
stronger over that period. Far from alleviating regional disparities, there seems to 
have been a process of increasing concentration in the more developed and 
urbanised states, notably Maharashtra, West Bengal  ^ Tamil Nadu, and 
Haryana/Punjab whose share of total employment in the small scale manufacturing 
sector increased over the period 1961-1981. What this seems to reflect is a 
process of agglomeration, in which small firms proliferate in major urban centres 
which afford significant external economies to small firms. At a smaller scale, 
analysis of District-level data for the state of Tamil Nadu demonstrated a similar 
clear relationship between the level of small industry employment and level of 
urbanisation. Between 1961 and 1981, four districts gained more than half the 
increase in employment, and those Districts included two of the major urbanised 
areas, Madras/Chingleput, and Coimbatore. While there was some evidence for 
an increase in employment in rural areas, there is little support for the notion that 
promoting small scale industry will contribute to rural development. Indeed, it is 
much more likely that rural industrialisation is a consequence rather than a 
stimulus to rural development. Overall, the conclusion to be drawn from this 
analysis is that the claim that promoting small scale industry will lead to a more 
balanced spatial economy is at best misleading, based more on wishful thinking 
than on a realistic assessment of the prospects.
3. A self-sufficient and viable small scale sector
The third, though less noticed aim of the small industry policy was to create a 
self-sufficient and viable small scale manufacturing sector. In attempting to
284
evaluate how far that has been achieved, use has been made of the recent literature 
on industrial districts and industrial networks, discussed in Chapter 2. This body 
of work suggests that successful and dynamic small scale industrialisation depends 
in part on the geographical agglomeration of small firms; and secondly, and more 
crucially, on the creation of strong bonds of cooperation. The existence of strong 
collaborative relationships distinguishes the industrial networks of both Emilia 
Romagna and Japan from 'simple' geographical agglomerations of firms, and that 
difference in turn translates into the difference between dynamic growth in the 
former case, and stagnation in the latter. The principal characteristics of the 
Emilian model of the industrial district are:
* a geographical concentration of small and medium enterprises which 
exhibit specialisation by product or process
* linkages between enterprises based on both market and non-market 
exchanges of goods and information
* a well developed informal system of cooperation between enterprises as
shown by the existence of credit unions, joint buying and marketing 
organisations, and producers associations
* a network of public and private agencies which provide support for 
small enterprises
The Japanese form of the industrial network is characterised by:
* a geographical concentration of small and medium enterprises which 
exhibit specialisation by process or product
* linkages which are predominantly with large firms, based on quasi­
permanent, non-market exchange
* a high level of cooperation between small /medium enterprises and large 
firms, based on the reciprocal exchange of goods, information and 
personnel.
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Chapters 8-10 attempts to assess whether the agglomeration of small engineering 
firms in the city of Coimbatore represents an industrial network of either the 
Emilian or Japanese type - or indeed a composite of the two. In particular, the 
case study sought to examine the role of public policy in creating a self-sustaining 
process of small scale industrialisation. Arguably, an effective policy of support 
for small firms can provide a stimulus to cooperative partnerships by acting as a 
concrete example of what a cooperative partnership can achieve. As a model of 
cooperative effort, public policy might then encourage further cooperative 
partnerships between small firms and other public and private agencies, including 
firms in the large scale sector; and between small firms themselves. In this way, the 
government's policy towards small firms operating through its local support 
agencies can act as a catalyst, helping to create a successful and dynamic small 
firm sector.
In their account of state intervention in Chile, Humphrey and Schmitz suggest that 
successful promotion of networking depends on (Humphrey and Schmitz 1996: 
1863-1865)
• delivering high quality services which directly address the needs of
small firms
• improving the take-up of services by working closely with small firms
• coordinating with other service providers in the public and private
sector, such as banks, training institutes, suppliers
• promoting cooperation among small firms through encouraging group
activities
Judged on those criteria, the support services provided by the Government of 
India through the District Industries Centre and the Small Industries Service 
Institute in Coimbatore are deficient. As shown in Chapter 10, the support 
services, although impressive on paper, suffer from a variety of shortcomings:
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• the quality of the services provided is poor, particularly in respect of 
marketing and technical information, and this is related to the limited 
resources and the lack of skilled personnel with a sufficient knowledge 
of the range of local industries
• the take up of services among the sample of engineering units was very 
low; only one in five units had made use of the DIC's services, and one 
in seven had used the services provided by SISI.
• while the DIC does coordinate with banks and the state financial 
institutions, there is little coordination with other public and private 
service providers such as educational and training institutions, suppliers, 
or local large firms
• a proactive approach to supporting local small firms through extension 
visits does not appear to be programmed into the work of government 
agencies.
In sum, the results from a sample of small engineering firms in Coimbatore, 
broadly confirmed by the NCAER's larger study of small firms in seventeen Indian 
cities, indicate that the government's support system has not been at all successful 
in helping small firms to overcome their problems and difficulties (NCAER, 1993). 
At root, the support system seems to suffer two fatal handicaps, namely the lack 
of resources and the national system of priorities laid down for the local DICs in 
particular. National policy of having an Industries Centre in every District means 
that resources are spread very thinly across the whole country, and the 
effectiveness of the DICs, with their responsibilities for providing support to the 
range of small firms and village industries, is thereby severely limited. At the same 
time, that problem is compounded by a system of priorities for the DICs which 
emphasise the encouragement and registration of new firms and self-employment 
at the expense of support to already established firms.
If state action to provide effective and useful support to small firms has failed, 
there are promising examples of other forms of informal collective action in 
Coimbatore. Apart from its role as a pressure group, CODISSIA has developed a 
range of support services for its members. Among its more important
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achievements is a trade fair which acts both to promote demand for the products 
of local firms and provides an opportunity to acquire information about 
appropriate new technologies; while the setting up of the Small Industries Testing 
and Research Centre is an attempt to improve quality and reliability and so 
enhance the demand for small firm's products. A further important agency is the 
PSG Trust, whose educational work, supported by its income from its own 
production facilities, provides a training ground for small entrepreneurs, and 
makes its technical facilities available to small entrepreneurs. The PSG Polytechnic 
and the College of Technology provide much better facilities for their students, 
and for the local industrial community, and there is a more determined effort to 
build collaborative links with local industry and with CODISSIA than is evident 
among the state-run educational institutions.
There are then, in Coimbatore, some promising local experiments in collective and 
collaborative action, but their impact seems to be limited to relatively few small 
firms. Among the sample of small engineering firms, just over a third were 
members of CODISSIA, and none of the firms in the sample had taken advantage 
of the technical support facilities offered by the PSG Trust.
In terms of the characteristics of the Japanese and Italian industrial networks, we 
can say that some of the elements of those models are to be found among the 
sample of small engineering units in Coimbatore:
• there is a concentration of small units which specialise in producing
particular parts or in particular processes
• there is a pattern of tight local linkages between enterprises, and with local
suppliers and traders
• there are also linkages between some small firms, producing either
components or finished goods, and local large firms.
288
• there is also evidence of growth and accumulation, with a third of the sample
investing in additional plant and machinery, and just over half increasing 
their labour force
• there is evidence too of flexibility of production, with a third of the units
changing their output, towards items in demand from an emerging 
middle class, such as wet grinders and washing machines
There is in other words a degree of dynamism among the sample of small firms in 
Coimbatore - but that dynamism coexists with technological stagnation, lack of 
innovation in production methods and generally poor quality standards. In an 
important respect, Coimbatore's small scale engineering units stand in marked 
contrast to Italian and Japanese industrial networks, where technical innovation 
and high quality production are deemed to be essential elements in creating a 
viable and competitive small firm economy. More fundamentally, what appears to 
be lacking in Coimbatore is the cooperative ethos which is seen as the hallmark of 
both Italian and Japanese industrial networks. There seems to be little in the way 
of widespread cooperative effort or collective involvement. Indeed, among the 
generality of small engineering firms, the most remarkable feature is their 
continuing isolation. Neither public policy, nor the repeated interaction between 
firms within a relatively small area seem to have been able to overcome that 
particular problem, nor has spontaneous collective effort prevailed. While 
evidence of cooperation is limited, there is plentiful evidence of a basic lack of 
trust among small firms and those they deal with. Among the more important 
indicators of this are:
• the lack of an informal cooperative system as evidenced by the
absence of credit unions, joint buying and marketing organisations
• no evidence of forms of mutual help, such as the sharing of machinery and
orders among small firms
• the reluctance of large firms to subcontract because of their lack of
confidence in the technical competence and skills of small firms
• SITRA's insistence on monitoring the performance and output of
small firms who take up production of their machinery
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• consumers' preferences for large firm's branded products, reflecting a
lack of confidence in the quality and reliability of small firms
• lack of trust within small firms, as shown by the way that most
entrepreneurs feel it necessary to supervise production themselves
• suspicion of government and bureaucracy1
What this amounts to is that there is widespread suspicion, lack of confidence and 
mistrust among small entrepreneurs in Coimbatore. This mistrust is not of course 
absolute: we have already referred to involvement with CODISSIA but an 
interesting feature of that, apart from including a minority of small firms, is that 
CODISSIA's membership tends to be drawn from the larger small firms and from 
entrepreneurs with a higher level of educational attainment. Conversely, it is the 
small and tiny units which are least likely to be involved in collective efforts, and 
that may arise because the risks involved in cooperating with others are that much 
greater for small units with very slender resources to fall back on. Survival might 
therefore encourage a very conservative, and risk averse attitude, while larger and 
more well-established firms with a better resource base can afford to take risks by 
cooperating with others. While such an explanation may carry some weight, it is 
by no means the only explanation for the generally low level of trust and social 
solidarity that prevails among small firms. Holmstrom has suggested that, as in 
Japan and Italy, cultural factors may play a significant role. He notes that:
"In the past, at least, many Indian entrepreneurs .. have been notoriously 
suspicious of anyone outside (and sometimes inside) their own family, caste or 
religious community, and unwilling to share information" (Holmstrom 1993: 
M-85).
1 That there is such suspicion was evident in undertaking the survey in which this study was 
based. Many small entrepreneurs required some assurance that the information would not be 
divulged to the government1 before agreeing to participate.
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Chapter 8 discussed the relevance of caste as a factor in developing business 
relationships. That is, entrepreneurs, traders, and suppliers who share a common 
caste background may find it easier to trust each other and so may be more likely 
to collaborate than where people are drawn from different caste communities. 
Arguably, the greater the diversity of caste backgrounds, the greater the difficulty 
in creating relationships of trust. And certainly in the sample units in Coimbatore, 
there is diversity of caste community. Altogether ten different caste groups were 
represented, though two-thirds of the entrepreneurs for whom information was 
available belonged to the Gounder and Naidu communities. While caste may have 
some influence in business matters, just how much of an influence it wields is not 
at all clear. Caste as such appears throughout the analysis undertaken here to 
have little systematic relationship with other factors; there is no relationship 
between caste and whether firms have grown or not, nor with membership of 
CODISSIA, nor do mainly Naidu-owned large firms show caste preference in 
subcontracting work. As Holmstrom has recently remarked
"..it does not seem that membership of the same caste or religion or language 
group is automatically a foundation for trust, or that entrepreneurs will 
subcontract work to or share information with someone simply for this reason” 
(Holmstrom 1997 L-13).
If caste and caste exclusiveness are not the key to understanding the low level of 
trust to be found among small entrepreneurs, then an alternative explanation might 
lie in strong familism. Beteille has noted that accounts of Indian society and 
culture tend to be preoccupied with caste, to the exclusion of a consideration of 
the significance of the family (Beteille 1992). He argues that, in urban India 
particularly, the commitment to caste is in decline, while "the moral commitment 
of most Indians to the family remains very strong, and may perhaps be growing 
stronger" (Beteille 1992: 17). Business, and indeed politics, is often a family 
affair. Most of India's top private companies are family-based organisations 
(Piramal and Herdeck, 1986), as are many of the larger firms in Coimbatore, and
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even among the small firms in our sample engineering units, partnerships are 
invariably kin-based. It is the family to which most people feel a strong sense of 
moral obligation, so that trust tends to be exclusive to kin members, and is not 
readily extended to non-kin. As in Italy and in Japan, socio-cultural habits and 
values do play an influential role over forms of economic organisation, but 
compared with the high levels of social solidarity and trust found in the Third Italy 
and Japan and which underlie inter-firm cooperation, in Coimbatore there is 
evidence of lack of trust and limited social solidarity which has inhibited 
cooperation and collaboration. A minority of small firms appears to have been 
able to embark on forms of collective and collaborative action through 
CODISSIA, implying that socio-cultural values are far from determining. But the 
generality of small firms remain relatively isolated units within a geographical 
agglomeration.
The broad conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the small scale industry 
policy that has operated in India for the last four decades has been of questionable 
value. Based as it was on highly dubious assumptions about labour intensity and 
the suitability of small industry for dispersal into backward and rural areas, the 
policy has been wasteful of public funds as evidenced by underused industrial 
estates and indiscriminate subsidies. The failure to tie financial assistance to 
employment creation is one of the more glaring instances of the counterproductive 
nature of policy. In addition, the government's support services for small firms 
have fallen far short of providing useful and effective help to small firms, so that 
policy has not contributed, at least in Coimbatore2, to creating a self-sustaining 
and dynamic process of small scale industrialisation. That failure is compounded 
by the evident lack of trust and the mutual suspicion with which small 
entrepreneurs regard each other.
2 And on the basis of the NCAER study, this seems to apply more generally across India 
(NCAER, 1993
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On a more general level, promoting small scale industries is not a panacea that 
will solve all the problems of Third World countries, but it can make a 
contribution to the urgent need to create employment opportunities and to raising 
living standards, and the literature on industrial districts offers insights into the 
basis of a programme of sustainable small scale industrialisation. But that literature 
has limitations.
Firstly, it tends to be preoccupied with the local, at the expense of considering 
how the local is conditioned by national policies. As Gertler suggests, studies of 
developed country industrial agglomerations have been characterised by 
"excessive localism" (Gertler 1992:274). Such studies rarely consider how 
national economic policy, or national educational and training systems impinge on 
the development and functioning of local agglomerations. In the case of India, the 
view that national policies are unimportant to the functioning of the small scale 
sector is untenable. For the past four decades, India has pursued an inward- 
looking strategy of development which has insulated and protected Indian industry 
in general from international competition. The creation of a protected market has, 
on the credit side, been a significant factor in the growth of the small scale sector, 
but, on the debit side, it has contributed to the lack of technological dynamism and 
poor quality standards of industry. At the same time, national and state 
educational and training policies have tended to sacrifice mass education in 
general, and technical education in particular, in the interests of expanding 
opportunities for an elite, with the result that there are both shortages of skilled 
labour, and especially of trained labour, as a significant proportion of firms in 
Coimbatore reported, and this too contributes to low productivity and poor 
standards of production. National policies, then, create the environment in which 
small firms in cities like Coimbatore operate. The industrial district literature 
tends to avoid discussion of such macro-issues, in favour of examining the local
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response of small firms, and how small firms can collectively attempt to overcome 
the difficulties they face - or not, as in the case of Coimbatore. The point to 
emphasise here, is that national policies and priorities have been and continue to 
be extremely influential in determining the development and the major 
characteristics of the small firm sector, and far more so than the small industry 
policy.
Secondly, the literature has afforded only very generalised insights into how 
agglomerations of small firms, such as that in Coimbatore, can be transformed into 
successful industrial networks. The dominant model emphasises the importance of 
trust, cooperation, and of locally accountable support systems geared to the 
particular needs and requirements of local industry. What the model has generally 
failed to do, is to provide answers to the question of whether an agglomeration of 
small firms can be successfully transformed into an industrial network and if so, 
how. Indeed some commentators seem to deny that such a transformation can be 
effected at all, because of the way that industrial networks are embedded within 
particular (local or national) social structures that encourage the habits and 
practices of trust and cooperation. That being so, "the particular local 
characteristics of various success stories (which) cannot be transferred to other 
places” (Hadjimichalis and Papamichos 1990: 182) This emphasis on the unique 
experience of particular localities contrasts with the greater optimism about the 
replicability of the industrial network shown in the recent work of Humphrey and 
Schmitz (Humphrey and Schmitz 1996). They provide some limited support for 
the contrary view, that public policy can be effective in encouraging closer inter- 
firm cooperation, even where the initial conditions of mistrust and suspicion are 
unfavourable. Indeed, arguably it is precisely when low levels of trust have 
deterred spontaneous cooperation that there is the greatest need for skilful 
intervention.
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For public policy to be effective in this regard, Humphrey and Schmitz indicate 
that policy must be proactive, locally focused on small groups of firms, and based 
around personnel with advanced technical and coordinating skills (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 1996: 1870-1872). Their findings do seem to have important implications 
for the design of small industry policies. What they seem to imply is that 
promoting successful and self-sustaining small industries is not to be achieved 
simply through tax breaks, cheap credit and industrial estates, which tend to be 
the common denominator of most government policies. Policies need to be 
sensitive above all to the objective of building co-operation between individual 
enterprises. Government support should be viewed not as an end in itself, but 
primarily as a means to encouraging (closer) networking, and this is best done 
where agencies work together with small firms at the local level, establishing 
themselves as credible agencies and able to demonstrate the benefits of 
cooperation. As far as India is concerned, such an approach would require a very 
considerable redesign of the small industry policy, both in terms of its aims and its 
organisation. In particular, the current policy has, as argued above, had little 
impact on the overall growth of the small industry sector, while the aim of using 
the small industry sector to promote regional balance is essentially misguided. 
The third aim of the original policy - that of creating a viable and self-supporting 
sector - has largely been ignored, but is precisely the goal that, in an era of 
liberalisation, requires much greater emphasis, and with it a rethinking of policy 
and priorities.
The inability of DICs in India to provide effective support to small firms arises 
from the blanket policy of locating an Industries Centre in every District, with the 
inevitable result that resources are spread thinly across the whole country, and 
individual DICs are unable to offer the quality of services that would make them 
useful and credible agencies. And that problem is compounded by the diversity of 
responsibilities - for the whole range of small scale industries, as well as village
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and handicraft industries - placed on the DICs, and by the tendency to focus on 
new start-ups, rather than aiding established firms. Improving the effectiveness of 
the government's support services, and of the small industry policy, would seem to 
require a shift away from a centralised and universalistic policy, towards one that 
recognises the fact of geographical agglomeration, encourages greater 
geographical selectivity, so that more resources can be concentrated on those 
localities with sectoral agglomerations of small firms, and directs those resources 
more clearly towards supporting firms in a more proactive fashion. Such changes 
in national policies and priorities (including education and training policies) may 
go some way towards improving the effectiveness and credibility of public policy, 
but it leaves unresolved the question of how and by whom such changes are to be 
brought about. The small industry policy has been in place in India for some four 
decades, and redesigning the policy will come up against bureaucratic inertia and 
political opposition. As Dreze and Sen remark, India may be characterised as 
suffering from too much government interference in economic matters, but that 
criticism should not mask the reality that there is also
"... insufficient and ineffective government activity in many fields.. This inertia 
contributes to the persistence of widespread deprivation, economic stagnation 
and social inequality" (Dreze and Sen 1995 : 203).
The real difficulty is precisely that of how to improve the effectiveness of 
government, to overcome the bureaucratic inertia and the political (and in the case 
of educational reform, class-based) opposition to change so that services are 
delivered in a more effective and focused manner. The literature on industrial 
districts ignores such issues, and assumes that there is a functioning local/regional 
system of government capable, perhaps with minor modifications, of delivering 
services. Such an assumption is unwarranted as far as many countries in the Third 
World are concerned. Dreze and Sen suggest that improving the effectiveness of 
government in India will come about only as a result of popular pressure (Dreze
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and Sen 1995: chapter 8). But as far as small industry is concerned, there is a 
clear dilemma in that while more effective and decentralised government may help 
to encourage greater cooperation, and thus contribute to a more dynamic and self- 
sustaining process of small scale industrialisation, the largely isolated and 
disorganised small scale sector lacks the means of exerting organised political 
pressure to bring about those changes. And change does seem to be all the more 
necessary in the new context of a liberalising economy, which, albeit haltingly, is 
exposing small firms in India to growing international competition.
To date, the small industry policy has not been noticeably successful in meeting 
the aims set for it. Both the financial and opportunity costs of continuing with it in 
its present form are high. The literature on industrial networks is beginning to 
indicate how public policy can help to create a viable and self-sustaining small firm 
sector, and India could well learn from that literature. Slavish imitation may be a 
bad thing, but there is always room to learn from others, a process which might 
give India's small scale industry policy a much needed new focus and a new sense 
of purpose and direction.
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A p p e n d ix  1 
Interview Schedule
1. What is the name of the owner of this unit?
2. Address
3. Is this unit owned
by a single proprietor 
a partnership 
a cooperative 
private company
4. Is this unit registered
with the Factoiy Inspectorate 
as a small scale industry with the District Industries Centre 
not registered at all
5. Was this unit established, bought or inherited by the present owner(s)? Established
Acquired
Inherited
6. Do you own any other units? Where?
7. If established by the present owner, why did you locate the unit here?
Founder lives here 
Nearness to large units 
Other small units in the locality 
Other factors
8. Before founding/taking over this unit, was the owner
Previously employed 
Self employed 
Unemployed 
At school/college
9. What educational qualifications does the owner have?
Secondary School leaving certificate 
Industrial Training Institute certificate 
Degree/diploma 
None
10. How many people regularly work in this unit ?
11. How many people occasionally work in this unit ?
12. How many of the people working here are members of the owner's family?
13. How many of the people working here are
skilled workers
unskilled
trainees
14. Since starting this unit, has the number of people working here increased
decreased 
stayed the same
Date
Date
Date
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15. How many of the people working in this unit have
Secondary School leaving cerificate 
Industrial Training Institute certificate 
Degree/diploma 
None of the above
16. Where do the people working in this unit live (district/village name)?
17. Please describe what you produce in this unit
18. What did you produce when you originally started this unit?
19. Does the owner of the unit take part in making these products? Yes/No
20. What raw materials do you use in this unit?
21. Who supplies you with those raw materials? Name of supplier Location of supplier
22. What machinery did you have when you first started up in this unit ?
Machinery with power Machinery without power
23. What machines do you use here now?
Machinery with power Machinery without power
24. What do you estimate is the value of the tools and machinery you use?
25. What do you estimate is the value of sales in the last month?
26. Do you produce your own designs for your products
designs supplied by others
27. Have you changed your designs since starting this unit? Yes/No
28. Who are your main customers? Are they mainly
other small manufacturing units 
large units 
Merchants/traders 
open market
29. What proportion of your business is conducted
locally, within Coimbatore
within Tamilnadu, but outside Coimbatore 
outside Tamilnadu
30. Do you have customers that you regularly work for? Yes/No Location
31. Do you have any contact with large units? Yes/No
If YES what is the location of the unit(s)
Do large units supply you with
- raw materials 
-job work
- product design and development 
- market research
- financial assistance
319
32. Have you borrowed money
From relatives/friends 
from a money lender 
from a bank
from government agency
33. For what reasons have you borrowed money?
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No
If YES, what was the purpose of your contact?
Would you say that these organisations are 
a very useful source of help 
a useful source of help 
not at all useful
What are the main problems facing your business ?
34. Do you have any contact with Chamber of Commerce Yes/No
Small Scale Industries Association Yes/No
Productivity Council Yes/No
Engineering Manufacturers Asociation Yes/No
Institute of Engineers Yes/No
35. Would you say that as far as your business is concerned, such contacts are
very important important not important
36. Have you had contact with Small Industries Service Institute
SIDCO - the State Industries Development Corp 
District Industries Centre
What other problems do you face?
